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Chapter I 
THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: "AS IT WAS 
IN THE BEGINNING .. II 
For though ours is a godless age, it is the very 
opposite of irreligious. The true believer is 
everywhere on the march, and both by converting 
and antagonizing he is shaping the world in his 
own image. And whether we are to line up with him 
or against him, it is well that we should know 
all we can concerning his nature and potentialities. 1 
Introduction 
Throughout his long existence man has sought to explain 
his world and his place in it. He has been perplexed 
since the days of ancient Greece by the notion of permanence 
and change. In the Twentieth century, the situation is no 
different. Institutions which have lasted unchanged for 
centuries have fallen to the onslaught of the new; buildings 
created as an expression of mankind and of his hopes have 
been demolished only to be replaced by bronze and glass 
representations of "progress." There is, in man, this 
unfathomable and unquenchable dichotomy -- the appeal of 
tradition and the stable counteracted by the novelty of 
the new and the changing. The German-born philosopher, 
Ernst Cassirer, addressed this in his book, An Essay on Man: 
We may speak of a tension between stabilization and 
evolution, between a tendency that leads to fixed 
and stable forms of life and another tendency to 
break up this rigid scheme. Man is torn between these 
two tendencies, one of which seeks to preserve old 
forms whereas the other strives to produce new ones. 
There is a ceaseless struggle between tradition and 
innovation, between reproductive and creative forces.2 
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The only permanence, beyond the cosmos, that man may 
ever experience is that of change. And, as if to demonstrate 
the ceaselessness of change, a new philosophy developed 
during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries 
a philosophy predicated upon a "new key" in understanding. 
man. It is, writes Susanne Langer, "not higher sensitivity, 
not longer memory or even quicker association [that] sets man 
so far above other animals that he can regard them as denizens 
of a lower world: no, it is the power of using symbols --
the power of speech -- that makes him lord of the earth. 113 
And it is Cassirer's development of symbols, as a 
symbolic form, that provides the permanence and change for 
man's understanding of himself. For Cassirer, the symbol 
is the product of an interaction between the sensuous -- the 
sensory, physical world -- and the sense in the terms of 
meaning, the significance, which the interaction has to the 
intellect. The sensory data, the perception, interacts 
with the spirit, the intuition, and produces a form of 
hyper-image which is made to represent the whole of the 
experience. And this representative of the whole experience, 
including the way of acting toward it, is the symbol. 
The question of being and knowledge perplexed philosophers 
for eons; but for Cassirer, the "reality", the "being", becomes 
subordinate to the symbolic forms through which the reality 
is experienced: 
. myth, art, language and science appear as 
symbols; not in the sense of mere figures which 
refer to some given reality by means of suggestion 
and allegorical renderings, but in the sense of 
forces each of which produces and posits a world 
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of its own. In these realms the spirit exhibits 
itself in that inwardly determined dialectic by 
virtue of which alone there is any reality, any 
o~ganized and definite Being at all. Thus, the 
special symbolic forms are not imitations, but 
organs of reality, since it is solely by their 
agency that anything real becomes an object of 
intellectual apprehension, and as such is made 
visible to us.lJ 
There may be a physical reality "out there", but it can 
only be known through man's symbolic forms. It is the forms 
which provide the permanence; but it is the changing of 
the forms and the inherent dialectic within them that produces 
the change. 
The notion of social order is no different. Cassirer 
maintains that there are tensions among myth which are 
essentially conservative and defend the old order; yet at 
the same time there is some change, for the original religion 
as myth must be viewed -- is not present in the entelechial 
interpretation of religion. There is change and movement 
toward more encompassing doctrines of the mythic approach. 
The same is true of the social order. A sociologist, Anthony 
Oberschall, writes that: 
Conflict overcomes the basically conservative 
tendencies in the social order; it prevents the 
ossification of institutions and builds pressures 
for responsiveness and innovation. During 
mobilization and confrontation, new leaders, 
organizations, ideas, and programs emerge and 
grow ••.. so far in history, change has been 
seldom if ever brought about by implementing a 
conscious, carefully thought out plan in which the 
consequences and complex ramifications of social 
action are correctly spelled out in advance and 
compensating corrections and modification are 
incorporated into the design. Change occurs rather 
as a response to cumulative pressures and social 
forces whose result benefits some groups while it 
creates misery and hardship for others. After a 
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period of social conflict, the imbalances are 
redressed somewhat, but newer processes of change, 
equally poorly designed, are initiated and call forth 
yet further conflicts.5 
It is this notion of society in conflict which makes the 
study of social movements important. None can deny the 
impact of social movements upon the lives of the people• 
who inhabit a given society which has experienced a 
collective movement for change. The values which guide pur 
existence were shaped by a religious movement centuries ago; 
the institutions which govern us are the products of a 
movement against the policies of an English King; and the 
policies which consume tremendous amounts of national 
resources are designed to combat the fulfillment of a 
movement which gained its expression through Marx, Lenin, 
and others. The importance of social movements which 
succeed cannot be denied; and the very success of some 
provides a rationale for others to attempt to change the 
world in which they, and we, live. 
This is not to say that social movements are entities 
which can be easily defined; instead, there "are challenging, 
often daunting, empirical and methodological problems: identi-
fying the political goals, principles or ideologies predomin-
ant in a given movement at a given time; deciding which 
leaders and ideas are in control •. "6 But we cannot 
permit difficulties such as these to obstruct man in his 
search for learning and understanding. There is something 
in man's nature which demands that he seek understanding; 
it is, in fact, this constant search which provides the 
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ultimate meaning for the existence of Cassirer's func-
tional forms of culture. Man must seek to understand 
himself; and he can only do so through his artifacts as 
they are symbolically interpreted. 
This means that, given the existence of different 
symbolic forms, there will also be different methods of 
perspectives of attempting to understand. And, we will 
agree with Julien Freund that "No one can say a priori that 
some one procedure per se is better than another; everything 
depends on the scientist's [we would prefer "critic's"] 
perspicacity, the aim of his research and his skill in 
applying the particular procedure, so that its validity 
can be determined only retrospectively, in the light of the 
results obtained." 7 There is no universal method of study, 
for it depends upon the act to be studied and the perspective 
of the critic. Attempts to understand the phenomenon of 
social movements have been made from the perspectives of the 
sociologist, the psychologist, the psychoanalyst and many 
others. But, recently, embodying the principle of symbol 
of the new key -- a rhetorical approach to movements has 
also arisen. The pervasiveness of this new key is all-encom-
passing. It is not only the philosopher who is enamored 
by it; but the sociologist also recognizes its importance. 
Robert A. Nisbet writes: 
It is language, spoken and written, above any other 
symbolic element that makes human culture possible. 
And it is language alone that makes possible the 
development of the human mind, the sense of self, the 
consciousness of personal identity, and that very 
fundamental capacity, unique in mankind, of being able 
to adopt one or more of the social roles that confront 
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each newborn infant in human society. Verbal language 
is by far the most important of all forms of symbolic 
communication, but it not the only form. Music, 
painting, sculpture, and physical mannerisms such as 
the raising of an eyebrow . are also modes of 
symbolic interaction.8 
Cassirer posits that there are certain forms of culture 
and that each of these may receive greater emphasis. Every 
function of the human spirit embodies a creative, formative 
power; and each of these functions (art, myth, language, 
science, and history) "creates its own symbolic forms which, 
if not similar to the intellectual symbols, enjoy equal 
rank as products of the human spirit. None of these forms 
can be reduced to, or derived from, the others; each of 
them designates a particular approach, in which and through 
which it constitutes its own aspect of 'reality. 1119 Each 
of them provides, as it were, an occupational psychosis or. 
a terministic screen; and the importance of this perspective 
cannot be overemphasized in its impact upon man. However, 
the inherent difficulty with each of these as a form of 
knowing is that each comes to believe in its own preeminence. 
The artist argues that his reality is "more real" than the 
scientist's, who in turn hypothesizes that his is more valid 
than the theologian's. What Cassirer hoped to achieve was a 
more universal approach, which could encompass each the 
different perspectives and the dialectical tensions between 
.:.1nd with in tlH.'m. llP Cound l t in the symboJ Jc rorrns: 
. a standpoint which would make it possible to 
encompass the whole of them in one view, which would 
seek to penetrate nothing other than the purely 
innanent relation of all these forms to one anotherv 
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and not their relation to any external "transcendent" 
being or principle. Then we could have a systematic 
philosophy of human culture in which each particular 
form would take its meaning solely from the place 
in which it stands, a system in which the content 
and significance of each form would be characterized 
by the richness and specific quality of the relations 
and concatenations in which it stands with other 
spiritual energies and ultimately with totality.lo 
Thus, the nature of the symbolic forms is such that it is 
only through the interrelations of the others individually 
that the entirety, or the totality, of culture can be 
perceived and understood. 
We would submit that the situation with social movements 
is analogous. It is not through a purely sociological, nor 
through a purely psychological-psychoanalytic approach that 
social movements are able to be understood. Even, we would 
submit,, it is not purely through rhetoric or only "symbolic" 
means that movements reveal their secrets. It is, rather, 
only through a combination, a series of relations between 
and among them, that we are capable of examining social 
movements productively. It is, however, through language 
or, in a somewhat broader sense, through rhetoric as purposive 
symbolism -- that we are able to draw these diverse elements 
together. Movements change man's life; and he must make 
choices relative to them. For this reason, he must under-
stand them; and it is through the interpenetration of social, 
psychological-psychoanalytic and rhetorical perspectives 
that man can best accomplish this. It is this interrelation-
ship and the role of the rhetorical critic toward it that 
we shall pursue in the following pages. 
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Resources for the Study 
In conducting this inquiry into a perspective of 
rhetorical criticism of social movements, reliance will 
rest primarily upon secondary sources. Disciplinary 
Journals, books and convention papers in the fields of 
sociology, psychology, psychoanalysis and rhetoric and 
rhetorical criticism will be examined. Such materials 
will cover a wide temporal range with emphasis given to 
early and seminal writings, to major theoretical approaches 
and to later refinements and modifications. 
Limitations of the Study 
No study of an area as broad as the role of rhetori-
cal criticism and social movements can be covered adequately 
in one small effort. In this study we make an attempt 
only to inquire into the broad nature of movements as 
viewed from the sociological and psychological-psychoanalytic 
perspectives. In each instance, the role and importance of 
rhetoric is examined. Such a study, however, can neither 
list nor critically examine all approaches from each of the 
disciplines considered. We cannot fully develop, for 
example, the controversy surrounding Freudian psychonalysis. 
All we can do is briefly present the major assumptions and 
theoretical statements and consider the major modifications 
of them. It is these and the influence upon the movement 
and its rhetoric that we shall examine. Additionally, we 
cannot fully explore any particular movement nor any combin-
ation in the hopes of proving the,efficacy of our 
interpretation of a theoretical approach to the study 
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of social movemePts. To do so would be to expand the bounds 
of this study beyond all reasonable limits. Rather, we shall 
seek to consider some major controversies in the criticism 
of movements and to reflect briefly upon them as they affect 
the rhetorical critic. We shall, then, assume a position . 
and argue for it. It must be uPderstood that this method may 
not necessarily be productive for each and every movement 
study; it is, rather, a tentative consideration of a unification 
of the "forms" of roovements so that we may understand them in 
their entirety. 
Organization of the Study 
The organization of this effort will proceed from a 
general consideration of the nature of social movements to 
a position stateroent regarding the overall perspective, and 
the necessity of such, and the role of the rhetorical critic 
and his responsibilities toward this phenoroenon. 
I. The Fhetoric of Social Movements: nAs It Was in 
the Beginning .•.. 11 This chapter considers a broad 
philosophical copsideration of the concept of man's capacity 
and means of knowing; of the importance of social movements 
and of details of the study necessary for placing it in 
perspective. 
II. The Nature of Social Movements. This chapter 
reviews the inportance of socjal movements to the societies 
in which they occur and the iroplications for mankind. 
Historical and philosophical foundations of the study of 
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movements are provided which indicate the development of 
studies of movements from the French Revolution to the 
present and of the impact upon movements of differing 
schools of philosophical thought. Social movements are 
then defined from a sociological perspective; and the 
implications of sociological, psychological and rhetorical 
approaches to the study of movements are presented. 
Finally, the characteristics of movements -- source of 
strain, ideology, membership, leadership, organization and 
social control -- are considered. 
III. Rhetoric, Criticism, and Social Movements. This 
chapter advances a definition of rhetoric and contrasts more 
traditional conceptualizations of the term with that advanced 
in this study. The development of rhetorical criticism 
and the duties and responsibilities of the critic are 
briefly examined; and the application of these to social 
movements as exemplified in recent publications is considered. 
IV. Rhetoric and the Social Aspects of Movements. The 
application of traditional and modifi sociological thought 
to the study of social movements is pursued in this chapter. 
General approaches to social change as advanced by four 
maJor sociological theories are considered; and an application 
of the characteristics of movements and the rhetorical 
implications of such characteristics are also presented. 
V. Rhetoric and the Psychological-Psychoanalytic Aspects 
of Movements .. In this chapter, the "traditional" view of 
movements is presented which considers such manifestations 
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popular action as "deviant" and "abnormal." After arguing 
against such a perspective, the investigation of psychological 
constructs and the application of them to the study of movements 
is made. Following this, the psychoanalytic approach is 
considered relying largely upon Sigmund Freud's theories and 
modifications of them. Again, as in the chapter preceding, 
the integrative function of rhetoric as a centripedal force 
is considered . 
VI. II . And So Shall It Be in the End." This 
concluding chapter attempts to draw the diverse threads of 
this study together. The study of social movements is viewed 
from the perspective that only by the "interpenetration" of 
the various individual approaches can we attempt to fully 
reveal the implications of movements. The final section of 
this study considers the responsibility of the rhetorical 
critic as a member of the larger society of mankind. He is 
not merely operating in the role of the critic, but is bound 
by the larger, and more important role of a participant in 
the human experience. 
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Chapter II 
THE NATURE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
For three hundred years, the Church of England has 
had in its litany this supplication: 'From famine, 
from battle and murder and from sudden death, from 
all seditions, privy conspiracy and rebellion, Good 
Lord deliver us.•l 
Introduction 
During the hectic decade of the 1960's, America 
broadcast the image of a nation in danger of being torn 
asunder by internal dissension. Protest, demonstration 
and riot became commonplace as various groups attempted 
to influence or alter the policy decisions of various 
institutionalized authorities -- be they universities, 
businesses or governments. More than isolated violent 
expressions of sentiment, however, Paul Wilkinson notes 
that these groups identified themselves as participants 
in "the Movement," and as presenting demands for Justice, 
equality and humanity: 
Parties and groups of every ideological persuasion 
claim proudly to be part of a national or international 
'movement', claim to have the support of their own 
youth movements, women's movements, labour movements, 
peasant movements. In recent years among student 
protesters, peace campaigners, anti-Vietnam War 
groups and civil rights crusade, the rhetoric of 
'moyement' has maintained its irresistible and 
universal appeal.2 
As students of rhetoric, we must first gain some insight 
into the nature of social movements before we can begin to 
understand this "irresistible and universal appeal." 
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It is this framework -- within which we shall seek a more 
detailed investigation -- which shall be examined in this 
chapter. 
The Function of Social Movements 
Most individuals probably maintain negative predispositions 
toward social movements. While admitting that an occasional 
movement will provide some benefit, one easily envisions some 
undisciplined mob intent on destroying the stability and 
institutions of society. Just as many no longer consider 
the American Revolution (euphemistically entitled the War of 
Independence) as falling within the purview of revolution, so 
too do many consider "good" social movements as distinct 
from the genre of social movement. And yet, despite these 
preconceptions and the fears of the Church of England 
social conflict and social movements perform valuable 
services to society. An early sociologist, George Simmel, 
wrote that "conflict is a form of socialization."3 The 
conclusion from such analysis is that no group, nor any 
society, can function without disharmony for it would then 
be without incentive to change or even to maintain itself. 
Lewis Coser is quite precise when he states, "Groups require 
disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as 
association; and conflicts within them are by no means 
altogether disruptive factors. Group formation is the result 
of both types of processes. 11 4 Such an analysis does not 
posit that all change, especially continual or drastic change, 
is of itself beneficial for a given society at a given time. 
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What it does contend is that there are times and situations 
in which values and norms must change if society is to 
survive. It is during such times as these, and when the 
majority of society either refuses to recognize the 
necessity for change or else refuses to make change of trre 
magnitude required, that adjustments must be achieved by 
"concerted action of other groups -- in other words, by a 
social movement .. 11 5 
The primary thrust of any social movement is a change 
of some sort, of varying degrees of magnitude and intensity, 
in the prevailing social order. While by no means an exhaustive 
listing, social movements may perform several functions in 
society: movements may change the entire nature of the 
society -- as in the Russian Revolution of 1917; "movements 
can frequently change the ideology of a society without 
greatly affecting the substructure or even the social 
structure 11 6 -- e.g., the impact of the Women's Christian 
Temporance Union on American society during the early part 
of the twentieth.century resulting in the passage of 
Prohibition; movements may change institutions "associated 
with but not central to the class structure" -- for example, 
working conditions and welfare reforms.7 Additional functions 
of movements may be less obvious but no less important: the 
contribution to the formation of public opinion by bringing 
issues to the fore of public discussion; and by providing 
training for potential leaders in both public and private 
institutions of society. 8 This again is not to maintain that 
- 16 -
all social movement is beneficial (for as Eric Hoffer has 
written, "No mass movement, however sublime its faith and 
worthy its purpose, can be good if its active phase is overlong, 
and, particularly, if it is continued after the movement is 
in undisputed possession of power. 11 ) 9 , but it is to emphasize 
that such movements need not be detrimental and may, in fact, 
be necessary for the very survival of society. 
The Study of Social Movements: Historical Foundations 
As with the study of any phenomenon, that of social 
movements has a discernible and progressive tradition. The 
violent and dramatic events of the French Revolution stirred 
inquiries into the nature of collective behavior. Continental 
scholars attempted to discover how and why these occurrences 
were created and published studies of crowd behavior. Across 
the Channel William Cobbett commented on the disorders among 
English poor in 1812: "'This is the circumstance that will 
most puzzle the ministry. They can find no agitators. It 
is a movement of the peoples' own. 11110 At this point the 
primary emphasis was upon collective behavior. The pioneer 
effort to establish a scientific conceptualization of social 
movements and to develop a theory of social change was made 
by the German Lorenz von Stein writing his History of the 
Social Movement in France, 1789-1850, first published in 
1850. Wilkinson maintains that "instead of surveying the 
French Revolution and its aftermath from the point of view of 
changes in governmental structure or personnel, Stein stressed 
its significance as a series of endeavors to create a new 
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society. 1111 It was in Stein's work that the original meaning 
of the term "social movement" emerged: "the movement of the 
new industrial working class, with its socialistic, communistic 
and anarchistic tendencies. 1112 From this conceptualization, 
social writers and commentators discussed the social move~ent. 
In somewhat the same line of analysis, Ferdinand Tonnies, 
another German, made the distinction between a social 
organization and a social collective. The former is a 
"corporate body which is pure artifact and which 'is never 
anything natural, neither can it be understood as a mere 
physical phenomenon' 11 ; 13 whereas social collectives are 
natural creations which display certain physical traits. 
In what was an important insight, Tonnies held that the substance 
of these social collectives was their "natural and psychological 
relationships." Tonnies further recognized that collectives 
were "consciously affirmed and willed. 11 14 
After Tonnies, other writers began to explore and to 
speculate about the nature of social collectives -- Durkheim, 
Marx, Weber, and so on. Social movements received occasional 
scholarly glances from the end of the nineteenth century 
until the mid-1930's. With the rise of Fascistic movements 
and their phenomenal successes in Japan, Italy and Germany, 
a new fascination developed in the rise and consequences of 
social movements. Studies of totalitarianism, especially 
Nazism, resulted in formulations that have often been applied 
to other, widely divergent movements. In recent years, 
scholars from various fields have branched out to examine a 
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variety of movements -- from vital to miniscule, from 
totalitarian to anarchistic. 
The Philosophical Foundations of Social Movements 
The rise of social movements is a relatively recent. 
occurrence -- being largely exhibited, at least until JUSt 
recently, only in Western cultures during the last two 
hundred years. The primary stimulus was the removal of 
divine perspective from the thought of eighteenth century 
man. Rudolf Heberle explains: 
Movements aiming consciously at a radically 
different social order, a 'change from the roots,' 
are possible only when the social order is seen 
not as a divine creation but as a work of man, 
subject to man's will. Movements of this kind 
are concommitant with the secularization of thought. 
This is why such movements have occurred in the 
West only since the eighteenth century and in the 
East quite recently as a consequence of cultural 
contact with the West. Earlier revolts and 
disturbances among the lower social strata typically 
aimed at improving their social position without 
attacking the social order in its foundations. 
Radical movements of earlier periods tended to 
assume the character of millenarian religious or 
quasi-religious sects.15 
Perhaps the foundations of a philosophic rationale for 
social movements can be found in Rousseau's contrat social. 
For, as Paul Wilkinson has written, " ... there is an 
implicit and appealing revolutionism underlying the whole 
conception of contrat social. 1116 Rousseau maintains that 
the "general will" remains hidden beneath the strains of the 
old regime; and that when it is identified and understood 
by the leaders of the revolutionary movement (the rise of 
the movement) such sentiment must be transported to the 
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throne of power (the revolutionary seizure of power). 
Concurrent with the rise to power, the counterrevolutionaries 
must be destroyed. Having seized power and eliminated 
social and political opposition, the revolutionary will 
commence the "creation of a revolutionary kind of man, and 
the final ushering in of the new millenium. 1117 The 
pervasiveness of Rousseau's doctrine of the social contract 
may be inferred from the wide-spread use made of the "right 
of revolution" and the 11 legitimate supremacy of the popular 
will" in 11 practically every secular, reformist or revolutionary 
ideology, and every Western politicized movement, in the 
past two hundred years. 11 18 
Not only did Rousseau provide a philosophic base for 
the existence and Justification of social movement as a 
revolutionary force, but in his description of the archetypal 
revolution, he provided what may have been a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Such an analysis provides the basis upon which many 
"natural history" approaches to social movement study rests. 
If Rousseau provided the philosophical rationale and 
justification for political and revolutionary movements, 
Karl Marx -- drawing heavily upon the philosophy of Hegel 
offered a simple explanation of social conditions to the 
emerging class of workers in Europe. Wilkinson explains 
the Marxian approach: 
The historical movement does not proceed from an 
entirely incomprehensible and random manner, but 
rather by a series of organic evolutionary stages. 
Each stage is ushered in by a fresh revolution in 
the modes and social relations of production which 
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can be causally explained as dialectic response 
to the changes in the real material conditions and 
class antagonism of the society. This pattern 
of response-reaction-response takes the form of 
thesis, (movement), antithesis, (counter-movement), 
and synthesis, (the fusion or reconciliation of 
thesis and antithesis) .19 
For the wage earner struggling with the capitalist who e~ploited 
his labor and coerced him to live in unsatisfactory conditions, 
the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engles offered a 
clear and attractive explanation of the past, present and 
future conditions of society. What was even better, the 
proletariat was to emerge on top because of the inherent 
contradictions within the capitalist system. II . the 
overthrow of the capitalist exploiting class, their ruling 
class ideology and their power structure, did not entail a 
retrogression in the technology or the loss of the social 
benefits of the capitalist method of production. 1120 
Relying largely upon these two philosophical approaches, 
Ralph Turner posited that there have existed two maJor themes 
of social movement during the past two hundred years: the 
liberal humanitarian tradition and the socialist. Each 
of these depends upon the provision of certain needs to 
the masses. In the first, the liberal humanitarian, movements 
were primarily concerned with guaranteeing political partici-
pation; in the second, the socialist, with providing the 
essential economic necessities. What is particularly interesting 
about Turner's position is his understanding of the ~heme-- ---
of contemporary and future social movements. The new rallying 
call is man's search for value: 
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a new revision is in the making and is increasingly 
giving direction to the disturbances of our own era. 
This new conception is reflected in a new obJect for 
indignation. Today, for the first time in history, 
it is common to see violent indignation expressed 
over the fact that people lack a sense of personal 
worth -- that they lack an inner peace of mind 
which comes from a sense of personal dignity or a 
clear sense of identity .... The idea that a man 
who does not feel worthy and who cannot find his 
proper place in life is to be pitied is an old 
one. The notion that he is indeed a victim of 
injustice is the new idea. The urgent demand that 
the institutions of our society be reformed, not 
primarily to grant man freedom of speech and thought, 
and not primarily to ensure him essential comforts, 
but to guarantee him a sense of personal worth is 
the new and recurrent theme in contemporary society. 21 
This new search for dignity, for worth, arises from the 
existentialist philosophers. "Existentialism focuses on 
the problem of man's alienation, on the problem of man's 
existence and the dilemma of his efforts to uncover a viable 
sense of self. 1122 
Whether one agrees with Turner or not, and probably 
no substantive evaluation can be made until movements have 
emerged, the philosophic foundations provide an additional 
means by which the student may "place" the social movement. 
A Definition of Social Movement 
Thus far, we have been discussing social movements and 
their study as if all were familiar with the term. To 
continue without attempting to pin down the phenomena which 
we are studying would be to commit a serious error. In 
preceding sections we have used the term to denote specific 
attempts at social change and large, more societal occurrences. 
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If we accept the admonition that "social movements are not 
particularly precise units of analysis, 1123 we may nevertheless 
recognize that the boundaries of that animal which we seek 
should be identified as clearly as possible. 
We have stated earlier that change is inevitable in -
virtually any society. We may now maintain that, very 
broadly, collective behavior is an important factor in this 
change. The very existence of collective behavior is 
probably not a sufficient condition for change to occur 
within a society or culture; but it may provide "the maJor 
vehicle of change when contact between diverse cultures or 
development within the culture supply novel values about 
which collective behavior can become focused. 1125 In the 
broadest sense of the term, Herbert Blumer defines collective 
behavior as: 
the behavior of two or more individuals who are 
acting together, or collectively. Each is under 
the influence of the other and fits his line of 
action to that other. Behavior is collective or 
concerted as opposed to a mere addition of the 
separate lines of individual activity.26 
A more formalized definition is provided by Neil Smelser --
collective behavior is "an institutionalized mobilization 
for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain 
on the basis of a generalized reconstitution of a component 
of action. 1127 
Within both these definitions are found the components 
of multi-inaividual action directed against some strain in 
concert with others sharing similar beliefs. Included as 
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examples of such behavior would be riots, mobs, fads, and 
social movements. A social movement, however, is not merely 
collective behavior even though there is varying interpretation 
as to just what it is. The following definitions will 
provide some insight to how social movements have been 
conceptualized: 
(1) As a mode of pluralistic behavior, it [social 
movement] belongs to a general class of social 
phenomena which includes mob actions, booms, 
crazes, panics, revolutions and so forth. As 
a sub-class, a social movement is circumscribed 
by pluralistic behavior functioning as an 
organized mass-effort directed toward a change 
of established folkways or institutions.28 
(2) A social movement occurs when a fairly large 
number of people band together in order to 
alter or supplant some portion of the existing 
culture or social order.29 
(3) ••. collective enterprises to establish a 
new order of life. They have their inception 
in a condition of unrest, and derive their 
motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction 
with the current form of life, and on the other 
from wishes and hopes for a new scheme of 
system of living.3D 
(4) .•. an attempt on the part of interest 
groups to chan~e some of the existing social 
practises [sicJ in a society, or to bring about 
a new way of life; ••• a widespread, but 
not consciously organized nor coordinated 
trend in social conduct or in the ways of 
thinking which seems to be developing in a 
certain direction.31 
(SJ ••. large-scale, widespr~ad, and continuing, 
elementary collective action in pursuit of an 
objective that affects and shapes the social 
order in some fundamental aspect.32 
(6) ••. a concerted and continued effort by a 
social group aimed at reaching a goal (or 
goals) common to its members. More specifically, 
the effort is directed at modifying, maintaining, 







... a purposive and collective attempt of a 
number of people to change individuals or 
societal institutions and structures. 34 
... a set of attitudes and self-conscious 
action on the part of a group of people directed 
toward change in the social structure and/or 
ideology of a society and carried on outside 
of ideologically legitimated channels or which. 
uses these channels in innovative ways.35 
. socially shared demands for change in some 
aspect of the social order. 3 6 
... emergent ideological realities given 
social significance during periods of a 
consciousness of dysfunction, which provide 
referents for mobilization to being about 
desired change within and/or of the social 
system. 37 
This listing of definitions indicates that although there 
is some broad, general agreement to what constitutes a social 
movement, there is not agreement concerning its most salient 
characteristics. What does seem to emerge from this composite 
is that social movements are a form of collective action 
directed toward some change in society -- be it institutional, 
customary, ideological or whatever -- which exists over time 
and arises out of some dissatisfaction with the present or 
some hope of the future. Another important consideration is 
that the social movement is comprised of a voluntary membership. 
It is ideology that provides both the enemy and the salvation 
which guides the movement along some path. 
With this conceptualization of a social movement, perhaps 
the boundaries may be more clearly drawn by stressing what~ 
social movement is not. First, it is not merely crowd action. 
The notion of duration eliminates from consideration such 
short-term, spontaneous outbursts of collective action as 
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riots, lynchings, demonstrations, etc. It is possible that 
such volatile crowd actions may compose a part of the 
movement or may even arise as a result of such actions (as 
"when the Jacobins made use of the Paris crowds, . , 
when the communards played on the grievances of the Paris. 
National Guard, or when the Bolsheviks helped to foment and 
unleash the frustration of demoralized Russian troops in 
the 1917 revolution"); 38 but it would be incorrect to conclude 
that such transitory collective action can masquerade as 
social movements. 
Second, social movement is not mass migration or fad. 
In mass migrations the motives for action remain entirely 
individual with no group consciousness whereas social movements 
involve volitional action on the part of the individual within 
the context of a group. Demographic movements (or mass 
movements) "are not synonymous with social movements. They 
do not involve attempts to change society; they are responses 
to external 'pushes' or 'pulls' and do not have an internal 
dynamic of ideology ... 1139 Thus, although the implications 
of mass or demographic movements for society may be great, 
they are not the same as social movements. 
A social movement is not the same as an institution. 
The notion of institution implies established, prescribed 
and normative practices which operate within the social order 
as it now exists; social movements consistently attempt in 
varying degrees to alter this existing order in some way: 
As a result, depending upon the degree to which the social 
movement threatens the foundations of the institutions, the 
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movement will operate outside of the established channels. 40 
Additionally, if we grant that the fundamental purpose is 
to change the institutions via their structure or ideology, 
we must also exclude "palace revolutions" and coup d'etats 
as well. Both seek not to change the structure, nor to · 
alter the existing power relationships with society, but 
merely to secure specific personnel changes. 41 When, 
however, the seizure of control is the culmination of a 
longer, more fundamental change in society or permits such 
a change to occur, it is possible that the coup d'etat 
may prove an integral component of the overall social movement. 
Fourth, although we have maintained that social movemeRts 
are composed of a membership making voluntary choices as to 
association, a social movement is more than an association. 
Associations tend to operate within the normative structures 
of the existing social order: " . the Parent-Teacher 
Association, the National Association of Manufacturers . 
cannot be classed as social movements, unless, of course, they 
were to challenge the existing normative and structural 
order. 11 42 In a similar vein, Gladys and Kurt Lang note that 
organizations usually confine their activities to 
the joint pursuit of interests that members as 
individuals have in common and that constitute 
the reason for forming the organization in the 
first place .... Sometimes, when it furthers 
the aims of the association, mass support is care-
fully elicited, but it is never permitted to 
dominate the organization. Hence, established 
political parties, though forced to appeal to the 
mass of voters at election time, are not social 
movements.43 
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If an association finds that its legitimate attempts to 
influence policy decisions within the area of interest are 
frustrated for one reason or another, it may well "start 
to spread the gospel" and become the core around which a 
social movement may emerge. 
One important aspect of the existence of social 
movements not yet specifically discussed is the matter of 
size or numbers. It shall be the position of this study that 
while members may be an important consideration in achieving 
the goals of the movement and even as an estimation of its 
importance, the true significance of any social movement 
will depend more upon the acceptability of the movement's 
ideology within the framework of society at large. Paul 
Wilkinson, expressing some criticism of the "numbers approach," 
wrote the following: "The assumption that 'numbers count' is 
in harmony with recent fashions in quantification in the social 
sciences and humanities. Some find it reassuring to have 
someting concrete to measure and upon which to found explanations. 
However, the belief that 'you cannot argue with numbers' has 
never convinced the leaders or followers of movements. 1144 
A Perspective of Social Movements 
It may have become obvious in the previous section that 
most of the definitions and analyses of social movement 
relied upon came from sociologists. While this does not 
reflect any enshrinement of the sociologist, it does place 
an emphasis on social movements which shall heavily influence 
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how we view and how we shall study them. Even in this 
discipline -- e.g., sociology -- recognition is granted to 
the observation that one sees that which he is looking for. 
We are told by Gary Bush and R. Serge Denisoff, for instance, 
that when "sociologists look at social movements, they do. so 
in terms of certain implicit conceptual frameworks. These 
are part of the conventional wisdom of the discipline and 
may be traced to the sociological trinity -- Durkheim, 
Marx and Weber. 11 45 As a result, most views of social 
movements center on three concepts: social disorganization, 
class, and status. Much of the early work (early in terms 
of pre-1950's) was performed by social and abnormal psychologists 
which may help to explain why collective behavior is often 
typified as congregations of the "frustrated" and "maladjusted." 
Generally speaking, most studies of social movements have 
been from one of three perspectives: first, "the analysis 
of groups and other social structures that defines situations 
for individuals"; second, a psychological approach which 
explains "recruitment to movements" and "an examination of 
cognitive structures and the patterning of meaning in every 
day life. 114 6 Third, relying largely upon the Rousseau 
model, a natural history approach to discern certain sequential 
patterns. 47 These varying types of analysis have been 
performed by the sociologist, the psychologist and the 
historian. The sociologist attempts to define the movement 
in terms of dysfunction, alienation, class struggles, role 
and norms; whereas the psychologist defines them in terms of 
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the participant's cognitive structuring of the environment 
or in psychoanalytic terms. Neither of these is sufficient 
for a complete understanding of social movements; but, 
according to Neil Smelser, each is vital for a complete 
understanding: 
A social role may integrate many of an individual's 
drives, skill, attitudes, and defenses; an individual's 
motivational predispositions determine in large 
part whether a system of roles (e.g., a network of 
friendship) will persist or not; a social role (for 
example, that of a parent) may be internalized to 
become part of a child's personality.48 
Thus, both the sociologist and the psychologist/psychoanalyst 
make vital contributions to our understanding of the social 
movement. 
In addition, the historian adds to the wealth of 
knowledge concerning movements. It is through the historian's 
concern with documents, spokesmen and events that we are 
able to better understand the forces shaping social and 
psychological determinants and their implications. In 
developing his analysis, the historian relies heavily on 
the case study method and often follows the temporal 
progression through the natural history approach. 
In recent years, a fairly heavy indictment of attempting 
to define and study social movements from only one perspective 
has occurred. Sociologists have indicted historians: "a 
specific case under study is all too frequently viewed as 
an isolated phenomenon. Investigations limited to the 
consideration of a given movement tend to ignore other more 
important aspects of general theory"; and "a related difficulty 
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of the case study is that the phenomenon being investigated 
may not be representative of the class of phenomena under 
which it is subsumed. 11 49 Sociologists themselves have been 
criticized: "Even if a listing of social conditions could 
provide a degree of discrimination between participants and 
nonparticipants, it would do little to explain the different 
types of participation. 1150 And even psychologists have been 
on the receiving end: II . shifting allegiances in 
radical movements may be attributed more to the external 
effects of history and to ideology than to psychological 
quirks. 1151 What seems to emerge from this competition among 
disciplines is the bulldog-gripping, holding on to an area 
where the given discipline perceives itself as having an 
important contribution to make while contending that other 
disciplines do not "have the answer" -- even though reluctantly 
admitting that others may provide some insight which clarifies 
or deepens the original concept. 
In somewhat the same line, an effort has been made in 
recent years to define movements in terms of rhetorical 
evaluations. As a resuft, traditional perspectives have been 
criticized. Rhetorical critics fault the historian because 
he can provide no more than a historical definition of the 
phenomenon. In a seminal essay on the rhetorical study of 
social movements, Leland M. Griffin posited that the "student's 
task is to isolate the rhetorical movement within the matrix 
of the historical movement. 1152 Griffin posited three 
periods of the rhetorical movement which corresponded quite 
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closely with the typing of Rousseau. Later rhetorical 
critics obJected to such advice because it "would appear to 
place an extra burden on the rhetorical critic to distinguish 
between that part of the movement which is historical and 
that part which is his special province, the rhetorical. •l 53 
Other objections to the historical approach in terms of its 
utility to the rhetorical critic are that: ( 1 ) II it i S to 0 
confining. We are rrot only limited to past human interactions, 
but we should wait for a complete cycle of the interaction 
to take place before it can be recognized as the act in 
question. 11 54 ( 2) II . the lineal interactions necessary 
to the movement are not sufficiently distinct in quality or 
degree to permit us to isolate the movement from other 
human interactions occurring at the same time. 11 55 Finally, 
perhaps the unkindest cut of all was delivered by Robert 
Cathcart: 
When historians tell us that a movement has taken 
place they usually do so by identifying the impor-
tant documents, spokesmen, and events associ~ted 
with the ~ovement. As rhetoricians we then proceed 
to analyze these documents and the spokesmen 
believing that we will encompass the movement. This 
type of criticism turns out to be much like tradi-
tional speaker-speech analysis.56 
One cannot help but wonder after examining these indictments 
whether they are criticisms of the historian and his method 
of analyzing social movements or an indictment of the failures 
on the part of rhetorical critics themselves for not using 
the historical data when applicable and then delving into 
uncharted waters on their own initiative. 
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Much the same criticism may be leveled at the rhetori-
cian's complaints about the social scientist. Dan Hahn and 
Ruth Gonchar note that "Sociologists assume that social move-
ments are found in certain demographic pockets (youth, poor, 
black, etc.) because these people have similar experiences. 
This is one explanation -- but it is also possible that 
movements are located in communication pockets or networks. 1157 
Granted, but most sociologists would recognize the importance 
of communication networks as vital to the spread of the 
movement. Yet one wonders if the networks exist because 
of sociological and/or psychological considerations such 
as similar cognitions of the environment in which they 
function and similar belief systems. 
But more important (and more vague) condemnations have 
been levelled by such critics as Cathcart: 
Besides being too general and imprecise, the 
definitions of social movements utilized by 
the social scientists are misleading in a way 
which is detrimental to the work of the rhetorical 
critic of movements. The social psychologists 
usually look at collective behavior in contrast 
to individual behavior rather than contrasting 
certain collective behaviors with larger societal 
behaviors. They tend not to be as concerned with 
those collective behaviors which vary in relationship 
to the established social system. It is, however, 
precisely this latter relationship -- and not the 
relationship between one individual and the group 
that concerns the rhetorical critic of social 
movements. 
The social scientists tend ... to overlook or 
neglect the dynamic quality of the larger social 
system, or what is sometimes called the evolving 
status quo. When they talk of collective 0ehavior 
organized to produce change, they are often describing 
the status quo rather than a social or a political 
movement.58--
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Besides such indictments being themselves "too general and 
imprecise," one need only refer to the sociological constructs 
and those of the psychologist presented later in this study 
to indicate that, indeed, it is the comparison of collective 
behavior with that of a larger, institutionalized, society. 
that provides much of the study of social movements. Comparisons 
are made of the psychological characteristics of groups of 
individuals found in particular types of social movements 
as opposed to other groupings of collective behavior and of 
the general cognitions of society as a whole. The sociologist 
emphasizes the importance of the ideology of a given movement 
and its appeals to certain social groupings as' opposed to 
others. Further, to indict the social scientist for neglecting 
the dynamic nature of the social movement appears to create 
a straw man when sociologists themselves have emphasized 
the changing nature of social movements: "the genesis of a 
social movement involves an interactional process between 
an interest group and its social enviromnent 11 .59 Others have 
noted that successful tactics depend largely upon the actions 
of agents of social contro1.60 Therefore, the tactics of a 
social movGITent may change as it grows -- they way become 
"less revolutionary as the movement gains influence, or they 
way become more aggressive as the chances of success increase. 1161 
While this may seem like overkill, for a discipline to deny 
the contributions and constructs of an0ther is to bring into 
question the motives of that criticism. Rhetorical criticism 
can make its own contribution to the study of social movements 
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by relying upon those made by others and by virtue of its 
own special skills. 
Additional questions are raised, however, about the 
applicability of social scientific definitions -- such as we 
have provided to the rhetorical critic. ~uthur L. Smith 
delivered the most fundamental ind1ctmePt when he wrote, "a 
moveNent is a rhetorical trend, a tendency in the use of 
communication which may be understood by the prevalence of 
a certain metaphor, whereas a mass movement suggests not 
Just language tendencies but mobilization and reconstitution. 1162 
Yet to find a linguistic tendency without some social relevance, 
or some language without purpose is to question the significance 
of the discovery. Smith further maintains that: 
To discuss a social movement or an historical 
movement is to indicate an emphasis which does 
not preclude but seriously impairs our rhetorical 
vision. A mass movement is itself a river of 
communication with diverse tributaries, heading in 
the same direction ... It is elementary that 
movements are never formed without rhetoric; all 
grievances, frustrations, and reformist or 
revolutionary aims must be communicated in order 
to create the specific social collective which 
supposedly will sustain the ideological directions. 
The problem then with a sociologically based 
theory is its emphasis on the mobilization of a 
collective to implement a program for reconstituting 
social norms and values without recognizing that 
it is communication alone that determines mobilization 
and reconstitution. There is no reason to seek 
elsewhere for an arching view of mass movements; 
rhetoric isolates and collectivizes and establishes 
itself as the essence of a movement.63 
This whole position may be summarized in three generalizations. 
1. A movement presupposes that a collective of 
human beings have entered into a dynamic 
fraternity with each other to verbalize their 
aims. The movement is not the people apart 
from their rhetoric. 
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2. A movement presupposes the creation and 
production, through rhetoric, of symbols and 
metaphors which characterze its ideological 
direction. 
3. A movement is the sum total of the adherent's 
communicative activity, internal and externa1. 64 
Such an expression of movements, while perhaps initially. 
ego-satisfying to the student of rhetoric, does not long 
stand under scrutiny. Most social scientists would admit 
that communication performs a function without which the 
movement cannot become viable: "Communication is essential 
if enough people are to share their similar dissatisfactions 
and find the numbers of kindred spirits to permit effective 
collective action 11 ; 65 and "agitation operates to arouse 
people and so make them possible recruits for the movement. 
It is essentially a means of exciting people and of 
awakening within them new impulses and ideas which make them 
restless and dissatisfied. 1166 Thus, it appears that few 
sociologists, or even psychologists, would deny that rhetoric 
is an important -- even vital -- portion of the movement's 
emergence; but what the rhetorical critic seems unable to 
provide merely by his grouping of metaphor is determination 
of the belief systems which may make one rhetorical appeal 
effective in one situation and impotent in another. It is 
this that the social scientist can provide and thus make the 
rhetorical study of social movements more viable. The 
rhetoric must appeal to the masses in the first place for 
them to be effective, the symbolic expression of discontent 
must reflect the very real discontent experienced by the 
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individual. Through the investigation of the social norms, 
roles and strains and of the psychological characteristics 
of those susceptible to the movement, we more adequately may 
analyze the rhetorical strategies employed -- or, given the 
chance, more effectively design the rhetorical appeal. At 
the very least, we must give the devil his dues. 
To call for an analysis of a rhetorical as opposed to 
a social movement provides no useful purpose. If social 
scientific definitions are "too imprecise and general," 
it would seem that "a trend, a tendency in the use of 
communication" is guilty of the same fault. To analyze 
communications without understanding the social context in 
which they occur and assume relevance is to deny one of the 
primary components of any rhetoric. To fault a sociological 
theory for its emphasis upon mobilization and reconstitution 
of alternative norms and values within a society is not 
to demonstrate that the emphasis denies the importance of 
rhetoric. 
If we are to study any phenomenon, we must attempt to 
define its boundaries as best we can -- even if we must 
ultimately admit that we have been imprecise. But to 
argue for the conceptualization of a rhetorical movement 
as opposed to a social movement based upon trends in communi-
cation and metaphor is not defining boundaries by which we 
can separate the phenomenon from the welter of other interactions 
occurring simultaneously. Therefore, we shall contend that 
the sociological and psychological constructs and definitions 
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provide a valuable perspective from which to commence our 
rhetorical analysis of social movements. We must recognize, 
and do so readily, the importance of rhetoric in the life 
of movements -- whether successful or not; but we shall 
continue to refer to social movements as collective actions 
directed toward changing societal norms and/or values which 
exist over a period of time and attempt to provide some 
ideological foundation for current dissatisfaction and 
future hope. We shall gladly emphasize that the social 
movement will receive expression through rhetoric. A social 
movement may, then, be perceived as a confluence of social, 
psychological and rhetorical elements each contributing to 
the shaping and understanding the others. 
Methodological problems exist in the study of social 
movements as to identifying the goals, principles and ideologies 
which dominate a given movement, choosing which leaders are 
in the fore and which of the conflicting ideas expressed 
by the movement assume preeimence, and even evaluating 
the obvious implications of a message are the real ones 
but whatever methods we arrive at, the vital consideration 
which must remain uppermost is that "they are constructs. 
This carries with it the obvious implication that they may be 
faulty. They may be defective in at least two ways. In the 
first place, they may not be coherent; there may be too many 
gaps and unintelligible items for our liking. This can be 
cured by further knowledge ... A worse defect is almost the 
reverse: we may be too satisfied with our model. 1167 
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Characteristics of the Social Movement 
Implicit throughout our discussion of definitions and 
perspectives of social movements has been the idea that there 
exist different types of movements; and that depending upon 
the type, various components will be emphasized to the 
detriment of some others. While much of what is presented 
in this section will be examined more completely and from 
different perspectives in later chapters, it nevertheless 
seems beneficial that an overview of types and components 
of social movements be given at this time. 
Each author writing on the subJect has attempted to 
create the typology of social movements depending upon his 
particular terministic screens. Herbert Blumer has posited 
three types (general, specific, and expressive); 68 and Paul 
Wilkinson ten (religious movements, millenarism and sects; 
movements of rural and urban discontent; nativist, nationalist 
and race movements; imperialism and pan-movements; class and 
occupational interest movements; and so on) . 70 These have 
been "typed" largely on the basis of the functions or purposes 
of the movement. 
Movements have been labeled depending upon the 
"sociopsychological types" of membership based upon the 
motivation of a movement's adherents (the "value-rational" 
fellowship of believers, the "emotional-affectual" following 
of a charismatic leader, the "purposive-rational" collection 
for individual interests) . 71 While many other typologies 
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exist, for the purposes of this study those employed by 
Bush and Denisoff shall be used: reform, revolutionary, 
regressive and expressive movements. 72 
Reform movements "are directed at the alteration of a 
segment of the power distribution of a social system in o~der 
to achieve a specific goal"; and "their intent is only a 
modification of the power distribution. 11 73 Within this 
larger category it is possible to subsume many of the other 
typologies advanced: that section of Blumer's specific 
movements which advocate modification rather than destruction 
of existing social institutions; Wilkinson's movements to 
the extent that they meet the same criteria; and, more 
clearly perhaps, Smelser's norm-oriented movement which he 
defines as "an attempt to restore, protect, modify or 
create norms in the name of a generalized belief. 11 7 4 
Within reform movements any norm (or legitimatized institu-
tion) may be altered i.e., social, political, educational, 
economic, religious, etc. 
Revolutionary movements are concerned not with 
reforming existing social order but with more radically 
altering the fundamental structure or ideology of institu-
tions. For Bush and Denisoff, the revolutionary movements 
are characterized by those of the left and "possess a 
metaphysical rationale for bringing about a new social 
order based upon body of thought which defines the past 
and the present and interprets the future (e.g., anarchism, 
utopian socialism, and the various models of the ideal 
Communist state) _,,75 Within the context of this study, 
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revolutionary movements shall be those indicating a "left-
leaning11 ideology. Those general and specific movements 
exemplified by Blumer which advocate structural replacement 
within the ideological context given will fall within this 
type. Some of Smelser's value-oriented movements (which· 
envision a 11 reconstitution of values")76 will also fit --
whereas others will fall in the regressive typology. Perhaps 
the crucial distinction made between the revolutionary 
and the regressive movement by Bush and Denisoff is the 
difference in ideological perspective. On the one hand, 
the ideology of revolutionary movements minimizes 
the role of the individual actor in determining 
social conditions and instead stresses societal 
dysfunctions and contradictions as the source 
of problems and offers collective solutions 
designed to achieve an 'ideal' future state.77 
whereas, on the other hand, regressive movements 
come about to counteract existing trends in society 
and to change the values and institutions of the 
system from their present (decadent) form to 
those of a historical or idealized past •..• 
Ideologically, this type of movement emphasizes 
individual weaknesses and "deviation" as the 
sources of social problems and suggests as 
solutions individualism, charismatic leadership, 
and a return to past value systems.78 
It is within the broad general outlines of regressive 
movements that the remainder of Smelser's value-oriented 
movements would most probably fall. 
The final form of social movements are expressive 
movements, a term initially introduced by Blumer. For 
him, expressive movements do not "seek to change the 
institutions of the social order or its objective character. 1179 
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Rather, they are conceptualized as statements of dissent 
in response to social conditions which "aliena,te" the 
individual. While typified largely by "symbolic dissent," 
they may exert "profound effects on the personalities of 
individuals and on the character the social order. n 80 • 
Regardless of the specific type of social movement, 
it appears that each is created in response to very 
general considerations existing throughout the social 
system -- i.e., although one movement may be expressive, 
another reformist and so on, each arises in response to 
some strain, some dissatisfaction between the individual's 
perceptual evaluation of the existing situation and the 
evaluation of the way the situation should be. Various 
explanationsfor this phenomenon have been offered and 
will be examined at some length at a later time. Suffice 
it to say that whether one subscribes to 
useful in understanding a given movement 
or finds most 
the theory 
of alienation, class conflict, status inconsistence, 
relative deprivation or psychological inconsistencies 
and personality considerations, there must exist some form 
of strain ("an impairment of the relations among and 
consequently inadequate functioning of the components 
of action 11 ) 81 within the social structure. This strain 
may occur between any and/or all of the following components: 
(1) values -- "the broadest guides to purposive social 
behavior"; (2) norms -- the "regulatory rules governing 
the pursuit of these goals"; (3) mobilization -- the 
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consideration of factors which motivate the individual 
and how these individuals are organized within the social 
system; and (4) the situational facilities -- that which 
the actor uses as means to achieve the other components. 82 
Thus, if the individual finds an inconsistent relation 
between his situational facilities (e.g., his standard 
of living) and the norms or values structuring his belief 
system (e.g., every man has a right to a minimal standard 
of living) which cannot be resolved, a strain between 
these will develop. If the individual is made aware of 
the strain, if some means of resolution can be advocated 
which he comes to regard as capable of eliminating this 
strain (largely through rhetoric), and if he exists in a 
social milieu under which he can congregate with others, 
a social movement may begin. 83 
Eric Hoffer, longshoreman-cum-social commentator, 
has remarked that "Mass movements can rise and spread 
without belief in a god, but never without belief in a 
devil. 1184 And it is this function that an ideology 
provides for a movement. In accordance with Hoffer's 
prescription, perhaps the most important aspect of an 
ideology is the establishment of a devil. In reform or 
revolutionary movements the individual is pictured as the 
victim of the whims of the social system. The source of 
strain is the inability of the legitimate authority to 
effectively deal with imbalances. It is the social order 
which is not functioning and which is to blame for the 
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difficulties encountered. There is an indictment, a 
criticism, a condemnation for the existing social 
arrangements. There is thus great anxiety about the 
person's place and position in society, an anxiety which 
can partially be alleviated by finding something to 
dislike, such as those who represent that portion of 
society resisting changes which could remedy the 
imbalance. 85 If the movement is regressive, the devil --
while changed is still present and becomes those social 
agents who have perverted the idealized state to such an 
extent that it has sunk to its present putrid level. The 
object of hate then becomes those who refuse to change 
toward the idealized form in much the same fashion as in 
the reform/revolutionary movement. 
On the positive side, the God-term will provide the 
hope for the future, the means of salvation. As soon as 
the proposed changes are implemented, the social imbalances 
will cease to exist and unlimited happiness shall be the 
vision of the future. Such an approach may ultimately 
create difficulties for the movement leadership if such 
changes cannot be implemented and provide the desired nirvana. 
The effectiveness of the movement's ideology can be enhanced 
if it combines both elements; but whatever the god and 
devil terms which are created, both must be symbolic 
responses to the perceived strain which created the desire 
for change. Whether the collective action is a riot or a 
social movement, the "solution" (i.e., the ideology) is 
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directed toward some specific problem whether it be the 
symbolic destruction of a despised institution (e.g., stormingthe 
Bastille) or an attempt to change the existing normative 
order. "Collective behavior," writes Neil Smelser, II• is . . . 
embellished with symbols to explain and justify the partici-
pant's actions. To determine why certain objects and 
symbols are chosen, we must refer to the specific strains. 1186 
As the ideology appeals to dissatisfied individuals 
throughout the social system, it is conceivable that many 
· will seek membership in the emerging movement. Membership 
has been analyzed in terms of when they Joined the movement, 
in terms of social and economic class, and in terms of 
motivations. If nothing else, perhaps the study of social 
movements reveals the preconceptions of the student. Among 
those who differentiate on the basis of time of joining, 
Lang and Lang describe the "early converts, won over to the 
movement when it is still small and sectarian"; followed 
by the active reinforcements -- those who Join while the 
movement is beginning to develop some significance; the 
Joiners -- Jumpers-on-the-proverbial-bandwagon as the move-
ment achieves some respectability. And finally, the resisters 
who begin to display some affinity toward a movement which 
they strongly resist.87 
Another division of membership occurs based upon a 
division of labor. Lang and Lang also write: 
There is a 'division of labor' among the followers 
of every social movement. A central core of 
followers ... perform the routine work and 
dedicate what spare time they have to the 
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movement. Some of them consider themselves 
leaders, but in fact they only do the work. 
Opposed to this cadre is the larger rank and 
file of the movement, who 'march' along. The 
majority of them are loyal; they attend meetings, 
participate in activities, believe its ideology, 
and learn its songs and slogans. Beyond them is 
a much larger periphery of individuals, not 
clearly either in or outside the movement. They 
act as a 'cheering' section, whose support can 
be mobilized on occasion. Although their 
connection to the movement is tenuous, they are 
crucial to its success.88 
In addition to this "functional" categorization of 
membership, some have described the nature of social 
movements according to the types of memberships attracted. 
Thus the class theorists find that the bulk will be made 
up from "the aggregate of persons playing the same part 
in production, standing in the same relation toward other 
persons in the production process, these relations being 
also expressed in things (instruments of labor) • 118 9 Examples 
of movements classed according to this general method 
would be most of the reform movements of Europe and 
England during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Others, however, such as Hadley Cantril, have posited 
that we must look not at economic considerations to 
find the sources of membership, but rather to the 
beliefs and opinions of men. For when these 
components of an individual's psychological 
world are violently jarred by worries, fear, 
anxieties, and frustrations, when he begins to 
question the norms and values which have become 
a part of him, when the customary social frame-
work can apparently no longer satisfy his needs 
••••.. the individual is susceptible to new 
leadership, to conversion, to revolution. 90 
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Again, as in discussing the various "causes" of social 
movements, it seems that one must ultimately admit to a 
basic formulation: that some dissatisfaction has been 
created in the individual, regardless of the specific 
source, and it has been blamed on the existing social 
structure. As a result, believing that a particular 
course of action poses some probability -- or certainty 
of solving that unhappiness, he will have a tendency to 
seek that particular social movement which most nearly 
relates to the perceived imbalances. When presenting a 
definition of social movements, we stressed their volitional 
nature. And it is this which makes their membership viable 
and permits the movement to grow and function. It is this 
voluntary commitment to the norms and practices of the 
social collective which binds the movement together and 
gives membership the esprit de corps necessary to endure 
the dark days which virtually every movement must face. 
The implications of this volition are explained by Paul 
Wilkinson: 
It is, therefore, not only the choices of 
great leaders,which may be decisive, but just 
as important, the choices of thousands of the 
rank-and-file humanity who have the moral 
responsibility for deciding whether they will 
Join or support a given collective action, 
how they will select their programmes and 
leaders, what means they are prepared to 
employ to realize the movement's aims, and so 
forth.91 
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If the membership of a movement is important 
(and it is), then equally so is the type of leadership 
exhibited. As in most other aspects of the movement 
mystique, typologies of leadership have been advanced . 
. Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, whichever the case -
may be, is Max Weber's charismatic leader. Not only 
because of his high visibility, but also because of 
this era's almost pathological preoccupation with charisma, 
it is the most widely reported type. Charisma is "the 
real or imagined extraordinary qualities of any group 
leader, 11 and charismatic leadership is dependent largely 
on the specific characteristics of the individual -- be 
they attributes of heroism, sanctity, or whatever. The 
success and validity of a movement itself may rest upon 
the qualities and broad shoulders of the leader.9 2 Another 
type is the institutional leader whose "authority is 
founded on the belief in the legality and constitutionality" 
of the means by which the leader was placed in his position 
of responsibility. 93 Membership follows not because of any 
special qualities of the leader, although in fact he may 
have these, but rather because he occupies a position 
which has been consecrated by the norms of the movement. 
Closely related is the distinction between the leadership 
functions of symbol and decision-maker. The former is 
one whose activities are not so important to the success 
of the movement as are the qualities which he represents 
the ideology, the struggle, or whatever. The decision-maker 
- 48 -
is important not so much for the symbol which he presents 
to the membership and to the opposing social structure 
but rather for the pragmatic abilities he displays for 
guiding the movement through the maze of problems.94 It 
is imperative that these types should not be interpreted 
as being mutually exclusive. Like all categorizations, they 
are valuable only so long as they aid rather than obscure 
our analysis of movements. 
Another vital consideration is that the requirements 
for leadership may vary over time depending upon the condi-
tions which the movement encounters. Depending upon the 
particular time in a movement's development, Eric Hoffer 
maintains that leadership will be provided by the man of 
words (the initial phase), the fanatic (the crisis stage) 
and the man of action (the consolidation phase). It is the 
rare man who can effectively fulfill all three roles and 
guide the movement from its inception through the active 
phase toward the fulfillment of the original prophecy. 
Membership and leadership combine -- along with 
other factors -- to influence the organization of the 
movement. The movement's organization will be a general 
reaction to five major influences: (1) the degree of 
opposition encountered -- the greater the opposition, the 
more militarily structured the organization will tend to 
be; (2) the social position of the followers -- a middle 
class membership will probably produce a parliamentary 
organization or at least one providing some degree of 
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participatory democracy whereas one composed of largely 
lower social-economic classes might be presumed to rely 
more upon an autocratic structure; (3) the aims of the 
movement -- one advocating reform may be much more open 
than a revolutionary movement; (4) the cultural ethos of 
the society -- reflecting the country and the period in 
which the movement exists. For example, in a democratic 
state a movement may function much more freely than in a 
totalitarian system where any dissent is considered 
revolntionary. And (5) the type of leadership -- charismatic 
leader versus institutional.95 
Generally speaking, when one considers the organization 
of a movement -- or of any collective behavior -- he 
tends to conceptualize it as tending toward a hierarchical 
structure culminating with some Olympian group ultimately 
controlling or directing the movement. Heberle gives 
some testimony to this when he writes that" . the 
general tendency in any social movement is toward complete 
and intensive organization of its adherents. 11 96 The reasons 
for such concentration appear obvious: a more efficient 
division of labor, less duplication of effort, a more 
responsive leadership and membership, a united front to the 
opposition, and so forth. Recently, however, some social 
scientists have begun to question this, and relying largely 
upon data gathered from contemporary movements, have posited 
that a movement" ... is neither a centralized conspiracy 
nor an amorphous collectivity, a spontaneous mass eruption. 
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Instead, it has a defineable structure which we term 
'segmentary, polycephalous, and reticulate' in structure." 97 
It might be well to explain these multisyllabic words 
for those who, like us, lack a working knowledge of the 
Oxford English dictionary. "Segmentary" means, quite 
simply, that the movement is composed of diverse groups, 
or cells, which exhibit all the life-cycles of the larger 
movement. "Polycephalous" recalls the multiheaded Hydra --
i.e., the movement organization does not have one centralized 
command-post or decision-making structure. Rather, the 
various cells each have independent leadership or even 
competing leaders within each cell. And finally, "reticulate" 
implies that there exists no random collection of ideologically-
similar groups: instead, they are connected through a 
communication network, inter-linking memberships or leader-
ships. Contrary to what may be popularly believed about 
such a structure, Luther Gerlach argues that it is 
not inefficient but rather is highly effective 
and adaptive in innovating and producing social 
change and in surviving in the face of established 
order opposition. It is also possible that such 
segmented, many-headed and networked organization 
will be adaptive not only for social movement, 
but also for established order in business, 
industry and government. 98 
So, like other aspects of the social movement, the organiza-
tion will be a product of interaction among a wide range of 
components. 
Throughout this section, we have discussed the role of 
the opposition. It is implicit in the very nature of social 
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movements that they must encounter resistance of some 
degree as they seek to fulfill their goal. Each of the 
types we have presented, with the sole exception of the 
expressive movemen~ seeks at least some change in the 
existing social structure; and additionally blames some 
existing imbalance upon it. The source of this resistance 
may vary quite drastically depending upon the particular 
norm or value the movement seeks to alter: government 
officials, churches, community leaders, courts, other 
social movements -- each may oppose the actions of a given 
collective. 
More importantly, the attitude of the governmental 
agencies may have great influence upon the future role of 
the movement: if the governmental authority is ". persis-
tently hostile and repressive toward modest demands for 
reform, those desiring reform may be driven into underground 
organization, may become more extreme in their demand for 
change, and may even begin to challenge the legitimacy 
of the political authorities. 1199 Such action may frustrate 
the reform movement even more and, accepting that norms 
cannot be changed, challenge the values of the system and 
become revolutionary. Thus, as forms of social control, 
there exist three major methods of resisting movements: 
suppression (which may rely on intimidation, dismissal from 
positions, arrest and detention, physical violence and murder) 
may only serve to strengthen the member's commitment; co-optation 
(granting the changes desired in the social system or else 
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symbolically incorporating them into the existing structure) 
of the grievances will remove the raison d'etre; and 
denigration (attacks on the ideology, the leader, and so 
on to reduce the credibility of a movement's ability to 
fulfill the needs of potential members) relying largely 
upon rhetorical appeals. The choice of resistance is 
often dependent upon how seriously the "establishment" 
perceives itself as being threatened, and how the strength 
of the public (and governmental) conscience limits the 
use of violence in suppressing dissent. 
One further approach to the study of social movements 
remains and it arises out of the natural history approach 
to their study. Various writers from different backgrounds, 
among them Hoffer and Leland M. Griffin, have advanced 
phases of social movements, largely derived from Rousseau's 
model. Hoffer describes the phases as marked by the man of 
words, the fanatic and the man of action. These correspond 
closely to Griffin's period of inception (when the movement 
emerges into public notice through the actions of the 
aggressor rhetorician -- a striking similarity to Hoffer's 
"man of words"), period of rhetorical crisis (when opposing 
rhetoricians compete for the minds of men), and a period 
of consummation (when either the movement is successful or 
the cause is lost.) .lOO Sociologists have very nearly 
described these same periods as the "preliminary stage" 
in which general dissatisfaction emerges although the masses 
do not interact nor recognize that they are in fact a group 
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of similarly-minded people; the "popular stage" -- the 
fomenting of discontent by intellectuals, the emergence of 
an ideology, and the formation of group-consciousness; 
and the "formal stage" -- the full-blown social movement.101 
Throughout this discussion an erroneous assumption 
may have entered: that all social movements are successful. 
That is not the case. Most probably fail to emerge into 
fully grown movements with a developed ideology and organi-
zational structure of any type~ Of those that do, many are 
suppressed by resistance which cannot be overcome, or their 
demands are co-opted without struggle. Many more may fail 
to create sufficient discontent among enough people to 
acquire the characteristics of social movements. And finally, 
leadership may fail to emerge. Whatever the reason, every 
social movement contains the seeds of its own destruction. 
If it cannot achieve modifications in existing structures, 
it must fail and the reason for its existence no longer 
remains; on the other hand, if it indeed is successful, 
the moment that its reforms are adopted or else it changes 
the social order, it, again, no longer has any justification. 
It becomes the institutionalized order and must now contend 
with newly emerging social movements. This is not to say 
that the movement's organizational structure may not find 
other goals to supplant the original, but in so doing it is 
acknowledging that the original dissatisfactions which 
brought it into existence have ceased to be vital concerns. 
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Summary 
In this chapter we have examined the functions of 
social movements in contributing to the betterment of a 
given society; have briefly considered the roots of the 
study of social movements; and have considered the 
philosophical premises of some of the major approaches 
to social movements -- i.e., the liberal humanitarian, 
socialist and the new existentialist foundations which are 
the cornerstones upon which movements are built. A 
definition has been advanced which emphasized that social 
movements are forms of collective behavior directed 
toward some change in societies which exist over time and 
arise out of some dissatisfaction with the present or 
some hope of the future. In addition, the movement is 
composed of voluntary members who are attracted by the 
movement's ideology. 
Attention was directed to the perspective from 
which we shall view social movements and, after an examina-
tion of sociological, psychological and rhetorical approaches, 
concluded that to view a movement from one perspective at 
the exclusion of the others would severely limit our 
knowledge; rather, a movement was perceived as a confluence 
of the three. 
Finally, a brief analysis of the major components of the 
movement was made so that a general framework might be established 
by which we may make more detailed examinations into the rhetori-
cal nature of social movements. 
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Chapter III 
RHETORIC, CRITICISM, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
"' . the power which has always started the 
greatest religious and political avalanches in 
history rolling has from time immemorial been 
the magic power of the spoken word, and that 
alone.' 111 
Introduction 
The importance of social movements to the continuation 
of any given social system and the nature of social movements 
have already been briefly examined; and although movements 
have been analyzed and described largely in sociological 
terms, it is imperative that the function of communication 
receive adequate emphasis. Without rhetoric to spread the 
word of the movement, to acquaint the disenchanted masses 
with the salvation of the movement's ideology (which is 
itself a symbolic restructuring of reality) indeed, often 
to create the dissatisfaction among these very masses, 
there would be no movement. 
In point of fact, it is largely in times of social 
disorder and upheaval that the rhetorical means may become 
most important. Edwin Black, writing in Rhetorical 
Criticism, states that: 
The accounts of Germany under the Weimar Republic, 
or of Russia under Nicholas II, disclose situations 
of extreme and pervasive anxiety on all levels of 
the society and the rapid deterioration of insti-
tutions and ideals that bind people together and 
supply them with a common fund of attitudes, of 
cues for feelings, of regulations governing 
propriety and impropriety. It is at Just such 
rooments in histcry that persuasive discourse asserts 
its fullest power over human affairs. 2 
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Because of the importance of these speeches, man must 
understand the phenomenon of rhetoric -- how does it 
function, what does it do, how does it exert its impact 
upon society? And man can best turn to the rhetorical 
critic for these answers; for, as Charles Lomas has 
written, the "rhetorical critic brings to this eve:Pt a 
specialized training which enables him not merely to 
record a description of the event more precisely than the 
untrained observer, but to interpret the rhetorical basis 
for whatever effect the speech roay be shown to have had. 113 
For these reasons, then, we shall consider the nature of 
"rhetoric," the purposes and ideals of criticism, and the 
joining of these two toward an understanding of social 
movements. 
A Perspective of "Rhetoric" 
Whenever one versed in, or even exposed to, writings 
about speech oommunication or rhetoric encounters the 
term, he immediately recalls Aristotle's famous dictim that 
rhetoric is "the faculty of cbserving il"l any given case 
the available means of persuasion. 114 A more recent approach 
is that of Kenneth Burke, for whom rhetoric is rooted in 
language itself and is the "use of language as a symbolic 
menas of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature 
respond to symbols. 115 But each of these definitions is 
broad, permitting various theorists to offer their own 
interpretations of 11what :rhetoric really is" -- or ought to be. 
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Perhaps the most widespread notion of rhetoric, held 
in sway by rhetoricians for decades, is that which places 
rhetoric in the realm of verbal discourse -- either written 
or oral. Thonssen and Baird, writing in 1948, maintain that 
authorities both ancient and modern agree that "the fundamen-
tal purpose of oral discourse is social coordination or 
control. 116 Marie Hochmuth Nichols uses 11 rhetoric 11 to "apply 
to verbal activity primarily concerned with affecting persuasion, 
whether it be done by writing or speaking. Rhetoric operates 
in the area of the contingent, where choice is to be made 
among alternative courses of action. 117 Edwin Black would 
qualify this conceptualization somewhat and add that it is 
intent that determines whether a particular statement is 
rhetorical or not, not the ect of the discourse.8 
But if Aristotle wants to include the means of discovering, 
and probably using, all the available means of persuasion, 
and if Burke wants to include language that induces coopera-
tion, men such as Everett Hunt and Karl Wallace want to limit 
rhetoric to "reasoned discourse." They desire to lessen, 
if not eliminate, the impact of emotional and ethical 
modes of proof in attaining persuasion. Hunt wants rhetoric 
to be the study of "men persuading men to make free choices"; 9 
while Wallace would characterize rhetoric as "the art of 
finding and effectively presenting good reasons. 1110 "Good 
reasons" are those statements offered in support of 11 ought 11 
propositions or propositions of value which are consistent 
with one another and which emphasize the logical: 
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•.• the word reason indicates that the process 
of proof is a rational one and can be used to 
cover such traditional forms of reasoning as 
deduction and induction, the sylloglsm, generali-
zation, analogy, causation, and correlation. 
Furthermore, the term good reason implies the-
indissoluble relationship between content and 
form, and keeps attention on what form is saying.11 
While not being quite so definitive as Wallace, Donald C. 
Bryant telegraphs an empathy with such an approach when he 
defines the function of rhetoric as being "adJusting ideas 
to people and of people to ideas. 11 12 
But like it or not, man is not always persuaded by the 
"rational" or by "good reasons"; and if we are to understand 
the phenomenon of rhetoric -- particularly the rhetoric of 
social movements -- we must acknowledge that rhetoric "deals 
in the main with man's motives and desires and ... basic 
human nature has not changed essentially in two thousand 
years. The way to a man's heart in ancient Athens is still 
the way to a man's heart today. 11 13 Man.is mqtivated by 
love, and hate, and jealousy, and duty, and all of the other 
emotions which dwell within us. Aristotle seemed to acknowledge 
this with his three modes of proof which could combine for 
altering beliefs; Burke seems to advance this notion when he 
argues that language is motive -- and as such reveals the 
attitudes of the speaker. Thus, it seems unreasonable to 
limit our concept of rhetoric to the expression of "good 
reasons." 
Writing in 1953, Bryant stated quite flatly that some 
types of persuasion did not fall within the scope of rhetoric: 
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Some means of persuasion, however, in spite of 
Aristotle's comprehensive definition, are not 
within the scope of rhetoric. Gold and guns, 
for example, are certainly persuasive, and the 
basic motives which make them persuasive, profit 
and self-preservation, may enter the field of 
rhetoric; but applied directly to the persons to 
be persuaded, guns and ~old belong to commerce or 
coercion, not rhetoric. 4 
But the intervening two decades may have done much to shake 
the strength of such a statement. Rhetoricians write articles 
on the "Rhetoric of Confrontation 11 , 15 books on the Rhetoric 
of Agitation and Contro1,l6 and even ponder if the "Rhetoric 
of Black Power" reveals two dimensions of moral conflictl7 
or justifies violence. 18 The problems of transition and of 
coping, not only from a theoretical perspective but from that 
of ethics as well, is perhaps best expressed by Barnet 
Baskerville at the Wingspread Conference on Rhetoric: 
Until quite recently one would have found in our 
ranks almost universal assent to the familiar 
statements of Jefferson, Mill and Lippman concerning 
the necessity for open competition of ideas in 
the marketplace. We once quoted Everett Hunt's 
definition of rhetoric as "the study of men 
persuading men to make free choices," and Karl 
Wallace's: "the art of finding and effectively 
presenting good reasons." We accepted Sidney 
Hook's admonition that "the cardinal sin, when we 
are looking for truth or wisdom of policy, is 
refusal to discuss, or action which blocks 
discussion." 
But suddenly we are not so sure. The streets 
echo the angry voices of those who would usher in 
a new order by destroying the old, and some 
rhetoricians -- rightfully indignant at the 
enormity of past inJustices, warmed by sympathy 
for the goals proclaimed -- Jettison the old 
axioms and scramble to rationalize the new reality 
I do not wish to be unfair • . • • I see the need 
for understanding the rhetoric of the New Left and 
for analyzing the rhetorical effects of shouts, 
obscenities, and the like. Such analyses are 
- 65 -
already being made, and I am sure that some of 
our colleagues who are dealing with these subJects 
are in patient, kindly quest for understanding. 
But the evidence seems too clear to be ignored 
that others have identified understanding with 
approval, and are rapidly moving beyond approval 
to implicit or explicit JUstification. 19 
Authur Kruger unites Wallace with the new rhetorics (admit~ing 
that, " ... yes, people are persuaded by irrelevant factors 
but they should not be 11 ) 20 and advances the ethical concern 
of the rhetorician more explicitly than Baskerville. "A 
truly ethical speaker," he posits, "respects the intelligence 
of his listeners and tries to get them to think about what he 
is saying, however difficult thinking might be·for some. 
Only in this way does he show any respect for democratic 
values, which presume that people can think for themselves 
and govern themselves intelligently. 1121 
Most of those who advance the "reasonable" approach to 
rhetoric do so in terms of promoting the best interests of 
a democratic society. It is, after all, a society which permits 
the free expression of ideas and evaluates those ideas 
logically that can best determine those courses of policy 
which will "promote the general welfare." But throughout 
the analyses of those who write about the rhetoric of 
confrontation, of protest, of the streets, runs the theme that 
such rhetorics emerge largely because traditional rhetorics, 
the rhetoric of "good reasons", fails to gain a voice -- much 
less an ear -- in the marketplace; or that even if it does, 
the "good reasons" advanced are never considered by the 
institutional powers of the status quo. It is in this realm 
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that the rhetoric of social movements becomes most apparent. 
Leland Griffin provides an outstanding example of such thinking 
when he related the type of rhetoric which emerged to the 
type of culture which surrounded it: 
If debate ("forensic drama," "reasoned discourse") 
is the creating myth of American democracy, [Bayard] 
Rustin's justification of the necessity of "body" 
rhetoric on the ground that "the accepted demo-
cratic channels have been denied the Negro" might 
be entertained in light of the Burkeian "scene-act 
ratio" (non-rational, non-democratic "acts" in a 
non-rational, non-democratic "scene") ..• a 22 
Thus, if society were truly democratic, then rational 
discourse such as advocated by Baskerville, Wallace and others 
would hold sway, or at least would be more influential than 
it now is; on the other hand, if society does not permit 
such freedom of expression, or is non-responsive to its 
legitimate demands, then dissatisfaction continues to grow 
until the perceived differences between the "have-nots" 
and the "haves" are no longer over means but become questions 
of value, of ends themselves. 
If rhetorical scholars are divided over the question of 
whether physical acts, of gold or guns, constitute "rhetoric" 
or not, there are others in our society from diverse backgrounds 
who hold no such doubts. Justice John Harlan wrote in 1961 
in a concurring opinion to overturn the convictions of blacks 
conducting a lunch counter sit-in (in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 
us 157, 201-101): 11 Such a demonstration in the circumstances . 
is as much a part of the free trade in ideas .•. as is 
verbal expression more commonly thought of as speech. It, 
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like speech, appeals to good sense and to the power of reason 
as applied through public discussion •.• just as much as, 
if not more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox 
at a street corner. This Court has never limited the right 
to speak . . . to mere verbal expression." 23 And, somewhat. 
less eloquently, a student activist asked if "violence" was 
not "sometimes a form of speech, of communication, perhaps the 
only effective form? Wasn't the most eloquent speech we heard 
in a long while the flames in Washington, D. C.? The tear 
gas in Washington, D. C.? The flames in Detroit? The sound 
of guns in a motel in Detroit -- didn't they say something 
to us? What do you do about Fred Hampton and Rap Brown? How 
do they speak? They can't do it in the press. 1124 While 
each of us may not condone such actions, in this age of street 
demonstration, of riot, and of establishment violence, can we 
as rhetorical scholars afford to ignore such activities with 
all of their symbolic meaning and yet still claim that we want 
to make "realistic" contributions to society? 
We have maintained that such physical acts, or verbal 
expressions of threatening behavior, are replete with symbolic 
meaning. But one might well ask wherein lies the symbolism 
of throwing bags of feces and urine into the faces of police-
men in Chicago, of threatening to burn universities and cities? 
James R. Andrews attempts to create the distinction between 
persuasion (which apparently leans toward the "good reasons" 
approach) and coercion. "Rhetoric becomes less persuasive," 
writes Andrews, "and more coercive to the extent that it limits 
- 68 -
the viable alternatives open to the receivers of communication. 
For while persuasion aims at moving a receiver to select one 
of the many avenues of action open to him, coercion attempts 
to offer only one route by removing all other approaches from 
the realm of the possible. 1125 This, however, is a distinction 
that might well be questioned, for one "rarely observes 
significant political, commercial, or international rhetorical 
address that does not bristle with 'dire consequences' swiftly 
to follow if one elects the wrong candidate, fails to puuchase 
the right product, or continues a foreign policy of dangerous 
initiatives. 1126 Instead, even those situations which threaten 
( "Your money or your life!" "America will burn!") still allow 
room for symbolic interpretation. 
The hoodlum who demands our hard-earned money, the 
black or the student who occupies our buildings, and the 
politician who threatens our nations, each of them seeks to 
constrain the symbolic world in which we live. And yet, though 
the world be "turned upside down," we must still func,tion 
symbolically, we must still reason. To the extent that we 
interpret the gun in the hoodlum's hand as a symbol of his 
intent to inflict harm should we not comply with his command, 
and to the extent that we interpret the agitator's demands (or 
threats) as pleas for attention, we have functioned symbolically; 
and given the available evidence, we have even created "good 
reasons" for our having acted as we have. 
- 69 -
Even the purely physical act may become symbolic. 
Just as Justice Harlan recognized that sit-ins constituted a 
form of speech, so may other, less accep~able, actions 
function. For physical acts may specifically have two kinds 
of intention: (1) to inflict physical force in order to 
constrain or promote action or to inflict punishment; and 
(2) to "say something." Parke Burgess argues, for instance, 
that "the American venture in the Vietnam War has been 
essentially rhetorical in intention and thus largely ineffectual 
in result 11 ; 27 and Bowers and Ochs contend that: 
If an agitator says to an establishment spokesman, 
"You are disgusting, like urine," he is using 
arbitrarily symbolic behavior that must be decoded 
by the application of the rules of syntax and 
semantics. If, instead, he throws at the 
establishment spokesman a plastic bag filled with 
urine, he is using more naturally symbolic 
behavior. We consider both kinds of behavior 
symbolic, since they stand for qeneral concepts 
that an observer easily infers. 28 
Thus, since man does use threat and physical act to express 
his views and to influence his environment, these acts too must 
fall within the scope of rhetoric along with Wallace's "good 
reasons" and Hunt's persuading of men to make free choices. 
For a social movement to develop, real or perceived 
problems must exist within society; and as men attempt to deal 
with these and to urge their removal, the type of rhetoric 
which they employ will depend to a large extent upon the societal 
conditions in which they must seek to persuade others. If 
grievances are not perceived as significant or as deeply felt, 
we may expect the rhetoric to assume milder forms. But to 
the extent that "traditional" persuasive techniques -- i.e., 
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verbal symbols either written or oral -- are not permitted or 
are ineffective, and to the extent that the dissatisfactions 
which gave rise to the rhetoric are not alleviated and such 
grievances remain important, we may expect the rhetoric to 
convey the value-laden elements of the scene. In such 
situations norm-oriented or reform movements become shifted 
toward revolution. If we are to understand social movements, 
we must understand the rhetoric which propels them -- and it 
may be the rhetoric of "good reasons," the rhetoric of "coercion," 
or the rhetoric of "the street." 
A Perspective of Rhetorical "Criticism" 
Rhetoric is the means by which man influences other 
men, or by which he symbolically induces his cooperation; and 
rhetorical criticism is the study of how man has used rhetoric. 
The goal of criticism is the "understanding of man himself",29 
is ''illumination, the providing of insights into the work which 
will deepen the reader's [auditor's, observer's] understanding 
and appreciation. 1130 While criticism per se has a long and 
glorified history, ranging from Aristotle and beyond, the 
growth of rhetorical criticism as a particular form of criticism 
is relatively new. 
Perhaps the first American to call for the study of 
rhetoric according to the principles of its own existence was 
Brander Matthews in 1898: 
The painters have long protested against any 
judgment of their work in accordance with the 
principles of another art; and at last they have 
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succeeded in convincing the more openminded of 
us that what is of prime important in a picture 
is the way in which it is painted, and that its 
merely literary merit is quite secondary. They 
are not unreasonable when they insist that the 
chief duty of a picture is to represent the 
visible world, not to paint a moral or adorn a 
tale, and that in the appreciation of a picture 
we must weigh first of all its pictoral beauty. 
Nor are sculptors asking too much, when in a 
statue they want us to consider chiefly its 
plastic beauty. 
Now, the orator and the dramatist ask for themselves 
what has been granted to the painter and the 
sculptor: they request that an oration or a 
drama shall be judged not as literature only, 
but also in accordance with the principles of its 
own art. 31 
Even if we may question the standards of judging painting 
advanced by Matthews (one must wonder how he responded to 
the Impressionists), there can be little doubt that 
rhetoricians strongly agree with his claim to Judge the 
"art" of rhetoric by those standards most appropriate. 
Following upon Matthew's lead, Josephy Denney 
published a collection of speeches showing the way for all 
who would follow with his categories of legislative, 
farewell speeches, eulogies, and so on in 1910; and J.M. 
O'Neill published his Models of Speech Composition in 1922. 
These early works for the most part consisted of representa-
tive speeches which one studied in an effort to improve 
his own platform performance.32 
If Matthew's cry was the conception, Herbert A. Wichelns 
"The Literary Criticism of Oratory" was the birth of rhetori-
cal criticism when it was first published in 1925. Wichelns 
distinguished oratory from poetics; and then, in a passage 
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that would control (at least dominate) the discipline for 
the next half-century, wrote the following: 
The scheme of a rhetorical study includes the 
element of the speaker's personality as a con~i-
tioning factor; it includes·also the public 
character of the man -- not what he was, but 
what he was thought to be. It requires a 
description of the speaker's audience, and of 
the leading ideas with which he plied his hearers 
his topics, the motives to which he appealed, 
the nature of the proofs he offered. These will 
reveal his own judgment on the question he dis-
cussed •••• Nor can rhetorical criticism 
omit the speaker's mode of arrangement and his 
mode of expression, nor his habit of preparation 
and his manner of delivery from the platform; 
though the last two are perhaps less significant. 
"Style" -- in the sense which corresponds to 
diction and sentence movement -- must receive 
attention, but only as one among various means 
that secure for the speaker ready access to the 
minds of his auditors. Finally, the effect of 
the discourse on its immediate hearers is not 
to be ignored, neither in the testimony of 
witnesses, nor in the record of events. And 
throughout such a study one must conceive of 
the public man as influencing the men of his 
own times by the power of his discourse. 33 
Among rhetoricians in 1925, Wichelns probably appeared as 
a Messiah; for his methodology was historic and, in a way, 
scientific. The critic was forced to study effects and 
thus to become kin to the historian -- who had academic 
respectability. By making the categories of criticism 
relatively uniform and laying out the areas which might 
be profitably studied, the approach smacked of rigor, of 
objectivity and offered the possibility of various critics 
producing similar results. In the words of Walter Fisher, 
it W9-s as "though the adoption of method in rhetorical 
criticism was not only a matter of the identify of rhetoric 
as an academic discipline but also a means of redemption as 
well. 1134 
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In any field of inquiry there are milestones; and 
Wichelns' essay was perhaps the first in the field of 
rhetorical criticism. Although other works were published 
in the ensuing years 3 5 it was not until 1943 that the 
second appeared: William Brigance's History and Criticism 
of American Public Address, a collection of essays on major 
orators which was patterned heavily in the Wichelns' 
method. But perhaps the one milestone which has had the 
greatest effect upon contemporary rhetorical critics is 
that published in 1948 by Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird 
Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical 
Appraisai. 35 
Speech Criticism, as either a stimulant or an irritant 
to other criticial methods and as a "guide" for critics, 
has probably had an effect unmatched by any other single 
work upon the field (with the exception of Aristotle's 
Rhetoric). Rhetorical criticism was defined as "a 
comparative study in which standards of judgment deriving 
from the social interaction of a speech situation are 
applied to public addresses to determine the immediate or 
delayed effect of the speeches upon specific audiences, and, 
ultimately, upon society. 113 7 The critic is warned that 
the success of the critical appraisal "depends heavily 
upon the critic's ability to effect faithful reconstructions 
of social settings long since dissolved 11 ; 39 and that 
"Aristotelian conceptions" are "safe points of departure 
into criticism. 1139 We have an influential work heavily 
influenced by Wicheln's essay. 
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As might be expected of such an undertakjng, it 
received both praise and blame. Charles Stewart wrote: 
Speech Criticism presented the first histories 
of rhetorical criticism, treated aspects of 
criticism that writers had previously only 
mentioned, and explained the purposes and 
functions of rhetorical criticism. But this 
work offered a rather rigid scheme not readily 
applicable to studies of movements, issues, or 
campaigns; stressed political speaking; presented 
discovery of effect as the single goal for 
all criticism; and unwittingly opened the door 
for continued "cookie-cutter" studies in which 
the critic looked for a little emotional appeal, 
a little logic, a little ethos, a little style, 
and did not recognize the inter-relationships 
of these rhetorical principles.40 
Other critics leveled other charges. Otis Walter responded 
to the tendency of using Aristotelian conceptualizations to 
discover all the available means of persuasion by asking, 
"Is it, after all, of much importance whether or not the 
Sermon on the Mount used the available means of persuading 
the audience of shepherds and fishermen? Suppose we found 
that the Speaker missed using some means of persuading the 
Galileans He addressed? Would not one be tempted to say 
'so what? 11141 And, among other criticisms leveled, Edwin 
Black objected because the heavy speaker-speech orientation, 
which stressed the speaker's background influencing his 
discourse which in turn influenced the audience, as ignoring 
the dynamics of the situation, i.e., the impact of the 
speech upon building expectations among the audience for 
future speeches, for committing the speaker to particular 
courses of action both rhetorically and ideologically, and 
the public ±mage which he creates (or destroys) . 42 
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Perhaps the last word should go to those who would 
defend the neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical criticism 
(as the Wichelns/Thonssen and Baird approach has become 
known) when they contend, perhaps rightly, that the "critics 
who have decried traditional criticism have objected 
actually to its incomplete application" by practitioners 
and not by theorists.43 Rightly or wrongly, any art is 
defined by its practice; a cross it must bear. 
Arising out of this tradition, however, certain basic 
functions of rhetorical criticism have become reasonably 
standard among both neo-Aristotelian critics and their 
detractors. In one form or another, many of the more 
widely known critics have expressed statements similar to 
that made by Barnet Baskerville when he concluded, "The 
making of an intelligent critical Judgment involves 
(1) thorough understanding of the thing being criticized, 
(2) formulation of acceptable criteria or philosophic 
principles of judgment, and (3) application of criteria to 
the object, idea, or event for the purpose of evaluation. 1144 
An evaluation contains more than just positive or negative 
valences toward the rhetorical phenomenon under consideration; 
for, as Edwin Black has written, "The person who hears a 
speech and says, 'I like it,' is not making a critical 
statement. He is reporting the state of his glands .• 
What is required is that the critic offer some Justification 
for his evaluation, that he Jump headlong into Wallace's 
"good reasons" for concluding as he has. 
1145 
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Once having made up his mind to make up his mind, the 
critic must still have some criteria by which to evaluate 
the speech, i.e., what shall be evaluated. And here the 
controversy begins. Thonssen and Baird opt for effect, 
arguing that a "rhetorical Judgment is a composi t of data· 
and interpretation that is intended to reveal the effect 
of a given speech upon a particular group of listeners. 
The word effect, or response, is all-important. It suggests 
the central reason for rhetorical criticism. 1146 While 
recognizing that effects need not be immediate, the 
implication from Thonssen and Baird is that we are usually 
concerned with the observed effect of the speech upon the 
immediate audience the one for whom the speech was 
originally conceived. 
Thomas Nilsen, however, would have us "ask what the 
speech implies about rationality, tolerance, and the moral 
autonomy of the individual; what it iroplies about the 
expression of opinions, deliberation and persuasion. 
Only if what the speech implies about these attitudes and 
procedures is made clear, can we make significant Judgments 
about the ends to which the speech is moving men. 1147 Wayland 
Parrish and Marie Hochmuth agree that we need to measure 
effect, but only as a subordinate factor to the quality of 
the speech, because "the judge or listener as Aristotle 
conceives him is always a qualified judge -- a person of 
good education, sound sense, and Judicious temper. This 
is the kind of audience we must assume in assessing the 
effectiveness of a speech, for it is the kind of audience 
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aimed at in the best efforts of all our orators. 114 8 
Perhaps so; but persons of good education, sound sense and 
judicious temper are few and far between, even in Athens. 
If we are to measure effect, it seems we are forced to 
consider that the audience in question may not have thesa 
characteristics -- and that if the orator spoke to such 
an audience as Parrish and Hochmuth have envisioned, he 
might well fail in the marketplace of ideas. 
The most reasonable approach, and the most difficult, 
is one which seeks some cowpromise between the immediate 
effect and the "contribution "t:he speech maJ?"es to, or the 
influence it exerts in furthering, the purpose of the society 
upon which it has its impact. 11 49 If we limit ourselves 
to the former we may be so time-bound that the true signifi-
cance of the rhetoricaJ act may not be felt; and we 
deal only with the impact upon the society and the prcmo-
tion of the societal goals, we may find ourselves unable 
to judge the speech since it's comp]ete influence may not 
be felt yet either, or els1:~ we may find ourselves d,~f ining 
"effective" rhetoric in terms of the institutionalized 
norms against which the rhetoric is addressing itself. 
With typical scholarly stance, Anthony Hillbruner has 
found a way out: 
The general aim of the critic of public address 
is to discover what happened as a result of a 
given speech or a series of speeches. Specifi-
cally, such a study can take two distinct routes. 
The first is to determine the immediate effects 
of the speech. The second is to discover what 
the long range effects were. The critic•can 
emphasize the one or the other of these areas, 
or obviously, he can deal with both, showing 
relations, comparisons, contrasts.SO 
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The most reasonable approach seems to use which ever provides 
the greatest insight, the greatest illumination. However, 
the critic must remember that the rhetorical situation is 
not one-way as many of the neo-Aristotelians visualized it; 
rather, the response of the audience is a vital part of th€ 
message-method that produces the rhetoric of a given time and 
place. Thus, "rhetoric is shifted from a focus of reaction 
to one of interaction or transaction. 1151 
Whenever one makes critical judgments, he must grapple 
with the choice of evaluating the work according to some 
"objective," readily identifiable standards or of allowing 
his subJective reactions to the work and its subJect matter 
to enter into his considerations. While the application of 
standard criteria -- such as the use of proofs, syllogistic 
argumentation, etc. -- may provide clues and insights to the 
critic by which he may more completely understand the workings 
of the speech and guage its effect, either immediately or in 
the long term, to do so without making some critical evalua-
tion about the morality involved within the speech is to 
avoid the critic's primary responsibility -- that of providing 
understanding to man. Since each act has consequences for 
others, regardless of how miniscule, it is infused with morality. 
By considering these moral implications, as well as being 
aware of the ethical dimension of his own critical act, the 
rhetorical critic can provide a more complete illumination of 
the act under considerations To the extent that the critic 
uses language to describe the speaker, the speech, the 
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historical setting, and the other factors mentioned as 
important by Wichelns and others, he is displaying an attitude, 
a symbolic construction of reality. The speech act being 
examined is perceived in terms of the critic's perceptual 
field; he is offering "a view of social reality. Through -
his criticism, the critic invites his reader to share in this 
reality The purpose of writing criticism is to share 
a world of meaning with other human beings. What is shared 
is not merely the evaluation of an object, but a way of 
ordering the universe. 1152 The critic must interact with the 
obJect; and in so doing, experiences two types of existential 
interactions: (1) he must understand and interpret the 
experience which forms the content of the work; and (2) 
"the impact of the [rhetorical] work on him is itself an 
experience . . 1153 
In fully grasping the implications of each of these, 
the critic assumes a responsibility -- because of his 
special skills, and because of his own involvement in what 
happens to society -- for evaluating the speech act in 
terms of its (the speech's) impact upon society's moral 
fabric as perceived through his (the critic's) value 
system. Perhaps Marie Hochmuth Nichols provides the best 
example of this: 
Surveying the rhetoric of Hitler's Mein Kampf, 
Kenneth Burke notes: "Here is the testament of 
a man who swung a great people into his wake. 
Let us watch it carefully, and let us watch it, 
not merely to discover some grounds for prophesying 
what political move is to follow Munich, and what 
move to follow that move, etc.; let us try also 
to discover what kind of 'medicine' this medicine-man 
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has concocted, that we may know, with greater 
accuracy, exactly what to guard against, if we 
are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine 
in America." Such an observation suggests the 
responsibility of the critic. His place should be 
in the vanguard, not in the rear -- wise-after-the-
fact. He should be ready to alert a people, to warn 
that devices of exploitation are being exercised, 
by what skillful manipulations of motives men are . 
being directed to or dissuaded from courses of action.54 
It is to this end that the rhetorical critic must function. 
Before departing our general discussion of rhetorical 
criticism, there is one additional area of disagreement 
which has particular concern for the student of the rhetoric 
of social movements. And it is a concern that arises from 
the encyclical of Wichelns himself. We are told that 
we are to analyze the historical setting in which the 
particular rhetorical act occurs; that we must analyze 
the audience to understand the reasons for the selection 
of various message components; and at the same time we are 
warned that we must "not get lost in such studies, since 
they are, strictly speaking extraneous to rhetoric. They 
are useful only insofar as they help in the rhetorical 
analysis of the speech itself. Properly speaking, they are 
excursions into the fields of history, sociology, or 
biography which furnish a background against which the 
speech itself may be studied. 1155 Even such traditionalists 
as Thonssen and Baird warn us that "speeches are meaning-
ful only when examined in the social settings of which 
they are a part 11 ; 56 and yet a field that is seeking to 
define its own discipline and to preserve its bailiwick 
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from the encroachments by other academic departments must 
be especially careful of preserving its own identity and 
and chastity. Given the debate previously discussed 
about whether we have "rhetorical" or "social" movements, 
the student of movements must be particularly susceptible 
to such charges. 
While we would not be so rash as to urge with Ross 
Winterowd that "those who are genuinely interested in 
developing rhetorical theory should leave the field of 
rhetoric and use it only as 'a system of classification 
that reconstitutes linguistics, psychology, sociology, or 
whatever as rhetoric'",57 we would argue that the nature of 
rhetoric can only be properly understood as not so much a 
product but an interaction between the psychological 
constructs of the participants and the social surrounding. 
Rhetoric is vital to social movements; but the reasons 
for the success or failure or particular symbolic creations, 
indeed, even their existence at all, can only be fully 
comprehended within the framework which permits full 
exposure and consideration of the interactions among com-
ponents. 
We recognize that the rhetorical critic must be 
particularly careful of avoiding histories and of going 
beyond sociological and psychological monographs; but at 
the same time mere explication of metaphors and "rhetorical 
strategies" without an appreciation of the soil from which 
they spring are equally barren. We perhaps may draw some 
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solace from Kenneth Burke: 
•• once the door that gives us a glimpse of 
the speech's background is opened at all (as 
it must be), the aim to make a profound study of 
a text will and should require that it be 
opened much wider, even at the risk that the 
intrinsic examination of the text may get lost 
in the documenting of extrinsic factors.58 
We may be able to avoid some of Burke's dichotomy of 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors if we view the rhetorical 
situation in terms of a confluence or interaction of 
the social environment, the psychological constructs of 
both individual and collective participants, and the 
symbolic expression which fuses them all together. To 
analyze this convergence, to interpret and evaluate it 
is the purpose of rhetorical criticism. 
Rhetorical Criticism of Social Movements 
We began this chapter with a testimonial from 
Adolf Hitler as to the value of the spoken word to 
social change. Eric Hoffer would apparently disagree: 
There is hardly an example of a mass movement 
achieving vast proportions and a durable organi-
zation solely by persuasion. Professor K. S. 
Latourette, a very Christian historian, h~s to 
admit that "However incompatible the spirit of 
Jesus and armed force may be, and however 
unpleasant it may be to acknowledge the fact, 
as a matter of plain history the latter has 
often made it possible for the former to survive." 
It was the temporal sword that made Christianity 
a world religion. Conquest and conversion went 
hand-in-hand, the latter often serving as a 
justification for the former. Where Christianity 
failed to gain or retain the backing of state 
power, it achieved neither a wide nor a permanent 
hold.:> 9 
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But, in claiming that rhetoric -- or persuasion is 
vital to the growth and success (or even failure) of social 
movements, we need not burden ourselves with claiming that 
such occurs "solely by persuasion." We can find justifi-
cation enough for our ,study by turning to the devil himself 
when Hoffer remarks that it is "the militant man of words" 
who prepares the "ground for the rise of a mass movement. 11 60 
Through such symbolic acts as "discrediting prevailing 
creeds and institutions", as "creating a hunger for 
faith in the hearts of those who cannot live without it", 
as "furnishing the doctrine and the slogans of the new 
faith", and as "undermining the convictions of the 'better 
people'" the ground for the movement is prepared. It is 
not solely rhetoric that provides the ferment; but it is 
largely rhetoric that brings the ferment to conscious 
awareness and raises the hope that there is something that 
may be done about it.61 
It is the purpose of rhetorical criticism to provide 
understanding of rhetorical acts; and traditionally it 
has fulfilled this responsibility largely through studies 
of speakers, speeches, and the genres of particular forms 
of discourse. But if the masses have "lost confidence in 
the ability of a single speaker or a great man to deliver 
an adequate response," as James Golden has contended,62 
then it is largely through extended campaigns of rhetorical 
transactions that opinion is formed. During the Civil 
Rights Movement and the Peace Movement, it seems unlikely 
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that any one specific speech exerted great influence on 
the great bulk of American citizens. It is possible that 
particular speeches did persuade in that existing attitudes 
were reinforced; but the great mass of opinion change 
about human equality and the Vietnam War appears to be 
the response to long, varied rhetorical messages. And 
these messages were largely the products of social move-
ments which dealt with the issues facing our society. It 
is largely for this reason that the Report of the Committee 
on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism 
at the National Conference on Rhetoric urged further 
examination of social movements: 
Rhetorical criticism should continue to examine, 
insofar as it can, contemporary rhetorical move-
ments; that is, the rhetoric of the black power 
movement, the chicane movement, student protest 
movementsL the women's liberation movement, and 
so forth.b3 
The impact of this call was already apparent before 
it was ever uttered (leading one to remember the old 
adage about the leader running to catch up with his people 
so he could find out where to lead them!). The trend of 
rhetorical criticism during the period of 1965 through 1970 
found movement studies coming into the fore. A survey of 
movement studies from 1949 to 1969 by Charles J. Stewart 
found that 43 of seventy-five were completed in the four 
years following 1965.64 In J. Jeffery Auer's Rhetoric of 
Our Times, only three of thirteen case studies in comtemporary 
rhetoric deal with campaigns or movements, although two 
additional studies deal with a series of individual speakers. 65 
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Concern with movements is not limited merely to the 
troubled decade of the 1960's. As early as 1923, the 
Department of Public Speaking at Cornell included among a 
listing of some subJects for graduate study, the following: 
"The oratory of definite periods and movement: Louis XIV·, 
the French revolution, the American revolution, the rise of 
Puritanism, the southern secession. 11 66 In 1937, Donald C. 
Bryant gave passing reference to movements in a journal 
article67 ; and in 1943, rhetoricians hit the "mother lode." 
In the same issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
October 1943, Bower Aly and Dallac C. Dickey each gave 
special attention to movements as areas of future research: 
and: 
. we need to study the movements and issues 
in different periods of American history and 
give attention to the interrelations of various 
speakers with the issues. Immediately we think 
of such problems as Abolition. Countering the 
Abolitionists were the forces of pro-slavery. 
Again there are such movements as Temperance, 
Populism, Agrarianism, Woman Suffraget Tariff, 
Labor, Imperialism, and Isolationism. 8 
Movements. American speeches have been peculiarly 
associated with certain great movements of public 
opinion. What were temperance orators like? What 
arguments did they use in persuading their audiences? 
What emotions did they arouse or attempt to arouse? 
What were the effects of their speeches? What did 
their listeners think about them? What kind of men 
were the abolition speakers? Was the movement for 
Woman's Suffrage advanced or impeded by speaking? 
These and countless similar questions confront 
anyone interested both in history and in speechmaking.69 
Two things become apparent about these early calls for 
study of social movements (or historical movements, or 
rhetorical movements). First, they are still largely 
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conceptualized in terms of individual speakers within the 
movement; it is the single orator that sweeps up and surges 
the movement forward rather than the movement providing the 
occasion for the speaker. Second, they open the nasty door 
about which Burke spoke, for they require historical ana3.¥sis. 
It was not until S. Judsen Crandell published his 
monograph on social movements in 1947 that a broader approach 
was taken. Crandell, in what may well be the first major 
theoretical position to view movements as rhetorically 
unique and not an addendum to speaker-oriented studies, 
posited that a "social control study of the public speaking 
activities of a movement involves history, sociology, and 
social psychology."70 He turned to sociological constructs 
to conceptualize the movement because, as he put it: 
The traditional study of individual speakers employs 
a methodology of historical-literary-rhetorical 
criticismwhichhas become fairly well standardized 
and accepted. The application of that method-
ology, however, to a number of speeches by 
different speakers becomes cumbersome in some of 
its divisions and neglects certain aspects of 
social control techniques not usually the concern 
of the rhetorical critic [is Crandell, at this 
early date, providing some justification for the 
study of nonverbal rhetoric?]. It is therefore 
necessary to bring to bear on the problem a 
method~logy of a different sort and of changed 
emphasis.7l 
Crandell relied upon sociologist Jerome Davis' cycle of 
change, which begins with the expression of some need 
resulting in propaganda and agitation. From this there 
develops a growing number who organize and, if successful, 
become the new pattern which must then deal with other 
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movements. 72 Crandell's approach is important for the 
reasons mentioned -- i.e., it broke away from the ''traditional-
ist" school and it gave particular importance to the role 
of persuasion (agitation and propaganda) within the social 
setting. 
If Thonssen and Baird represent the touchstone for 
critics of individual speakers and/or speeches, Leland 
Griffin sets the original standard for most rhetorical 
critics of social movements. Griffin published "The 
Rhetoric of Historical Movements" in the Quarterly Journal 
of Speech in April 1952. Since then, many critics have 
utilized Griffin's methodology or have reacted against it. 
Griffin limits his concern to the rhetoric of persuasion, 
''not through the forces of wealth and arms", and calls 
for the isolation of "the rhetorical movement within the 
matrix of the historical movement. 1173 While Griffin 
establishes a format or cycle of movements, based upon a 
natural history conceptualization, he does place emphasis 
upon the criticism of the rhetorical aspect: 
A first, and obvious, principle is that the critic 
must judge the effectiveness of the discourse, 
individual as well as collective acts of utter-
ance, in terms of the ends projected by the 
speakers and writers. He will not need to be 
cautioned against the error of assuming a 
necessary identity between ends publicly 
announced and those privately maintained. 
A second, and derivative, principle is that 
the critic must judge the discourse in terms of 
the theories of rhetoric and public opinion 
indigenous to the times. This principle means 
that the critic will operate within the climate 
of theory of rhetoric and public opinion in 
which the speakers and writers he judges we7~ 
reared, and in which they practiced •... 
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While such an approach is commendable in dealing with the 
rhetorical acts and in gaining additional insights into 
the justification for selecting a particular course of 
action, to limit the criticism of the rhetoric to that 
prevalent at the times seems to ignore much of the value 
of rhetorical studies. Hopefully, what we have developed 
during decades, even centuries, of study represents some 
advancement. Assuming so, to only utilize what was 
available at the time places unJustified restrictions 
upon the critic seeking t0 completely understand the 
rhetoric of the movement. 
Other writers gave cursory examination to the 
rhetorical criticism of movements throughout the early 
'60's; among them Sillars (who proclaimed that "there 
has been little attention to the rhetoric of movement. 
What pioneer work has been done on the procedure for 
examining movements has not gone much beyond the problem 
of definition.") 75 and Edwin Black. Black included the 
"movement study" as one of three "distinct approaches to 
the practices of rhetorical criticism 
generalizes from Griffin to conclude: 
1176 Black 
They [the techniques for examining the movement] 
are techniques fashioned for the analysis of 
argument on a large scale, for widening the 
scope of the rhetorical critic from the 
individual performance to the sweep of a 
persuasive campaign. And to characterize 
these techniques in this way is to reveal 
their limits as well as their applicability, 
for it is precisely the subJect matter of 
criticism rather than its practice that the 
movement study affects.77 
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Such criticisms, which may well have been justified based 
upon the prevailing practices at the time Black wrote, 
seem nevertheless to be of the same cloth as his criticism 
of the nee-Aristotelian approach; hence, subject to the 
same reJoinder. Such a criticism seems more a fault of 
the practitioner than the theoretical perspective. But, 
if the traditionalist has his cross, so too must the 
student of movements. Many movement studies no doubt fall 
into the same trap as speaker-oriented criticism and 
become monographs on history and sociology rather than 
criticism; 78 but the movement critic who focuses upon 
the symbolic means by which the social setting, the 
issues and the participants are fused together would 
appear to avoid such a trap. 
In 1966, Griffin again broke with the mold and 
advanced "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of 
Movements", based largely upon Kenneth Burke's study 
of languag~ and the nature of hierarchy. Griffin's 
approach still relied upon his earlier concept of move-
ment as progressing through three phases (inception, 
rhetorical crisis, and comsummation), but now the 
emphasis was quite different: 
... man moves through the movements of his 
drama, which are also the movements of his move-
ment: moves, all told, from Order, Guilt, and 
the Negative, through Victimage and Mortification, 
to Catharsis and Redemption. He moves, and is 
moved, through speech -- through the rhetorical 
power of the word, the persuasive power of 
language (for rhetoric is the essentially human 
mode of striving). He is moved by words of 
meaning, value, and desire; words that draw 
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him a fonte, futuristically. And engaged in 
struggle, in the act of strife, he is cleansed 
by the dialectical power of the word, the 
purifying power of language (for dialectic is 
the essentially human mode of transforming). 
And thus, the study of a movement implies the 
study of its rhetoric. And thus the significance 
of "order, the Secret, and the Kill": for 
"to study the nature of rhetoric, the relation 
between rhetoric and dialectic, and the appli-
cation of both to human relations in ~9neral, 
is to circulate about these motives." 
As an example of this approach, it is during the period 
of inception that one finds the rhetoric of an anti-
movement, for it must be founded in the expression of the 
Negative to the established order and to infuse the 
masses with a reJection of the established hierarchy. 
Following the application of Burke's hierarchical 
analysis to social movements, a virtual flood of approaches 
to the study of movement appeared throughout the professional 
journals of rhetoricians and communicationists. In 1970, 
Herbert Simon published the first major journal article 
since 1952 to provide a conceptualization of the rhetorical 
problems of movements. Interestingly enough, it concentrated 
upon a speaker-centered approach to movements and attempted 
to provide an analysis of the difficulties encountered by 
a leader-centered movement: 
Rooted in sociological theory, [this paper] assumes 
that the rhetoric of a movement must follow, 
in a general way, from the very nature of social 
movements. Any movement ... must fulfill the 
same functional requirements as more formal 
collectivities. These imperatives constitute 
rhetorical requirements for the leadership of 
a movement. Conflicts among requirements create 
rhetorical problems which in turn affect 
decisions on rhetorical strategy. The primary 
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rhetorical test of the leader -- and, indirectly, 
of the strategies he employs -- is his capacity 
to fulfill the requirements of his movement by 
resolving or reducing rhetorical problems.BO 
Simons then analyzed,the potential problems, strategies 
and requirements in terms of confrontations between the 
leader and his movement membership, the leader and his 
opposition and the questions of media coverage and physical 
rhetoric. 
Simons' article attempted to analyze the rhetorical 
aspects of a social movement largely from a traditional 
approach -- even though he objected to the applicability 
of "traditional" approaches to the study of movements. 
But what he is essentially doing is analyzing the means by 
which the speaker maintains his credibility and influence 
within both the movement and in opposition to the established 
order. As Simons presents the issue, the leader must 
analyze his audience and make the appropriate response. 
This is not to say that such an approach is not justified 
or valuable; but it does place a concentration upon the 
expressions of leaders which may detract from an analysis of 
broader, more sublimated strands of rhetoric throughout the 
movement. 
Another approach, by Dan F. Hahn and Ruth Gonchar, 
expressed the belief that "social movements can be studied 
through the intertwining of four traditional categories of 
analysis, (ethos, logos, pathos, and style) 1181 
Under ethos, the student will seek to determine the nature 
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"of an ideal member of the movement"; logos will consider 
the premises, arguments, and evidence employed by the 
movement"; as the name suggests, pathos will be revealed 
by discovering which emotions the movement appeals to, which 
are ignored and "the target audiences of the emotional 
appeals"; and finally, style concentrates largely upon the 
metaphorical use of language by movement speakers. 82 
While the authors maintain throughout that each of these 
elements will interact with others, the danger that one 
readily sees apparent from such an approach is that it may 
encourage "cookie-cutter" criticism of social movements. 
The temptation looms large, as under speaker criticism, 
to merely catalogue the various elements and ignore the 
difficult examination of the interactions among them. 
Further, such an approach seems to concentrate the analysis 
upon the intention of the speakers themselves without 
giving sufficient attention to the interaction between the 
movement and the social setting or the movement and those 
it is addressing. 
If Hahn and Gonchar are concerned with the metaphorical 
use of language in movements, as is evidenced by their 
definition of style, then Art Smith finds in metaphor the 
very essence of the movementi 
... while it is possible to examine a movement 
from the viewpoint of a leader and his dilemmas 
[referring to the Simons article], it is crucial 
to a full rhetorical investigation to see what 
kinds of metaphors are employed to fire the 
movement's ideological engines. In other words, 
a sociological based theory is adequate neither 
as a description nor presentation of the rhetorical 
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dimension of a mass movement. What is argued 
then, is a message centered theory that affirms 
the communication phenomenon and explains the 
use of principal metaphors.8 3 
As an example of this validity of metaphor, Smith 
posits that the crucial difference between the civil 
rights movement led by Martin Luther King and the Back-
to Africa movement of Marcus Garvey was the rhetorical 
creation of reality. Smith asserts that 
Little was changed in terms of choices, funda-
mental opposition, followers, and socio-economic 
positions of blacks relative to whites. Rhetoric 
as the producing art defined the metaphors 
that guided the movements, in fact, the metaphors 
were the rhetoric. This point is further 
advertised by the fact that Garvey and King 
were both close enough to the traditional 
prototype of the black orator to attract large 
crowds, both understood certain basic organiza-
tional principles, both possessed a keen sense 
of black history, both had a core of ardent 
followers, both appealed to the middle classes, 
and both led movements that lasted for nearly 
a decade. But studying sociology or history 
alone provides no explication of the external 
and internal messages generated by the movement. 
Not even a combination of these disciplines can 
adequately describe the nature of the communi-
cation inherent in the movement phenomenon. 84 
We would agree with much that Smith claims: for 
instance, equation of rhetoric and metaphor -- for 
both are manifestations of the use of language, that 
rhetoric guides movements depending to some extent upon 
the rhetorical choices made by the leaders or speakers, 
and even that sociology and history cannot "adequately 
describe the nature of the communication inherent in the 
movement. " However, we would not agree with the 
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conclusion which one must derive from this that it is the 
function of these disciplines to do so. Just as we ought 
not to claim too much for rhetoric (for, even as important 
as it is, rhetoric cannot provide all the answers), neither 
should we attack something for not doing what it cannot de 
and does not claim to do. History and sociology (even 
throwing in psychology for good measure) cannot "adequately 
describe" the communication of movements any more than a 
mere analysis of the Back-to-Africa theme can explain the 
sociological and psychological characteristics which either 
made it appropriate or not. We would tend to agree with 
Smith that one major difference between the King and Garvey 
movements was the message and the metaphor; but one cannot 
adequately explain why one metaphor achieved preeminence 
in a given time among a given group, or why it failed to do 
so, without consideration of external factors. 
Sharing Smith's dissatisfaction with sociological 
and historical conceptualizations of movements, largely 
on the grounds that such views obscure our perceptions as 
rhetoricians, Robert Cathcart has proposed an alternative. 
Cathcart argues that a movement is "not a historical palce, 
but a dramatic situation where moral strivings for salvation 
bring human agencies into conflict. 1185 A dramatic theory of 
movement requires a similar definition; which is provided 
by "two Burkeian ratios -- agency-scene and agency-act . 
. for a movement to come into being there 
must be one or more actors who, perceiving that 
the "good order" (the established system) is in 
1186 
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reality a faulty order full of absurdity and 
inJustice, cry out through various symbolic 
acts that true communion, justice, and salvation 
cannot be achieved unless there is an immediate 
corrective applied to the established order. 
On the other hand, there must be a reciprocating 
act from the establishment or counter rhetors 
which perceives the demands of the agitator's 
rhetoric, not as calls for correction or re-righting 
the prevailing order, but as direct attacks on 
the foundations of the established order. It is 
this reciprocity or dialectical enjoinment in 
the moral arena which defines movements and 
distinguishes them from other dramatic forms. 
The essential attribute here is the creation of 
a dialectical tension growing out of moral conflict. 87 
Such an approach seems to verge back to the sociological 
in a number of ways. First, the very nature pf the agency-
scene ratio brings into focus the interaction between the 
rhetoric and the social setting in which it occurs, which 
would require -- if not sociological definitions -- at least 
sociological consideration. Second, the emphasis upon the 
"moral conflict" would tend to limit the concept of movement 
in this instance to only those which might be called value-
oriented, or as we have called them, revolutionary. 
Thus far, several writers have commented on the use-
fulness of certain of Kenneth Burke's ideas as tools of 
analyzing social movements. Griffin relied upon the nature 
of hierarchy and of the negative; Cathcart mentions two 
specific ratios. Perhaps it would be well for us to briefly 
present Burke's notion of the pentad: 
We shall use five terms .... They are: Act, 
Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded state-
ment about motives, you must have some word that 
names the act (names what took place, in thought 
or deed), and another that names the scene (the 
background of the act, the situation in which it 
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occurred); also, you must indicate what person 
or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what 
means or instruments he used (agency), and the 
purpose. Men may violently disagree about the 
purposes behind a given act, or about the character 
of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in 
what kind of situation he acted; or they may 
even insist upon totally different words to name 
the act itself. But be that as it may, any 
complete statement about motives will offer some 
kind of answers to these five questions: wh~ 
was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), 
who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and 
why (purpose) _88 
Without advocating or using what might be called a 
"Burkeian analysis" of social movements, such an overall 
framework does express the interrelationships which we 
advocate should be examined. Additionally, it suggests 
that the use of an act must be in accordance with, appropriate 
to, the remainder of the pentad -- i.e., we wou1a not 
expect a violent call for force from a wovement ostensibly 
dedicated to the promotion of peacen For, in the rhetorical 
act which is part and parcel of the social movement, "such 
naming as friend, foe, automobile or bastard not only names 
things, but in growing out of experience, suggest appropriate 
courses of action. 1189 As Marie Hochmuth Nichols has contended, 
"language-using is an act. The motive is the situation in 
general. Thus words act upon us as the result of an agent 
who uses them, the scene out of which they grow, the purpose 
for which they are intended, and the strategies that are 
employed in manipulating them. . a symbolic situation 
represents a coordination or interrelationship of act, agent, 
agency, purpose and scope [scene]. 1190 
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One aspect of Burke's pentad which is particularly 
flexible in use is the notion of circumference, which for 
Burke means that, "when 'defining by location,' one may 
place the object of one's definition in contexts of varying 
scope. And$ .. the scene-act ratio .•. suggest that. 
the choice of circumference for the scene in terms of which 
a given act is to be located will have a corresponding 
effect upon the interpretation of the act itself .. 1191 As 
an example of this, Burke discusses 'I'homas Mann's work, 
contending that virtually all of the "errors" which marked 
National Socialism were present in Mann's writings. He 
adds, however, that, "He contains them, but encompasses them 
within a wider frame -- and as so encompassed, they act 
entirely differently than they would if 'efficiently' isolatea 
in their 'purity. 11192 The er..tire nature of an act may 
be altered depending upon the context, the circumference 
in which the critic places it. Thus, a traditioPal 
speaker-speech, neo-Aristotelian critic might well focus 
upon a given speech and be ccncernea with the immediate 
audience, while a movement study m~ght place this act, 
within a larger context, in an ePtirely different light. 
It is, then, the rhetorical act -- the use of symbolic 
expression, verbal or not -- that fuses the elements of 
scene, agent, purpose together. And it is ~Le functicn 
of the rhetorical critic to analyze such occurrences and 
to report his interpretations and evaluations to his fellow 
man. Bruce Gronbeck has maintained that there are four 
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classes of force which affect society: social-psychological 
forces (which are beliefs and perceptions creating individual 
and collective attitudes); political-institutional forces 
(the centers of influence among institutions, cultures and 
individuals); philosophical-ideological forces (the valuep 
and ideational structures available); and rhetorical forces. 
It is the latter which are the "great integrative forces. 
Communication binds men into social-psychological groups, 
interlaces centers of power, and gives form to philosophical-
ideological prepositions. It is discourse which allows a 
power-center to advance a philosophy-ideology to a social-
psychological grouping. Rhetorical forces function as 
a set of skills able to create, sustain, and terminate 
movements by uniting the other forces. 1193 It is this view 
of rhetoric, of symbolic action, which appears to us as the 
most reasonable as critics attempting to understand social 
movements. Rhetoric does not explain the existence, the 
growth or failure of movements; but it does become the 
visible product/producer of the interface among the other 
components. "A perfect symbol," writes Geroge Knox, "might 
fuse biographical factors, psychological archetypes, social 
patterns, and specific requirements of formal progression. 11 94 
In order to understand this "perfect symbol" -- the rhetoric 
of social movements, we must often "look to a work by leading" 
oneself "away from it. 1195 It is for this reason that we 
advocate the rhetorical criticism of social movements; and 
that we advocate the use of sociological and psychological 
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constructs, where useful, in the process of rhetorical 
criticism. Perhaps we may find some encouragement, as well 
as awareness of the difficulties of good criticism, in 
Carroll C. Arnold's "Reflections": 
To be comprehensive, rhetorical studies must 
treat the influential roles of untraditional 
media and of nonverbal communication. To be 
incisive, rhetorical studies must probe the various 
aspects of rhetorical transactions philosophically, 
as well as historically, psychologically and 
sociologically. To be penetrating, rhetorical 
studies must probe rhetorical transactions, 
phenomenologically and existentially, as well as 
traditionally. To be clear, rhetorical studies 
must stipulate better than they have how "reason" 
and the "rational" are understood to exist and 
function in communications aiming at influencing 
human choice. Withal, rhetorical studies ought 
not abandon any linguistic, historical, or analytical 
prescience developed through past inquiry and 
experience.95 
Summary 
We have in this chapter attempted to explore some of 
the relationships between rhetoric, criticism and social 
movements. Rhetoric is unquestioningly an influence in 
social movements; and because of this importance, the 
place of rhetorical critics within society is assured. 
However, it is a place which must be claimed -- and it may 
best be done through difficult to do, meaningful criticism. 
Rhetoric is not only the "reasoned discourse" or the good 
man speaking well that many would wish it be. It is, rather, 
vi~tually any form of symbolic action by which man attempts 
to influence his environment. As such, it encompasses the 
traditional platform speech, the media broadcast, the pamphlet; 
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and it also includes the gesture, the nonviolent demonstra-
tion, and other forms of "coercive-persuasion." It is 
because of an attempt at understanding such actions that 
rhetorical criticism may provide such useful functions as it 
explains the phenomenon under examination, interprets it. 
using all there is to use which will add meaning to the act, 
and then evaluates the act in terms of its immediate and its 
"broader-circumferenced" impact and implication. Finally, 
we have reviewed several approaches toward the rhetorical 
study of social movements; opting for one which enables us 
to view the rhetorical (i.e., symbolic) act as integrating 
and fusing the other constituents into an interacting 
relationship. It is an understanding, an illumination, of 
social movements through this integrating element of 
rhetoric that we shall now pursue. 
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Chapter IV 
RHETORIC AND THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MOVEMENTS 
Talking once with a miner I asked him when the 
housing shortage first became acute in his district; 
he answered, "When we were told about it ..•. 11 1 
Introduction 
Social movements have been defined as a form of 
collective action directed toward some change in society 
be it institutional, customary, ideological or whatever --
which exists over time and arises out of some dissatisfaction 
with the present or of some hope for the future. Additionally, 
the movement is composed of a voluntary membership bound 
together by an ideology. 2 It is rhetoric, the symbolic 
expression through which man acts to influence his environ-
ment, that enables such movements to emerge, to develop 
and perhaps to succeed. At the same time, it is often 
rhetoric which sounds the death-knell for a movement's 
acceptance and expansion. If we are to study movements, 
then we must inquire into its rhetoric; and yet our 
inquiry into its rhetoric will prove fruitless unless we 
consider the social forces operating to make it effective 
or not -- for "the rhetorical act of any speaker cannot be 
isolated by the critic from the life-world (Lebenswelt) 
by which the rhetor and his auditors personally construct 
or affirm their intercommunication. 113 
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Any examination of the "social world" requires that 
we consider the discipline of sociology which is defined 
by Talcott Parsons as: 
a science which attempts the interpretive 
understanding of social action in order thereby 
to arrive at a causal explanation of its cause 
and effects. In "action" is included all human 
behaviour when and in so far as the acting indi-
vidual attaches a subJective meaning to it. 
Action in this sense may be either overt or 
purely inward or subJective; it may consist of 
positive intervention in a situation, or of delib-
erately refraining from such intervention or 
passively acquiescing in the situation. Action 
is social in so far as, by virtue of the subJective 
meaning attached to it by the acting individual 
(or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour 
of others and is thereby oriented in its course.4 
Such a conceptualization of sociology reveals a social 
system involving a process of interactions between actors, 
occurring in situations in which the other actors "are 
objects of cathexis." "There is . interdependent and, 
in part, concerted action in which the concert is a function 
of collective goal orientation or common values, and of a 
consensus of normative and cognitive expectations. 115 
In the attempt to discern causal explanations for 
social movements various interpretations of the workings of 
the social system, the interactions among actors, have 
been advanced. This chapter will briefly consider some of 
these approaches and will view the social interactions (largely 
through rhetoric) which emerge from the sociological character-
istics of movements as presented, i.e., the existence of a 
source of strain, an ideology, membership, leadership, 
organization, and social control. 
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General Approaches of Sociology 
While no examination of sociological theory can hope 
to be complete when placed under rather severe space limi-
tations, a brief presentation of some major approaches to 
social change are necessary before any more detailed 
examination of social interactions can be made. This 
section does not attempt to survey all of the theoretical 
analyses of social action; it does, however, present certain 
generalizations from what appear to us as the most pervasive 
in contemporary sociological literature. 
We shall ignore from the outset certain theories 
predicated upon supernatural forces, environmental determin-
ants and biological factors; for, as Amitai and Eva Etzioni 
have written: 
The supernatural theories have been discarded on 
the ground that the factors they deal with are not 
amenable to scientific inquiry; the environmental 
and biological theories because the factors they 
deal with change extremely slowly and therefore 
could hardly explain the changes of human society, 
which are occasionally quite rapid. The amount of 
rainfall in Russia and its racial composition 
hardly changed from 1817 to 1917 and so cannot 
adequately account for the shift from a tsarist 
to a communist regime.6 
Instead, we shall consider theories of class, of status, 
of functional-stratification and of mass-man. 
Perhaps the most widely discussed theory of social 
• 
change, and the one which generates more heated discussion 
than others, is that of class distinctions. Rudolf Heberle 
contends that "the great social movements have very largely 
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been the expression of class sentiments, class aspirations, 
and more or less class-conscious action. 117 While it need 
not be so, most interpretations of class have been derived 
from economic positions and find their genesis in the 
writings of Karl Marx and Fredrich Engles. 
Marxian theory developed from the Hegelian dialectic and 
envisioned a world where economic competition between classes 
would prepare the ground for a new class arrival. Thus, 
from the thesis of fuedalism and the antithesis of serfdom 
arose the synthesis of capitalist economies; which then 
emerged into the thesis of the bourgeois-capitalist and 
antithesis of the proletarian-worker. This is not to say 
that there is constant conflict. In fact, Marx even envisions 
cooperation during stable periods and that some will develop 
a "false class-consciousness'' which means that initial 
loyalties will be to the capitalist and not the proletariat. 
Ultimately, however, polarization between these two classes 
will occur: 
The law of the falling rate of profit, of competi-
tion, overproduction, and periodic depression, of 
the pauperization of the masses, will bring about 
the economic ruin of intermediate layers of the 
population such as shopkeepers, artisans, small 
masters and the like. In time, differences in 
religious belief, regional traditions, rural and 
urban life-styles,skills based on craftsmanship and 
training, even national sentiments will be erased 
by the inevitable march of technological and 
economic change under capitalism. As these differences 
disappear, the increasingly homogenious proletariat 
will become more organized, disciplined, class-
conscious, and militant. In time, the revolutionary 
overthrow of the bourgeois-minority becomes inevitable. 8 
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Two interesting implications emerge from this analysis: 
first, the resulting dictatorship of the proletariat 
becomes uniquely immune from dialectical tension of thesis-
antithesis which predominated all other economic orders 
(and hence, social orders); and second, that class in 
these terms is predominantly economic. We should submit, 
however, that when individuals perceive themselves as 
downtrodden in terms of status, wealth, power and so on, 
the tendency will be inevitably to consider themselves 
as constituting a "class."9 
We should not, however, accept such theories without 
reservation. Seymour Lipset, in a rather long passage, 
raises serious doubts about the "inevitability" of the 
Marxian approach to overcome interest-group differences 
among working classes: 
Before 1914, the classic division between the 
working-class t parties and the economically 
privileged right was not based solely upon such 
issues as redistribution of income, status, and 
educational opportunities, but also rested upon 
civil liberties and international policy. The 
workers, judged by the policies of their parties, 
were often the backbone of the fight for greater 
political democracy, religious freedom, minority 
rights, and international peace, while the parties 
backed by the conservative middle and upper classes 
in much of Eu'rope tended to favor more extremist 
political forms, to resist the extension of suffrage 
to back the established church, and to support 
jingoistic foreign policies. 
Events since 1914 have gradually eroded these patterns. 
In some nations working class groups have proved to be 
the most nationalistic sector cf the population. In 
some they have been in the forefront of the struggle 
against equal rights for minority groups, and have 
sought to limit immigration or to impose racial 
standards in countries with open immigration. The 
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conclusion of the anti-fascist era and the emergence 
of the cold war have shown that the struggle for 
freedom is not a simple variant of the economic 
class struggle.lo 
What seems to be the important factor, mentioned earlier, 
is that economic considerations are not the sole detPrminants 
of social change, and hence, social movements. Economic-
class concepts may be applied to any interest group and it 
may perceive itself as being an "oppressed class," but to 
apply the more traditional Marxian analysis to an examination 
of social movements would seem most profitable in those 
societies characterized by fairly rigid social systems where 
class distinctions are reasonably distinct. In Europe, for 
example, social movements have historically assumed the 
mantle of class distinction; and in underdeveloped countries, 
working class and agrarian interests may agitate for social 
change largely from the perspective of class. 11 
Status is another orientation from which sociologists 
have explained social movements. Such movements are usually 
centered about social values and power considerations and 
have been used as explanations for middle class, conservative 
and Fascist movements. "In contemporary writings, status 
analyses have been most frequently applied to North America 
.. Here, consumer credit and cheap imitations of symbols 
of rank are available to all but the most wretchedly, and 
largely invisible, poor. As a consequence, most Americans 
subjectively consider themselves part of the nebulous 
middle class." 12 The difficulty with such an analysis of 
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social movements is that it does not adequately explain 
middle-class involvement or precipitation of left-oriented 
movements. In terms of status theory, those who are most 
threatened with elimination or decreasing status will initiate 
regressive movements so as to maintain their positions. 
However, often the middle-class has been the primary source 
of leftist movements (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement in its 
early stages and the Peace Movement}. Additionally, differences 
in status may also be perceived as reflecting "class" 
distinctions; and the analysis is not particularly helpful 
in these terms. 
Other theorists tend to view society as structured along 
functional lines. According to some criteria whether it 
be on educational, skill, intelligence levels or even upon 
tolerance for unpleasant work -- distinctions are made among 
positions within society. Those which are deemed as more 
important are then accorded greater reward (either material 
or symbolic) to motivate more capable persons into these 
positions so that society may function more efficiently. 
"Thus", writes Alvin Boskoff, "stratification systems result 
from a combination of (a) specialization, (b) differential 
value of roles, (c) the law of supply and demand, and (d} 
a presumed rationality in ordering or adjusting valuation of 
roles and valuation of persons. 1113 It is this latter 
characteristic that will determine the ideology or values of 
the social order. As such, when the system of rewards is no 
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longer commensurate with necessary skills, intelligence, or 
other determinants of how reward ought to be distributed 
within society (e.g., lower strata may decide that the 
services they perform to society are increasingly important, 
and hence, deserving of greater reward), we may expect 
strains to develop within society. Among those sociologists 
who might be considered as "functionalists" are Talcott 
Parsons, Edward Shils and, although placing greater emphasis 
upon the subJective will of the individual, Max Weber. 14 
The final broad approach we shall consider is that of 
"mass theory." Mass society theorists make significant 
distinctions between earlier and post-industrial societies. 
Whereas pre-industrial life was predicated upon close-knit, 
relatively sroall and stable organizations and relationships, 
the modern, industrial society is characterized by impersonal 
bureaucracies, technological standardization of both products 
and beliefs, and greater central control over the pre-existing 
smaller units of organization. According to Joseph Gusfield, 
"the emphasis is upon the breakdown of immediate relationships 
and differentiations so that the population is now wore 
homogeneous but also less sharply identified and affiliated 
with distinctive social groupings. It is in this sense that 
the theorist of mass society views the traditional categories 
of sociological analysis -- family, class, community, ethnic 
identity, etc. -- as having lost significance in mass societies. 11 15 
It is this breakdown between culturally defined norms and goals, 
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and the structural capabilities of merobe.rs within that 
culture to act congruent with them, that creates anomie 
a breakdown of norms. 16 When man is placed in such a 
position, he may "either ... escape from the burden of 
this freedom [i.e., man is no longer constrained by tradi~ 
tional norms and conduct] into new dependencies and sub-
mission, or to advance to the full realization of positive 
freedoro which is based on the uniqueness and individuality 
of man. 1117 This new freedom ccnsists "in the spontaneous 
activity of the total, integrated personality. 1118 For 
Erich Fromm, this means largely the expression of the 
individual will emotionally, intellectually and sensuously. 
In either instance of man's "escape from freedom", whether 
into new dependencies or spontaneous activity from the will, 
such expression may well lead to the existence of social 
movements to the extent that collective behavior occurs. 
The. notion of "mass society" has largely been advanced 
by Emile Durkheim, A. W. Kornhauser, Rolf Dahrendorf and 
Erich Fromm. But, as Paul Wilkinson has maintained in 
Social Movement, such theorists 
do not begin to explain why some highly industrial-
ized societies have developed powerful totalitarian 
movements while others have net. No adequate 
empirical evidence has yet been adduced to prove 
that, in certain societies, populations are 
foredoomed to a state of nihilism, apathy or 
'privatized' docility. Furthermore, how is one 
to identify a quantitative increase in 'social 
alienation' (which Kornhauser defines as the 
'distance between the individual and his society')? 
Again, although a totalitarian movement or regime 
will, by definition, atteropt to bring all secondary 
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group activity under its own central coPtrol, 
we have no evidence for assuming that pluralist 
groups in non-totalitarian societiI§ have entered 
on a period of inevitable decline. 
It is, in fact, these voluntary associations wh1ch predowinate 
in open-societies and mitigate the effects of anomie. 
Sociologists have debated the merits and demerits of 
these theoretical approaches for decades, and we cannot 
hope to resolve them here. Rather, it seews that each of 
these attempts to account for some imba]ance in society between 
the prevalent values or norms and the capability of individuals, 
or groups of individuals, to live lives, perhaps of quiet 
desparation, which are congruert with the broader, overarching 
values of society. Such theories may be more helpful in 
examining social change, and hence social ffiovements, on an 
individual base depending upon the characteristics of a 
given society (i.e., class distinctions may be more beneficial 
in explaining the socialist movement in Britain than 
the Peace ~ovement in America) than in providing one, all-
inclusive theory for all movements. In each of these 
perspectives, however,with the possible exception of the more 
dogmatic iPterpretations of ~arxism, we can see roan striving 
consciously for greater congruence betweeD societal and 
individual norms and values. Man is an actor within a system 
of actors; and his actions will both be the result of and a 
creator of the system in which he exists. Man acts to the 
extent that he consciously attaches meaning to human behavior 
and he does so largely through ~ymbolic means. 
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Rhetoric and the Social Characteristics of Movements , 
A reading of contemporary literature on soc1al movements 
from a sociological perspective tends to reveal that certain 
characteristics are discussed consistently -- among these 
are the necessity for some source of strain, the ideology, 
membership, leadership, organization and sbcjal control of 
move~ents. Regardless of which specific general approach 
toward social change one takes (that is, whether a class 
theory, status or mass society), these characteristics all 
are equally applicable. In class analysis, the source of 
strain is the natural tension between the capitalist and 
the proletariat, each forced into polarizat.:i_on by mutually 
exclusive interests; the ideology may be provided by the 
theory itself -- the inevitability of the success of the 
proletariat; the membership will be composed of the working 
class; leadership and organization will provide the most 
efficient means of assuring the rise of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat; and the social control employed by the 
capitalists will have an influence upon the specific diffi-
culties which the movement must overcome and how extreme 
the measures taken to insure success must be. While 
specific interpretat10ns or applications will probably differ 
depenc'!ing upon which approach (and consequently what one 
considers the "t:nderlying cause" or the source of strain) is 
used, each of these specific characteristics will appear. 
It is for these reasons, then, that we shall not consider 
each specific theoretical approach and the rhetorical 
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implications arising from it as an analytical tool for our 
study of movements; but rather we shall concentrate upon an 
analysis of each of these components of the movement which 
typify interactions among actors and upon how rhetoric is 
vital for each, and vice versa. Unfortunately, whenever. 
concepts are arbitrarily divided for analysis, interrelation-
ships among them tend to become increasingly obscure. 
Therefore, it is imperative that we remember that ideology 
does not function except in relation with leadership, 
sources of strain, organization and so on. With this 
caveat in mind, let us pursue our study of rhetoric and the 
social characteristics of movements. 
Throughout this study we have maintained that a 
necessary, but not cient, prerequisite for the emergence 
of any social movement is some source of strain, which 
Smelser defined as "an impairment of the relations among 
and consequently inadequate functioning of the components 
of action. 1120 Just as conflict is inevitable, so too is the 
formation of strain within a society. Edward Shils, Talcott 
Parsons and James Olds write: 
There cannot a society in which some of the 
members are not exposed to a conflict of values; 
hence personality strains with resultant pressures 
against the expectation-system the society 
are inevitable. Another basic source of conflict 
is constitutional variability and the consequent 
difficulties in the socialization of the different 
constitutional types. It is impossible for the 
distribution of the various constitutional endow-
ments to correspond exactly to the distribution of 
initial or subsequent roles and statuses in the 
social system, and the misfits produce strains and 
possibly alienation. What is more, the allocative 
process always produces serious strains by denying to 
some members of the society what they think they are 
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entitled to, sometimes exacerbating their demands 
so that they overreach themselves and infringe on 
the rights of others. Sometimes denial deadens 
the motivation of actors to role fulfillment and 
causes their apathetic withdrawal from the roles 
which they occupy. Where the sense of deprivation 
is associated with an identification with a collec-
tivity or a class of individuals who come to identify 
themselves as similarly deprived in their allocation 
of roles, facilities, and rewards, the tasks of the 
control mechanism, thd the strains on the system, 
become heavy indeed.21 
The existence of strains need not necessarily lead to 
a social movement, but to the extent that the sources of 
strain are societally sanctioned and maintained, the 
political authorities will increasingly be held accountable 
for the discrepancy between individual and societal expec-
tations. In the modern state, we can contend that existing 
political entities incur ~uch attacks for two reasons. 
First, the state will be held responsible "not simply by 
default, but because of widespread organizational, 
ideological, or elite-generated expectations that the state 
has ultimate responsibility not only for a narrow set of 
security and regulatory functions but for the general welfare 
of its citizens. 1122 Thus, ambiguities within the political 
system itself will create the tendency to hold the state 
accountable. Second, the state may create new norms and 
values while simultaneously preventing their fulfillment. 
An excellent and recent example is provided by Murray Edelman: 
The enactment of civil rights laws and the 
proclamation of egalitarian public policies are 
symbols that they [Blacks] can expect equal 
treatment and that policymakers view them as 
deserving equal treatment. At the same time, 
these policies cannot effectively convey to the 
Negro living in a ghetto a perception of signifi-
cant advancement toward that happy state of 
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affairs. His experiences in virtually every 
waking moment are unambiguous evidence that he 
is not progressing, that he remains subordinate, 
and that many of the whites he encounters 
expect to exploit him ..•• Insofar as these 
whites are policemen or other local officials, 
their actions and policies effectively counter the 
largely empty rhetoric of national civil rights 
policy .... Such blatant conflict between 
the self-conception and expectations conveyed 
by different public policies inevitably generates 
further alienation, fear, and anger.23 
Thus, because of ambiguity about the responsibilities of 
the state -- ambiguities generated by "official" pronounce-
ments such as "to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general Welfare .... 1124 
-- and of the establishment of values within the society 
which are then thwarted, sources of strain are attributed 
to the State either through commission of ommission. 
One sociological concept which seems most inclusive in 
accounting for sources of strain is that of relative 
deprivation. Relative deprivation is defined as "a 
perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and 
their value capabilities. 1125 Thus, in the example JUSt 
provided, the value expectation would be that blacks are 
entitled to equal treatment, while the value capability would 
be that he is prevented from being treated in this fashion. 
The severity of the perceived discrepancy, or of the depriva-
tion, will depend upon the "distance" between the value 
and the capability and upon the degree of importance which 
the individual attaches to the value. We would also maintain 
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that deprivation can exist among norms as well as values, 
but that the discrepancy between value expectations and 
capabilities will be perceived as more important to the 
individual. 
Three general types of relative deprivation may 
account for most strains. "Decrimental deprivation" 
describes those situations where expectations remain 
relatively stable yet capabilities are perceived to decline. 
Our previous discussion on status theories of social change 
would be an example of decrimental deprivation: the 
individual sees his expectations in terms of the degree of 
status which he ought to have as remaining constant, or 
perhaps increasing. However, he perceives threats to his 
status and seeks to block these changes. If the changes 
have already occurred, he may seek to restore a former 
condition. Often, such types of deprivation are manifested 
in rightest or regressive movements. "Aspirational depriva-
tion" occurs when capabilities remain relatively static 
while expectations increase. This specific form of 
deprivation is also entitled the problem of "rising 
expectations," and is often applied to developing nations. 
However, its applicability to industrialized nations is 
JUst as warranted, witness the example of the black who is 
proclaimed as equal yet prevented from fulfilling his 
expectations. The third and final form of deprivation is 
"progressive deprivation", occurring when expectations 
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arise and capabilities decrease. While probably the least 
common form, we would also expect it to be the most 
intense creating the greatest strain.26 
The values which may be brought into conflict between 
the expectations created in the individual, largely through 
reference groups or society at large, and the capabilities 
to attain value fulfillment have been expressed by Ted 
Robert Gurr as welfare values (those contributing directly 
to physical well-beingand security), power values (the 
extent to which man can control his environment, including 
political participation), and interpersonal values ("the 
psychological satisfactions we seek in nonauthoritative 
interaction with other individuals and groups") . 27 The 
similarities between these value levels and Maslow's need 
levels should be obvious~ 28 As stated previously, we might 
also expect norms to be sources of deprivation as well. 
Just as the miner who was not aware of the housing 
shortage until someone told him about it, deprivation per 
se does not exist either. It must be perceived by the 
individual. Thus, as Denton Morrison has stated, " .•. before 
a goal [norm, value] can be legitimately expected, we must 
presuppose contacts of the kind and intensity that establish 
the awareness, the desirability, and the possibility of 
certain goal-states. 1129 Such behavior, or expectations, 
must be learned, either through experiences which relate 
specifically to the individual or "by identification with 
persons and groups whose investments are perceived as similar 
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to and, thus, no more deserving of, certain awards than 
one's own but Whose actual returns are greater. Thus one 
comes legitimately to expect returns equivalent to persons 
in such 'reference groups. 11130 Such "learning" may be 
either through rhetoric or through the socialization process 
in either case through symbolic means. 
Some sociologists have contended that relative depriva-
tion does not adequately explain all social movements. Robert 
Lauer, examining the LSD movement, which assumes the 
characteristics of Blurner's expressive movement, argues 
that it "appealed strongly to mature, educated, and 
successful people. Among the thirty-five participants in 
the Zihuatanejo proJect [a proJect experimenting with LSD 
in Mexico], for example, were six clinical psychologists, 
five businessman [sic], threephysicist-engineers, three 
teachers, three artists, a rabbi, a minister, a psychophar-
macologist, an editor, and an architect. 1131 Lauer concludes 
from this description of participants that "members are not 
necessarily the most deprived segments of the population 
nor even those who experience relative deprivation. 1132 
While we would certainly agree that one usually does not 
think of clinical-psychologists and rabbis as being ''deprived" 
(although teachers may well be), it seems as if Lauer is 
only considering deprivation in an economic sense. If 
one considers the values expressed by Gurr, particularly 
those of interpersonal values or those relating to the higher 
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need levels in Maslow's hierarchy, such a blanket denial 
no longer seems supportable. 
This is not to say that deprivation need always result 
in action. Those who are the most deprived, and who have 
been so for so long that they have come to accept their 
fate, most probably will not perceive discrepancies between 
expectations and capabilities. Or, if they do, they will 
not perceive them as being obtainable. Seymour Lipset 
analyzed the plight of such people: 
Extreme ignorance and illiteracy [often signs of 
severe deprivation] make communication and under-
standing of any political program difficult. 
People completely occupied by the day-to-day 
task of keeping alive have no surplus of time and 
energy to invest in long-run ventures for better-
ment through political action. They may also be 
too powerless to stand up to the economic pressure 
or viole~~e used against them by local privileged 
classes. 
Such symptoms are characteristic of many blacks prior to 
the moves for equality. 
We have discussed deprivation largely in abstract 
terms; but the dissatisfactions which are most real to 
individuals are "usually related to rather limited social 
settings (e.g., the family, the job, transportation, leisure-
time for specific social categories, and religious groups) • 1134 
Thus, the deprivation has social implications only to the 
extent that it affects interactions between actors; but it 
must appeal initially to personal values. Theodore Abel, 
writing in 1937, discussed the dual nature of deprivation: 
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No movement can occur unless personal values are 
involved, such as social status, income and so 
forth. This was the case in the Hitler movement, 
insofar as it grew out of the dissatisfaction and 
opposition induced by such events as the revolution 
of 1918, the inflation, the economic insecurity 
of the white-collar class, unemployment -- all 
of which affected directly the personal welfare 
of many individuals. But for a movement to 
materialize, a threat of impairment of personal 
values must be linked to the experience of a threat 
of impairment of social values. These values 
are shared by members of the same group or 
community, such as traditions, jroup prestige, 
group symbols, and possessions. 5 
Thus, when social strain exists, attempts are made to relate 
this strain to an individual, i.e., to make him aware of 
his deprived state and to appeal to his own recognized 
deprivations, while also relating such deprivation to socially 
shared values. In the example of the black, the individual 
must recognize the discrepancy between values of being 
treated with dignity and as an equal to others with the 
"reality" of being denied such dignity and equality. In 
order to create the foundations of a movement, however, 
others must share his feelings -- they must be reconstituted 
in terms of social values, such as racial equality. As 
Neil Smelser concluded, "attempts are made to move to 
higher-level components, reconstitute them, then incorporate 
the new principles back into the more concrete, operative 
levels of social action. 1136 If initial efforts to create 
feelings of deprivation fail, then efforts are usually made 
to appeal to higher order values; and then to reconstitute 
back to the more specific. Thus, the rhetor attempting to 
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to create feelings of deprivation will attempt to place 
smaller, more specific actions which have significance 
for the individual in the context of broader, more socially 
shared symbols or traditions (which also can be understood 
only symbolically).- If the symbolic structure at the higber 
order is appropriate, it can then be "re-translated" by 
others back into more specific actions which then have 
individual significance for them. The result is that 
movement "rhetorics .•• seize on conditions of real depri-
vation or on sharp discrepancies between conditions and 
expectations -- the reformist urging change or repair of 
particular laws, customs or practices, the revolutionary 
insisting that a new order and a vast regeneration of values 
are necessary. .. 37 Deprivation is thus both constructed 
by rhetoric and a force which calls it forth. 
The rhetoric which identifies personal and social 
levels of deprivation as elements of a unified concept 
will more than likely express the ideology of a movement. 
The term ideology, as originally coined by an eighteenth 
century French philosopher named Destutt de Tracy, referred 
to the search for truth by means other than faith and 
authority, the traditional methods advocated by Church 
and State. For de Tracy, one "'purified' ideas by 
reducing them to sense perceptions -- a belated French 
variant of British empiricism with a barely concealed 
anti-religious bias -- and this new science he called 
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'ideology. 11138 It was Marx who put this term through a 
twist in interpretation that remains with us today. In 
his German Ideology, Marx linked traditional conceptuali-
zations of ideology to philosophical idealism, or that 
ideas independently have the power to reveal truth and 
consciousness. Marx did not accept such linkings, however, 
and maintained that this was "false since 'existence 
determined consciousness' rather than vice versa; any attempt 
to draw a picture of reality from ideas alone could produce 
only 'false consciousness. 11139 Marx proceeded one step 
further, however, and argued that ideologies in fact masked 
particular group interests. They claim to be true; but 
are actually expressions of group interest. It is this 
usage which is currently more predominant. 
For most sociologists, "every revolution has a great 
myth or ideology. 1140 And, while stated somewhat differently, 
most would also agree with Alan Haber's explication of an 
ideology: 
Ideology as an intellectual production has 
several elements: 1) a set of moral values, 
taken as absolute, 2) an outline of the "good 
society" in which those values would be realized, 
3) a systematic criticism (or, in the case of 
status quo ideology, affirmation) of the present 
social arrangements and an analysis of their 
dynamics, 4) a strategic plan of getting from the 
present to the future (or, in the case of status 
quo ideology, how continued progress is built 
into the existing system) .••• 
For ideology to be linked to a political move-
ment and for that movement to develop a mass 
following certain requisites must be met: 1) the 
ideas must be easily communicated which usually 
involves their simplification and sloganization, 
2) they must establish a claim to truth, and 3) they 
must demand a commitment to action.41 
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It is largely through such cries as "Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity," as "Freedom Now," "Back to Africa," and others 
that the ideology of a movement, albeit a bit truncated, is 
expressed. All of the elements mentioned by Habar can be 
found, or can be interpreted as being found, in such 
statements. 
Recently, an idea has circulated to the effect that we 
have experienced the "end of ideology." Daniel Bell maintains 
that: 
Few serious minds believe any longer that one 
can set down "blue-prints" and through "social 
engineering" bring about a new utopia of social 
harmony. At the same time, the older "counter-
beliefs" have lost their intellectual force as 
well. Few Jclassic" liberals insist that the 
State should play no role in the economy, and 
few serious conservatives ... believe that 
the Welfare State is the "road to serfdom." In 
the Western World, therefore, there is today a 
rough consensus among intellectuals on political 
issues ••.. In that se~~e, • the 
ideological age has ended. 
Such a belief is predicated upon an apparent disillusion-
ment among many scholars following the Second World War 
and with the inability of Marxism to achieve the predicted 
utopias. Marxism thus no longer appears as a viable 
intellectual-political system. Further, class conflict 
within the Western World, in terms of Western Europe and 
the United States, no longer seems as perilous as it once 
did; and the political problems facing modern states are 
not easily resolved by appeals to "conservatism" or "state-
• 11 43 operation. 
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Such a position, while defensible if one equates only 
Marxism and its ideological counterparts (conservatism or 
classical-liberalism) as ideology, seems overly restrictiveo 
The failure of Marxism as an ideological foundation for 
social change in the West must not be equated the end of• 
ideology. While the cries of "Freedom Now" and "Black 
Power" do not entail nearly so extensive a formulation of the 
world as did the Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital, 
failure to recognize that they encompass a set of moral 
values, a vision of the "good life", a criticism of the 
existing structure Just as did "workers of the world, Unite!" 
is to ignore their justification and power. 
Bell seems to equate the slogans per se with the 
ideology which they represent; and given this perspective 
he may well be correct -- at least to the degree that a 
movement cannot call for freedom and equality in opposition 
to established political order. But what he apparently 
does not recognize is that the conceptualization of freedom 
for the white policeman in Chicago or Los Angeles may be 
quite different for the black, Chicano'or Oriental who 
protests for equality. Ideology in terms of massive, 
world-wide appeals like Marxism may well be dead; but 
ideology as a moral orientation for groups of people is not. 
From the examples we havegivenof ideological slogans, 
one might conclude that ideologies are rather broad statements 
of general belief. In fact, Rudolf Heberle, a sociologist, 
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writes that "modern social movements typically resort to 
abstract principles concerning the nature of man, his 
destination, and his natural rights in combination with a 
certain critique of the existing economic, political and 
cultural institutions. 1144 And Herbert Simons, a rhetorician 
(in the broadest sense), maintains that "mass support is 
more apt to be secured when ideological statements are 
presented as 'generalized beliefs,' oversimplified concep-
tions of social problems, and magical, 'if-only' beliefs 
about solutions. 1145 Such statements appear to receive confirm-
ation with "Freedom Now" and "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." 
A more fundamental statement, one which apparently 
raises a rhetorical dichotomy, is made by Edwin Black: 
It is well known that we are much more likely to 
respond to concrete language than to abstraction, 
particularly when our convictions are as yet 
unformed or uncommitted. We would unhesitatingly 
acknowledge our disapproval of hunger and starvation, 
but this disapproval would be of a concept merely. 
We must apprehend specific cases of starvation, 
either directly, imaginatively, or through the 
medium of descriptive language, before we experience 
a strong affective response. Abstract nouns 
such as democracy, freedom, equality, salvation, 
the fatherland, power, grace, may, as a result of 
prior conditioning or prior persuasion, have 
become so deeply associated with a person's 
values and point of view that they have the ability 
to evoke in him an emotional response. But 
when, at the beginning of a suasive process, 
one's conversion still hangs in the balance, 
abstractions do not have the power to move one to 
a new conviction. 46 
Two implications from this apparent dichotomy tend to make 
it less severe, however. First, Black's call for specificity 
states that we must "apprehend specific cases of starvation, 
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either directly, imaginatively, or through ..• language. 
To those of a specific group who experience starvation, or 
its more latent causes, the phenomenological foundations of 
sources of strain have already been apparent. There is no 
need for "descriptive" language -- it is already such that 
language can probably only evoke the specific experiences 
of the individual involved. Secondly, the dichotomy can be 
resolved rhetorically, through the linking of the specific 
(e.g., unemployment) to the general, value-laden symbol 
of racial discrimination. Black is probably correct to 
some extent, as are Simons and Heberle -- but once the 
rhetorical link has been forged, the unique capacity of 
symbolism can carry within one term the specific personal 
slight and the moral wrong perpetrated by society. It is 
this multivalence, the "capacity to express simultaneously 
several meanings the unity between which is not evident on 
the place of inunediate experience" which is the essential 
character of religious symbolism according to Mircea Eliade. 
We would extend the circumference of "religious symbolism 11 
such that it includes, in varying degrees, all symbols. 
Eliade continues: 
This capacity of religious symbolism to reveal a 
multitude of structurally united meanings has an 
important consequence: the symbol is capable of 
revealing a perspective in which diverse realities 
can be fitted together or even integrated into 
a "system" .... One cannot sufficiently insist 
on this point: that the examination of symbolic 
structures is a work not of reduction but of 
integration. One compares and contrasts two 
expressions of a symbol not in order to reduce 
them to a single, pre-existent expression, but 
in order to discover the process by w~~ch a structure 
is capable of enriching its meanings. 
II 
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It is the function of uniting the individual with others, 
of creating a community, as well as providing mental 
reminders "of the nature and causes of his discontent" 
that such slogans as we have presented perform. 48 
We have previously discussed how reform movements, 
which call for normative changes in specific customs, laws 
and so on, may be transformed into revolutionary movements, 
which call for structural changes predicated upon values. 
This is in fact a primary distinction made by Smelser in 
types of social movements. 49 Similarly, Seymour Lipset 
argues that tensions, or sources of strain, which are 
resolved one at a time usually produce stable political 
systems. The Progressive Period in the United States would 
be an example. However, "carrying issues from one historical 
period to another makes for a political atmosphere characterized 
by bitterness and frustration. Men and parties 
come to differ with each other, not simply on ways of 
settling current problems, but on fundamental and opposed 
outlooks. This means that they see the political victory 
of their ooponents as a major moral threat .••• 1150 
With the escalation to moral levels, social movements no 
longer have programs obtained for a specific purpose; but 
develop ideologies encompassing moral positions. It is 
at this point that elements of social control will be more 
firm, and that the conflict will further intensify. Thus, 
the inherent Catch 22 of the emerging social movement appears: 
- 134 -
if sources of strain are maintained at specific levels, the 
impact of them may not be significant enough to warrant 
collective action, and if the movement is to attract a 
following it must use appeals that will make the source of 
deprivation shared (or "socialized"). It is at that instant, 
however, that moral, or value-laden terms and judgments 
are attached which make it more difficult for the established 
order to accept change and more difficult for the emerging 
movement to accept limited change which will alleviate the 
specific source of deprivation upon which the movement was 
founded. "The change we are speaking of is represented in 
the difference between conceiving of a problem as a misfortune 
and conceiving of it as a state if inJustice. 1151 The difficulty 
is presented by Anthony Oberschall: 
•.• conf]icts over symbols [those reflecting 
morals and value-Judgments] tend to be more intense 
and more difficult to regulate than nonsymbolic 
conflicts. Symbols are collective representations 
expressing the moral worth, claim to status, and 
collective identity of groups and comrounities. 
The defense of these symbols is seen as an unselfish 
action worthy of group suoport; disresoect for 
svmbols or an attempt to substitute different 
symbols will be perceived as an attack on the 
integrity~ moral standing, sense of identity, and 
self-respect of the entire nation or group, 
threatening the basic consensus and the principle52 of legitimacy uoon which social order is founded. 
This observation, which is qu~te close to that of Georq 
Simme1, 53 also helps explain the role of the intellectual 
or, as Eric Hoffer would describe him, the man of words --
in the social movement. They have historically "obJectified" 
the movement from soecific, concrete conflicts of interest 
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between groups into conflicts of ideas, of ideologies. 
This may well constitute the main energizinq force and the 
main hindrance of the movement. 
Besides providing the primary means of extendinq 
specific personal perceptions of deprivation into social,. 
shared perceptions which permits the movement's emergence, 
ideology performs a number of other social and psychological 
functions. While the two are inextrically entwined, we shall 
here concentrate upon the social and discuss the psychological 
implications later. By far, the most important is that 
of promoting identification among members_., 
Identification represents an attempt by man to overcome 
his inherent division; for, as Kenneth Burke has told us, 
"Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely 
because there is division. Identification is compensatory 
to division. If men were not apart from one another, 
there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their 
unity. 1154 In his attempts to overcome division, the movement's 
rhetorician must persuade men that their interests are the 
same, or at least that they perceive them to be so. Burke 
seems to discuss three forms which identification may take, 
each of which may be found in the social movement. In 
the first, identification is predicated uoon perceived 
similarities between the individuals or groups involved 
"I was a farmer once myself." Burke refers to this as 
identification through properties, most often materialistic, 
but auite possiblv meta-physical as well. 55 Thus, we would 
here emphasize the similarities by which men may be identified. 
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Burke's second form of identification results from the 
omnipresent division among men; and if we may identify on 
the basis of that which we share in common, so too may 
we identify through that which we both dislike. Burke 
refers to this as the "dialectic of the scapegoat"; but is 
quite clear about its identifying potential: 
••• a scapegoat cannot be "curative" except 
insofar as it represents the iniquities of those 
who would be cured by attacking it. In representing 
their iniquities, it performs the role of vicarious 
atonement (that is, unification, or merger, granted 
to those who have alienated their iniquities upon 
it, and so may be purified through its suffering). 56 
Burke concludes that this "new merger" presents "the 
unification of those whose purified identity is defined in 
dialectical opposition to the sacrifical offering. 1157 
The third form of identification is made both by the 
individual and, probably more importantly, by others 
the identification of "autonomous activity." Burke is 
referring to the identification of an individual with a 
larger grouping, based primarily upon specialized activities. 
For example, Burke writes that: 
Any specialized activity participates in a larger 
unit of action. "Identification" is a word for 
the autonomous activity's place in this wider 
context, a place with which the agent may be 
unconcerned. The shepherd, qua shepherd, acts 
for the good of the sheep, to protect them from 
discomfiture and harm. But he may be "identified" 
with a project that is raising sheep for market. 58 
In the same way, because of specialized activities, men 
may be "identified" with social classes or with protesting 
groups. Ideology appears to perform identification for the 
first two forms of identification, and perhaps the third 
as well. But it seems more likely that the actions of social 
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control may well be the best promoters of this last form (an 
area which will be discussed subsequently). 
Identification through similarity may be achieved 
through the means of "symbolic inclusion." A common theme 
of Nazi rhetoric was the "historical community and accomplish-
ments of the Germanic people. Traditions symbolizing German 
unity were revived or created out of whole cloth, Germanic 
culture was glorified. 1159 If the collectivity being 
forged has experienced deprivation for considerable periods 
of time and does not have a positive self-concept, ideology 
may provide the self-image -- a self-image which links one 
of this groupwith its other members. A good example is provided 
by Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith in their analysis of 
dominant themes of black militancy: 
a. We are already dead. In the world as it is, 
we do not count. We make no difference. We 
are not persons. "Baby, it don't mean shit 
if I burn in a rebellion because my life ain't 
worth shit. Dig?" 
b. We can be reborn. Having accepted the evaluation 
of what1s, agreeing to be the most worthless 
of things, we can be reborn. We have nothing 
to hang on to. No old identity to stop us 
from identifying with a new world .... You, 
the enemy, on the other hand, must cling to 
what is, must seek to stamp out the flames, 
and at best can only end sorrowing at a world 
that cannot remain the same. 
c. We have the stomach for the fight; you don't. 
Having created the Manichean world, having 
degraded humanity, you are overwhelmed by 
guilt. The sense of guilt stops your hand, for 
what you would kill is the world you have made. 
d. We are united and understand. We are united 
in a sense of past dead and a present that is 
valuable only to turn into a future free of 
your degrading dornination.60 
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Such an ideological presentation meets most of the "character-
istics" of ideology presented by Haber; but they do so 
predominantly through creating a common identity through 
shared perceptions. Admittedly the elements of "scape-
goating" are also present -- we would be surprised to fintl 
any ideology which would not exhibit both -- but the major 
theme is the sharing of oppression, of a common meta-physical 
reality and a common denial of material benefits. It is 
through the unique properties of symbolism, of rhetoric, that 
group consensus is thus attained: "The Cross and the Crescent, 
the Stars and Stripes and the Hammer and Sickle, the Magna 
Charta, the Declaration of Independence. are and will 
continue to be potential forces for creating and maintaining 
consensus. 1161 It is because of the capacity for striking 
to personal values as well as to providing a broader over-
arching value which can encompass many of these personal exper-
iences that symbols are able to create the unification, the 
identification, of social collectives. 
If ideology and its attendant symbols provide the 
means of inclusion, they also provide the means of exclusion, 
of setting the group in question apart from the larger society. 
Just as the black ideology presented above provided common 
properties for one group, i.e., courage for a fight, it 
denied those same values to the other, out-groups. In so 
doing, ideology performs the second type of identification 
based on common enemies -- or scapegoating. The value of 
the scapegoat is that he, and he alone, can absorb the guilt 
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of social movement's denial of the values upon which society 
has been structured: 
Though hierarchy [social stratification] is exclusive, 
the principle of hierarchy is not; all ranks can 
"share in it alike." But: It includes also the 
entelechial tendency, the treatment of the "top" or 
"culminating" stage as the "image II that best repre- · 
sen ts the entire "idea." This leads to "rrlystifica-
tions" [or, as some sociologists have used the 
terw, distance] that cloak the state of division, 
since the "universal" principle of the hierarchy 
also happens to be the principle by which the most 
distinguished rank in the hierarchy enjoys, in the 
realm of worldly property, its special privileges. 
Hence, the turn from courtship to ill will, with 
ironic intermediate grades. At the sta~e of 
blunt antithesis, each class [or strataJ would deny, 
suppress, exorcise the elements it shares with 
other classes. This attempt leads to the scapegoat •• 
Thus, the scapegoat becomes the receptacle for all the sins 
of the rebelling collective; and it is through the destruc-
tion of the scapegoat, real or symbolically, that sin is 
expiated. 
Concurrently, however, the scapegoat loses his human 
qualities and becomes not a social being but an obJect 
"embodying a particular abstract function: aggression, 
evil, domination, obedience, and so on. [He does] not exist 
for mutual role taking, but .•. serve [s] the function 
in the mythic scenario that ••• inherent nature requires 
The political mytbs portray scenarios of manichean 
struggle or of a stratified, social order in which all must 
play their parts. n63 Not only does he lose his 
humanity, but the ideal scapegoat -- or "devil" for Eric 
Hoffer -- must assume mythic proportions beyond those of 
mere roortals. He becomes the sole cause, the one adversary, 
62 
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which has prevented the rightness of the social movement's 
doctrines being practiced. It was for these reasons 
that, when "Bitler was asked whether he was not attributing 
rather- too much importance to the Jews, he exclaimed: 'No, 
no, no! . . It is impossible to exaggerate the formidable 
quality of the Jew as an enemy .. ' Every difficulty and failure 
within the movewent is the work of the devil, aPa every 
success is a triumph over his evil plottir ..g. " 64 The "devil" 
rriay assume any form -- be he l.Tew, black, "hankie,·' 
Establishment, "commie" or whatever; but the symbolic 
attributes attached to him will convey the antithesis of 
those attached to the movement through its ideology. In 
the early days of the New Left, "devil terms" such as 
"competition, alienation, conformity, absurdity (the irrational), 
loneliness, passivity, fear, bondage (authoritarianism), 
hate" were prevalent. In contrast, "god terms" were associated 
with the New Left -- "cooperation, identification, commitment, 
sanity (the rational), community, action, freedom (autonomy), 
love, peace" and so on. 65 From this, a conflict occurs 
between the symbolic representations of good and evil, between 
the movement and the repressive social structure. 
We have examined the nature of identification in terms 
of both its inclusiveness and its exclusiveness; but the 
function of ideology is broader than this. It also provides 
a weltanschauung, or world-view, to the participant by 
which he can structure his life and attribute cause within 
it. Most ideologies relate to both the past and the future as 
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referents for the present. By referring to a glorious 
past, the ideology of a movement can perform two vital func-
tions: First, it can attribute some particular character-
istics to the rebelling group (a glorious past, a strong 
heritage, and so on). Such appeals need not be limited to 
positive characteristics; but through rhetoric such "unheroic" 
circumstances as slavery, bondage and so on can be re-
structured and presented as demonstrating the superiority 
of the enslaved group -- after all, if they had not been 
endowed with unusual characteristics, how could they have 
survived such horrendous conditions. The second function 
of restructuring a past, not necessarily accurately, is to 
justify the existing protest and to belittle the present. 
But the past is not left alone; for most movement 
ideologies present a utopian element -- a plan for the 
future. Bush and Denisoff maintain that "this applies not 
only to the left wing movements but also to movements of 
the right. To argue that right wing extremists desire to 
go back in time does not refute the fact that their idealized 
conceptions of the past become incorporated irto their 
utopian plan for the future. 1166 Devil terms will b~ applied 
to the past and to the future; and it is in the future that 
the benefits of the "good society" envisioned by the movement 
and its ideology will be realized. Such convictions are 
given strength by the exhorter who, "clad in the mantle of 
prophecy, proclaims that there will be" social change: 67 
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When the present is viewed in the perspective of a mere, 
and very transient, link between a glorious past and a 
l 
glorious future, it loses much of its mystification; and 
hence, much of its hold over the values of the people. 
By recognizing that any ideology is symbolic, we 
inherently recognize that it too is a "deflection of reality." 
But such distortion may often be heightened when the ideology 
seeks to move the level of experiential misfortune to that 
of social, or moral, inJustice. Saul Alinsky, a professional 
organizer, presents the example of the American Revolution: 
Jefferson, Franklin, and others were honorable men, 
but they knew that the Declaration of Independence 
was a call to war. They also knew that a list of 
many of the constructive benefits of the British 
Empire to the colonists would have so diluted the 
urgency of the call to arms for the Revolution as 
to have been self-defeating. The result might well 
have been a document attesting to the fact that 
justice weighted down the scale at least 60 per 
cent on our side, and only 40 per cent on their 
side; and that becuase of that 20 percent difference 
we were going to have a Revolution. To expect a 
man to leave his wife, his children, and his home, 
to leave his crops standing in the field and pick 
up a gun and Join the Revolutionary Army for a 20 
per cent difference in the balance of human Justice 
was to defy common sense.68 
It is, then, the purpose of ideology to give expression to 
the grievances which precipitate the movement. In doing so 
the ideology will encompass the symbolic means by which men 
are identified and by which they may expiate their guilt. 
It provides them with a view of the world which promises them 
a future free of the grievances which have mobilized them, 
and at the same time diminishes the importance of the present. 
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Two further implications emerge from tris ideology. 
First, if the movement is to succeed, the ideology (or program) 
must relate specifically to the perceived deprivations of the 
masses. The Union Party which campaigned on a platform of 
financial reform faced apotentially receptive audience in 1936. 
But the party refused to relate the ideology and its more obvious 
symbols to the perceived needs of the voters: "DE:spite over-
whelming evidence that prospective ••• supporters were concerned 
mainly with personal economic recovery, party speakers discussed 
economics solely in institutional terms. 11 69 The voters might face 
problems of acquiring enough food, clothing and shelter for 
their families; but the Union Party was concerned primarily 
with paying of a national debt. 
The second implication arising from an ideology is that once 
the membership has accumulated and accepted the ideology, fail-
ure of the movement to accomplish its goals may well precipitate 
further perceptions of relative deprivation, perhaps leading to 
more extreme movements or voices within the original. Just as 
the "established society" may create perceived deprivation by 
promulgating values and then denying the capabilities for reach-
ing them, so too may the social movement. Parke G. Burgess 
indicates thatthis may have accounted for some of the disillusion-
ment and splintering in the Civil Rights Movement as it moved 
from the South into different conditions in the North: 
"Freedom Now" appealed to the clear-cut legal issues 
in the South •••• Confronted by the more subtle mach-
inations of the culture at large, this rhetoric seemed 
to get a response to which Negro citizens had long been 
accustomed: promises, delays, and piecemeal tokens 
could only be taken now as an actual denial. 
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King has said, with some pain, that the very 
success of the rhetoric of Freedom Now, the "positive 
gains" it in part produced, only made matters worse. 
This rhetoric was most effective in raising the 
hopes and expectations of Negro citizens. When 
hopes and expectations were not realized, however, 
they seemed cynically to produc70worse conditions, 
especially in Northern ghettos. 
It is for these reasons that the ideology must at the same 
time provide the appeals for justice at a social level, 
probably encompassing demands of morality, while at the 
same time responding and presenting hope for the specific 
grievances of the individual member. 
Even with the existence of specific grievances and an 
ideology which expresses those grievances, the reasons for 
an individual Joining a particular social movement must 
receive further analysis. To be sure, since each man 
retains the ultimate choice over his social acts, such an 
analysis must consider psychological factors; but to the 
extent that a social system is defined as the attachment of 
meaning to interactions between individuals, sociology 
may provide some useful insights. 
One of the most complete, and yet at the same time 
least complete, analyses is that man acts as he does 
because he shares interests and perspectives with those 
individuals surrounding him. Robert Merton's "reference 
theory" advocates additionally that man can also be 
perceived as acting because of groups which he does not 
perceive himself as being a potential member: 
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That men act in a social frame of reference 
yielded by the groups of which they are a part 
is a notion undoubtedly ancient and probably 
sound. • There is, however, the further 
fact that men frequently orient themselves to 
groups other than their own in shaping their 
behavior and evaluations .... 
In general, then, reference group theory aims to 
systematize the determinants and consequences of 
those processes of evaluation and self-appraisal 
in which the individual takes the values or stan-
dards of other individuals and ~1oups as a 
comparative frame of reference. 
Thus, an individual who is "socialized" into a particular 
group will have a tendency to behave in certain ways, 
largely because the norms of the group have been internalized. 
Man performs, or fulfills, certain "roles" which are struc-
tured patterns of behavior appropriate to particular social 
situations. 
While such a concept may be helpful, it does not explain 
why, or how, membership within a given movement occurs. 
To understand the significance of role, we must refer to 
G. H. Mead's notion of the socialization of the individual 
through the creation of "generalized other." A biological 
unit, man, is born into a particular community largely by 
virtue of temporal and geographic determination. By his 
very nature, man will make "gestures" and, when some meaning 
is attached to a gesture by other biological units through 
some adjustive response, he develops "symbols." Importantly, 
it is the consequence which is anticipated from the fulfill-
ment of the gesture that requires the adjustive response, and 
hence, its meaning. 72 Through play and games, the child learns 
to apply meaning to specific stimuli or gestures -- and to 
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anticipate the responses of others, largely through 
organized games. He must understand the anticipated conse-
quences of any action not only through his own eyes but 
through an awareness of the responses of others. It is in 
this fashion that the child begins to assume "roles:" 
Each one of his own acts is determined by his 
assumption of the action of the others who are 
playing the game. What he does is controlled by 
his being everyone else on that team, at least in 
so far as those attitudes affect his own parti-
cular response. We get then an "other" which is 
an organization of the attitudes of those involved 
in the same process.73 
By expanding the circumference of the "game," the 
individual expands his concept of other into a "kind of 
corporate individual, a plural noun, a composite photo-
graph. 
role-taking," 
It is the universalization of the process of 
i.e., a "generalized other. 1174 Thus, the 
individual takes attitudes (formed symbolically through 
social interaction) of other humans toward himself and 
still other humans into his realm of personal experience in 
order for him to function without conflict. He must 
additionally, however, take the "other's" attitudes toward 
"the various phases or aspects of /he common social activity 
.•• in which they are all engaged. 1175 It is this attitude 
toward the larger social system which then permits the 
individual to define and to develop his "self." 
Two further terms must be introduced into our discussion 
of Mead -- the "I" and the "me" which are the components of 
the developed self. The "I" is that part which is unique, 
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assertive and subJective which must be so because ultimately, 
each individual retains some degree of intuitive force which 
is not found in social relationships; and the "me" is 
objective and formed from the values of the social group. 
The "me" limits individual expression, or acts as a censor 
to the "I" and promotes social stability. Thus, the "me" 
tends to shape man's reactions to society and to his own 
attitudes; but it is that something "new" which continually 
emerges in social relationships which demands an "I" 
response. And it may well be that "I" response which 
signifies an acceptance of a social movement. 
From this we might expect that a given individual will 
tend to behave in accordance with specific groups with whom 
he has interaction, his total "self" being an amalgam of the 
values and attitudes held by the specific groups with whom he 
has contact. If an individual has contact with limited 
numbers of groups, or if his social interactions in relation 
I 
to a particular issue are bound only within one group, then 
he is likely to have only the one perspective. Murray Edelman 
writes that the ability "to be self-critical (and therefore 
tentative, skeptical, and curious) is a function of the number 
of roles •.• a person can take or of his internalization of 
76 a generalized other." If the individual is exposed to 
many interactions with different groups, he is likely to 
attempt to incorporate many partially-competing attitudes and 
to develop a diversified self-concept which permits under-
standing of other positions. 
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It-is through such capacities to-expand-interactions 
with others, either directly or mediated through such factors 
as communication media and education, that one may develop 
a reference group which is beyond the specific group within 
which one exists due to geography or class status. It i~ 
through such an acceptance that we may explain an intellectual's 
identification with lesser privileged classes. He may either 
accept the less privileged groups' value system, hence acting 
in accordance with that group's values or attitudes toward 
social structures, or he may expand his horizon and include 
as his reference group the society as a whole and maintain 
that social values exist which supersede those of his parti-
cular group; and thus change his attitudes toward those of 
the higher, or larger, group. In either case, it is through 
his capacity to change the orientation of his "universal 
other" that he brings into question the values of one 
particular group. 
We generally assume, in a pluralist nation such as 
this, that individuals will be members of several groups and 
that this multitude of interactions will more completely 
integrate the individual into the "mainstream of society." 
Even in a society which has distinctive social strata, the 
potential for social mobility often reduces the potential for 
social movements. 77 But, distinctions must be made between 
"linked pluralism" on the one hand, and "superimposed segmen-
tation" on the other, as does Anthony Oberschall: 
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In linked pluralism, each individual is affiliated 
with multiple groups but memberships in any one 
intermediate group cut accoss memberships in others, 
and all groups draw their members from a variety of 
social groups, status groups, or classes. It is 
only in this type of social structure that cross 
pressures act to moderate conflict and prevent 
the division of society along lines of superimposed 
cleavage. 
Superimposed segmentation, on the other hand, 
means that although there may be high rates of 
participation in intermediate groups and many 
such groups and associations, memberships in 
these groups draw predominantly or exclusively 
from particular social classes, strata, or status 
groups. Thus, each class or stratum is highly 
participatory and bound together in dense but 
mutually exclusive networks of intermediate 
groupings.78 
To the degree that one individual is likely to develop an 
attitude toward some manifestation of deprivation, so are 
those members of his group unless there are mitigating 
influences. If the interactions of the group and those 
of society at large are frequent, it may be that there is 
greater likelihood that what deprivations occur will be 
minimized in the future; on the other hand, if such inter-
actions are not frequent, the hopes for solution within the 
"system" may be minimized and the potential for collective 
action encouraged. 
A common assumption in most literature on social move-
ments is that membership will be recruited from the lower 
strata of society. Seymour Lipset writes that the "social 
situation of the lower strata ... with low levels of 
education, predisposes them to view politics as black and 
white, good and evil. Consequently, other things being equal, 
they should be more likely than other strata to prefer 
- 150 -
extremist movements which suggest easy and quick solutions 
to social problems and have a rigid outlook. 1179 Other things, 
however, are usually not equal, and Eric Hoffer argues that 
an important element is that asense of the ability to 
resolve problems or to achieve higher standards of living_ 
must also be present: 
Discontent by itself does not invariably create a 
desire for change. Other factors have to be present 
before discontent turns into disaffection. One of 
these is a sense of power. 
Those who are awed by their surroundings do not 
think of change, no matter how miserable their 
condition. When our mode of life is so precarious 
as to make it patent that we cannot control the 
circumstances of our existence, we tend to stick 
to the proven and the familiar .. - .. There is 
thus a conservatism of the destitute as profound 
as the conservatism of the privileged, and the 
former is as much a factor in the preparation of 
a social order as the latter.80 
Hoffer provides a typology of the poor, and concludes that 
it is only in two of these that the potential for social 
movement participation exists: (1) the abject poor -- those 
who are so concerned with the staples of life that they 
have no time for other matters; (2) the creative poor --
who are usually free of frustration so long as they are able 
to create; (3) the unified poor -- who are also usually free 
of frustation, because of the meaningfulness of sub-group 
relations (for this group to be susceptible, group norms 
and values must be disrupted); (4) the new poor -- those 
who remember "how it used to be" and want to change their 
lives; (5) and the free poor -- those who have freedom 
but who are frustrated. 81 It is these latter two cateogries, 
the new poor and the free poor, who are most likely to 
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experience relative deprivation -- the new poor to experience 
decrimental deprivation and the free poor to encounter 
aspirational deprivation. 
Some support for Hoffer's hypothesis is found in 
Crane Brinton's analysis of the English Revolution of 1640, 
the French Revolution of 1789, and the American Revolution 
of 1776 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. He concludes: 
"The strongest feelings seem generated in the bosoms of 
men -- and women -- who have made money, or at least who have 
enough to live on, and who contemplate bitterly the imper-
fections of a socially privileged aristocracy. Revolutions 
seem more likely when social classes are fairly close 
together than when they are far apart. 'Untouchables' 
very rarely revolt against a God-given aristocracy .• 
The importance of similarities among groups as a founda-
tion for spreading the ideology of a movement is made 
quite clear by Mead. "You cannot build up a society," he 
writes, "out of elements that lie outside of the individual's 
life-processes. 1183 To the extent that an individual is 
socialized into a given group, or accepts one group as 
opposed to another as his 11 frame of reference," he will 
have shared life-experiences with the other members of that 
group. They are likely to have developed similar attitudes 
toward particular social acts, to which they are likely 
to respond in kind. Such associations are made through 
rhetoric, the use of symbols, and such associations may only 
be enlarged through symbolic means. Again, we turn to 
Mead -- "One may seemingly have the symbol of another 
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language [or frame of reference for a group], but if he 
has not any common ideas (and these involve common responses) 
with those who speak that language, he cannot communicate 
with them. 1184 
If there are groups of individuals who experience some 
source of strain, yet who are relatively isolated and do 
not interact, an individual may emerge who has the capacity 
to create an enlarged group, a collective, a community. 
"Occasionally a person arises who is able to take in more 
than others of an act in process, who can put himself into 
relation with whole groups-in the community whose attitudes 
have not entered into the lives of the others in the community. 
He becomes a leader. 1185 Leadership only exists to the degree 
that it is accepted as legitimate by those who follow. For 
Max Weber, whose discussion of authority remains the model 
for most that have followed, leadership is "legitimate" to 
the extent that members who follow consider it "binding" 
or that the leader's actions constitute "a desirable model 
\ 
for him to imitate. 1186 
Legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those 
acting subject to it in the following ways: 
(a) By tradition; a belief in the legitimacy of 
what has always existed; (b) by virtue of affectual 
attitudes, especially emotional, legitimizing the 
validity of what is newly revealed or a model 
to imitate; (c) by virtue of a rational belief in 
its absolute value, thus lending it the validity 
of an absolute and final commitment; (d) because 
it has been established in a manner which is recog-
nized to be legal. This legality may be treated 
as legitimate in either of two ways: on the one 
hand, it may derive from a voluntary agreement of 
the interested parties on the relevant terms. On 
the other hand, it may be imposed on the basis of 
what is held to be a legitimate authority over the 
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relevant persons and a corresponding claim to 
their obedience. 87 
To some extent those who participate ind social movement 
have denied the le<Jitimacy of the "established" leadership 
in a society. To the degree that the movement seeks to 
alter societal structure, so too will it deny the legitimacy 
of the structure. Thus, a movement directed toward specific 
laws, customs or norms will probably question the legitimacy 
of government only insofar as it relates to the specific 
source of strain. Once the movement has raised the level of 
conflict from one of specifics to that of moral opposition, 
the concommitant denial of an authority's legitimacy will 
also escalate. 
Neil Smelser posits that "charismatic" leadership 
characterizes value-oriented movements. 88 This is, to 
some degree, inevitable. The legally and traditionally 
established legitimation of authority has been denied; and 
new leadership must be found. According to Weber's formu-
lation, the alternatives are based on affectual attitudes and 
on a "rational belief in its absolute value." Both of which 
characterize charismatic leadership. Weber defines charisma 
as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically 
exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not 
accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of 
divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the 
89 individual concerned is treated as a leader." 
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We may be hesitant to completely accept the charismatic-
institutional dichotomy of leadership; for as Weber himself 
admits, it is often difficult to distinguish among certain 
individual cases, and most organizations -- and social 
movements are organized -- will exhibit charismatic aspec±s 
of leadership which assume traditional and legal legitimacy 
within each movement. As the movement grows, and particularly 
if it lasts for some time, the phenomenon known as "the 
routinization of charisma" comes into focus. By this, 
"the charismatic element does not necessarily disappear. 
It becomes, rather dissociated from the person of the 
individual leader and embodied in an objective institutional 
structure, so that the new holders of authority exercise 
it at second remove, as it were, by virtue of an institu-
tionally legitimized status or office. 1190 Thus, the very 
success of the movement in terms of existing for some duration 
tends to diminish the charismatic effect attributed to a 
single person and transfers much of this charisma to the 
organization or the movement's ideology, which then establishes 
Weber's other forms of legitimation. 
There are, however, other factors which operate against 
continued charismatic leadership. First, initial successes 
may fuel the demands for additional challenges to the 
authority, which the leader must not only undertake, but which 
must be successful if he is to retain his mantle of 
charisma. Secondly, the very success of a movement brings 
with it an increasing number of specialized demands. From 
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this, if the movement is to survive, individuals with 
particular skills must emerge in order to handle such 
problems. Such an occurrence operated within the Civil 
Rights Movement, as explained by Harold Nelson: 
With the snowball effect of what was now legitimate. 
movement activity, an increasing number of special-
ized problems were brought to the organization. 
Specialized leaders became known for their specialties 
and frequently the charismatic leader was bypassed 
and the problems brought directly to them •... 
The more this procedure was repeated, the more the 
charismatic leader was reduced to figure-head status 
and the administrative leader raised to the dominant 
position in the o9ianization and recognized as such 
by the following. 
A third difficulty with charismatic leadership, particularly 
evident as the movement expands, is the relatively short 
amount of time that a leader can spend on what are specific, 
localized actions. R. Peter Lewis explained such difficulties: 
When Martin Luther King, Bayard Rustin, Saul Alinsky 
came into a community in which slow, painful grass-
roots participatory and separatist organizing has 
been going on, they are more and more resented. By 
coming in with a well-trained army of "bureaucrats 11 
(middle-class Northern Negroes and whitP college 
students}, and efficiently taking over all the 
chores from the little people who were just getting 
involved but still groping for basic skills, the 
latter tend to withdraw again. They watch the 
community (e.g., Selma) come into the international 
spotlight with the presence of the great charismatic 
leader. Then perhaps something big is accomplished 
(e.g., a new voting rights bill is passed}. Just 
as suddenly the great leader moves on to the next 
confrontation, and the little people wait for the 
promised changes -- which do not occur. A great 
weight of court costs, and bitterness on the part 
of the local whites may ensue. 
During this experience the incipient organization 
has fallen apart, and later it is totally demoralized. 
However, it may take such a lesson to "radicalize" 
the people, by convincing them that their answer 
lies in their first attempts -- and perhaps they 
will begin to re-organize -- this time convinced 
that the ultimate answers are not in this form of 
"coalitionism" or in any form of "permeationism. 1192 
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Such difficulties all work to minimize the potential for 
continued charismatic leadership, and act as forces for the 
development of leadership at all levels of the organization. 
The charismatic leader may well retain his symbolic role, 
and perform it well; but the charisma which he embodies 
becomes increasingly transformed into a symbol of the move-
ment and further from the daily operation and control of 
the movement. A helpful distinction of charisma may be that 
of the leader who inspires an almost hypnotic acceptance 
by his following, close to Weber's original conception, 
and another type of "charismatic" leadership "who strengthens 
those he influences, inspiring them to work on their own 
. 't" t" 1193 ini J.a ive. In the long run, leadership exemplifying 
the latter characteristics may prove most beneficial to the 
movement. 
Thus far, our discussion has progressed as if the 
leadership of a movement functioned at the pinnacle of a 
well-established, rather rigidly defined concept of organi-
zation. However, certain characteristics of leadership 
behavior may emerge for specific movements which do not 
exhibit these assumptions and may find them anathema. 
Ideological beliefs about the "rotation of leadership" may 
require that one individual not be permitted continual 
access to the throne in order to minimize the "power of 
incumbence" and the growth of special interest groups. There 
is, additionally, the pragmatic reason that often leadership 
has been "co-opted" or "bought-off" by the establishment 
not to mention jailed or murdered. By having leadership 
- 157 -
functions scattered throughout the organization, elimination 
of a prominent member (or leader) need not mean the end of 
the movement. 94 
It appears that both the Civil Rights Movement, or the 
Black Power Movement, and the Peace Movement exhibited many 
of these characteristics. Several leaders emerged who provided 
charisma who could inspire other members within the 
movement to work for its goals independently and at local 
levels -- yet none of whom were able to direct the movement 
along any particular course of ideology (except the broad 
overarching values that encompassed the entire movement) 
or action. 
The type of leadership that is associated with a move-
ment is often a function of the perceived organization. Crane 
Brinton has noted that two competing theories of a movement's 
organization tend to emerge from any revolution, and we 
would extend Mr. Brinton's analysis to any social movement. 
The defeated supporters of the "old regime" argue that the 
movement is directed by a handful of ideological zealots 
who have succeeded only by unscrupulous tactics; on the 
other hand, the revolutionists maintain that far from an 
organized conspiracy, the movement was the manifestation 
of a spontaneous uprising of the masses against an 
oppressive regime. 95 
Much of the foundation for modern-_acceptance of the 
strictly organized movement springs from the writings of 
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Vladimir Lenin and his pamphlet published in 1902, What 
Is To Be Done? 
I assert: 1) that no revolutionary movement 
can endure without a stable organization of 
leaders that maintains continuity; 2) that the 
wider the masses spontaneously drawn into 
the struggle, forming the basis of the movement 
and participating in it, the more urgent the need 
of such an organization, and the more solid this 
organization must be (for it is much easier for 
demagogues to sidetrack the more backward sections 
of the masses); 3) that such an organization must 
consist chiefly of people professionally engaged 
in revolutionary activity 4) that in an auto-
cratic state, the more we confine the membership 
of such an organization to people who are profession-
ally engaged in revolutionary activity and who 
have been professionally trained in the art of 
combating the political police, the more difficult 
will it be to wipe out such an orgapization, and 
5) the greater will be the number of people of 
the working class and of the other classes of 
society who will be able to Join the movement and 
perform active work in it.96 
Such a conception of the leader and his organization entails 
consideration of factors beyond mere organization, which will 
be partially a function of the type of leadership, the stage 
of the movement's development and the degree and type of 
social control applied against it. But, such a conception 
does create the impression that communication within the 
movement will be largely directed from the leadership down 
toward the masses. One can envision the smuggling of illegal 
papers and pamphlets which carry the line to the movement's 
II 
faithful and the spectacle of the Nurnberg Party Rallies of 
the 1930's. Interestingly enough, however, even in these 
situations the party -- the movement -- developed largely 
through the organizational activities of smaller, independent 
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units who spread the ideology and recruited-largely by word 
of mouth. Even a revolutionary such as Trotsky "marveled how 
anything was done at all during the Russian Revolution because 
people spent so much time talking and debating with each 
other. 1197 
; George Rude commented that the spread of the 
movement was carried out largely by means other than "mass 
oratory 1198 but from his consideration of mass oratory he 
excludes addresses before the French National Assembly and 
other forms of symbolic expression that we have embraced 
within our definition of rhetoric. Even so, however, what 
appears the most important means of spreading the ideology 
of the movement is that of personal contact among individuals 
of similar reference groups interacting: "Close personal 
contacts between such people [those with common problems] 
further awareness of a community of interests and of the 
possibilities of collective action, including political 
action, to solve the common problems. 1199 Such a perspective 
seems particularly applicable to many contemporary movements 
especially those in democratic countries. In their analysis 
of the Black Power and Pentecostal movements, Luther Gerlack 
and Virginia Hine found a cell-like organization, i.e., no 
all-orienting national organization but rather locally 
autonomous organizations linked together through five major 
bonds: 
(1) Lines of friendship, kinship and other forms 
of close association between individual 
me~~ers of different local groups. Often 
a single individual will be an active partici-
pant in more than one group as well. 
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(2) Personal, kinship, or social ties between 
leaders and other participants in autonomous 
cells from networks that sometimes extend 
beyond the local community .••• 
(3) Every movement has its traveling evangelists 
who criss-cross the country as living links 
in the reticulate networks. 
(4) Closely related to the rally or the revival 
meeting of the traveling evangelist are the 
more permanent cross-cutting activities of 
the area wide, regional or national "ingathering." 
(5) A crucial cross-cutting linkage providing 
movement unity are those basic beliefs which 
are shared by all segments of the moveroent, 
no matter how disparate their views on other 
matters. 1 00 
It can be seen in this analysis of movement organization 
that the interplay of other sociological and psychological 
factors all influence the final form the movement will assume. 
The lines of friendship, the multiple memberships among 
various move1T1ents all provide certain reinforcing and competing 
beliefs for the individual. If we remewber the distinction 
made between linked pluralism and superimpos6d segmentation 
we can make certain assumptions about the direction of the 
movement. The charismatic leader, who may be necessary for 
the inception of the movement and to serve as a symbol may 
be envisioned as Gerlach and and Hine's "evangelist" who 
spreads the overarching values of the movement, providing 
inspiration for other's participation and spreading news of 
other activities. The locally autonomous cells are probably 
more likely to respond to specific sources of strain than the 
national "organization." This is not to say that a national 
organization does not exist, it very well may, but the main 
thrust of any movement must still be at the grass-roots level 
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if it is to gain support. Grass-roots may well be the 
"new poor" or the middle-class, but it will be those who 
who experience some strain between value expectations and 
capabilities. 
At first glance, one might argue that such diversity. 
awong the movement's organization would lead to duplication 
and overlapping -- in other words to inefficiency. And, to 
some extent this is inevitable. But the schisms also permit 
greater assurances that, even if one fails, others may have 
opportunities for success. Such factionalism also permits 
appeal to wider membership: 
Factionalism and schism facilitate penetration of 
the mov8Uent into a variety of social niches. 
Factionalism along lines of pre-existing socio-
econoroic cleavages provides recruits from a wide 
range of socjoecon0m1c and educational backgrounds 
with a type of black power group wjth which they 
can identify. 'I1he var 1. ety of ideological emphases 
and types of organizational structures produces 
an organizational smorgasboard which has something 
for everyone, no matter what his taste in goals 
or roethods wight be. A segmented social structure 
is designed for mriltipenetration of all sociological 
levels and psychol0g1ca] types. 10l 
If the movement can detect, or create, sources of strain 
among each socioeconomic group, or reference grouFs, and 
can then relate the movement's ideology -- in whatever 
variations -- to t0is strain, the potential for a widespread 
membership exists. It appears that great social movements 
require strategies and s~mbolic orientatl0ns of both militancy 
and moderation. "Tom Hayden can be counted on to dramatize 
the Vietnam issue; Arthur Schlesinger, to plead forcefully 
within inner circles. 11 102 
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Robert Cathcart argues that the main attribute of a 
social movement is a "dialectical tension growing out of a 
moral conflict. 11103 And, while we would not limit movements 
only to those encompassing moral issues, the element of 
conflict, or of competition is vital. The movement is 
against some form of established structure resulting from 
specific laws, customs, norms or from broader, moral appli-
cations. Just as those within the movement seek to promote 
their self-interests, or what they perceive the interests 
of society, so do the established structures. It is for 
such reasons that the existing social arrangement, largely 
through government action, will seek to maintain itself 
through social control of the movement. It is vital that 
we recognize the role of government in any society -- it is 
not only a ''representative" of the people, but it is their 
informer as well. Murray Edelman writes: 
Government affects behavior chiefly by shaping 
the cognitions of large numbers of people in 
ambiguous situations. It helps create their 
beliefs about what is proper; their perceptions of 
what is fact; and their expectations of what is 
to come. In the shaping of expectations of the 
future the cues from government often encounter 
few qualifying or competing cues from other 
sources; and this function of political activity 
is therefore an especially potent influence upon 
behavior. 104 
The degree of control that a government can exert in 
counteracting a movement's actions is dependent upon the 
legitimacy attached to it by the citizenry. So long as 
the government within a locality, area or nation state is 
perceived as being legitimate, of providing for the needs 
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of the people, of acting in a manner deemed a "good example," 
and of maintaining its capacity to "bind" the people to its 
decisions perhaps through force, the government will be 
perceived as legitimate. When circumstances indicate that 
such legitimacy no longer exists, social movements may well 
emerge. In Crane Brinton's analysis of four revolutions, in 
each of them the governmental machinery was inefficient and 
incapable of dealing with pressures arising in society.lOS 
Murray Edelman concludes that "the perception that social 
support for the established order was decaying and that 
power could be seized was a necessary condition for genuine 
revolt. .. 106 Even a movement not intent on revolt, 
seeking only change in specific institutions, must still be 
aware of the support or legitimacy of the existing institu-
tions. Often a measure of the degree of freedom of action 
by authorities is the degree of legitimacy they can employ 
that does not rest upon "popular support." "Power-vulnerables" 
are "leaders of public- and quasi-public institutions: 
elected and appointed government officials who may be 
removed from office •.• ; church and university leaders 
who are obliged to apply 'high-minded' standards in dealing 
with protests •.•• nl07 "Power-invulnerables" are "those 
who have little or nothing to lose by publicly ••• acting 
on their self-concerns. 11108 As a general rule, the degree 
of vulnerability will be a function of the type 0£ society 
in which the movement exists -- democratic societies are 
most vulnerable while highly authoritarian are less so. 
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The very use of civil disobedience depends upon a 
relatively vulnerable power structure in which the "political 
leadership is extremely reluctant to resort to armed force 
I 
to suppress demonstration .• nl09 For a norm-oriented, 
or reform movement to occur, movement toward some sort of 
confrontation must exist. Such confrontations may be purely 
verbal or physical, but in either sense they will be symbolic. 
Many of these confrontations, however, never reach 
fruition. The authorities may admit the justification of 
the grievances and initiate actions to remedy them. Other 
forms of co-optation may occur which are largely symbolic, 
but perform the same function of depriving the movement of 
justification for further agitation. Herbert Simons writes 
that: 
Theorists from Machiavelli to Marcuse have 
suggested that control may be exercised in a 
number of rhetorical ways: by such co-optative 
techniques as the appointment of riot commissions 
and the creation of regulatory agencies; by the 
enactment of quasi-religious rituals of affirma-
tion and victimage; by dissemination of secular 
theodicies of good and evil; by ••. "non-
decision-making;" by defining and restricting 
issues, choices and ranges of opposition; by 
information control and control over the mass 
media; by acting on policies first, then discussing 
them afterwards; by creating diversions and escape 
mechanisms; by political socialization; and by 
invoking the threat of defeat of common enemies. 110 
A review of recent history, both American and international, 
will disclose large numbers of co-optive techniques: the 
appointment of the Kerner Commission to study riots and civil 
disorders, creation of a Consumer Protection Agency, the 
taking of issues "under study," the labeling of "protest" 
as "riot", minimizing the number of marchers of participants 
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in demonstrations, and invoking the appeals of 11 disloyalty 11 
and claiming that protest "prolongs the war." 
Often, however, co-optation is ruled out -- either because 
the authorities actually believe that only a small handful of 
"agitators" are responsible, that "caving in" will precipitate 
further and more extreme demands, or that appearing weak and 
subject to manipulation will undermine the legitimacy of the 
regime. 111 In such a situation, the regime may well resort to 
suppression as a means of social control. 
Suppression has the function of forcibly eliminating the 
movement's leadersh'ip through banishment, incarceration or more 
extreme methods and of reducing the desirability of member-
ship by increasing personal danger. The difficulty with such 
methods, however, is that they close the avenues of peaceful 
protest (both figuratively and literally); the only means 
left available are more extreme measures which then seek 
control of the governing apparatus in order to achieve 
what are likely to become moral ends. Repression often 
produces escalation. 
Another result of repression is that it may promote 
the identification of individuals with the movement. In 
responding to peaceful protest, violent action on the part 
of "legitimate" authority may inflict damage upon by-standers 
and upon those sympathetic to the movement but not yet 
strongly committed. Kenneth Burke refers to this as 
identification with an "autonomous activity. 11112 An 
individual is "identified 0 as being part of a larger, more 
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encompassing activity. If a person is marching with a 
protest demonstration, he is a member of the march and 
fully accepts its principles; if someone is on the streets, 
he is a member of the march. Thus, when the authorities 
respond, they often do so indiscriminately, besides it's. 
probably quite difficult to distinguish between active 
demonstrators and "innocent bystanders." Once the repression 
is commenced, however, changes in attitudes may occur quite 
dramatically. An example of such change was reported by 
J.M. Treuhaft describing the actions occurring during a 
demonstration against hea~ings by the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities in San Francisco in 1960: 
There was by no means uniform hostility toward 
the committee nor uniform sympathy for the witness 
[among those who had come to observe the hearings]. 
At the moment of the clash with police something 
changed •••. All neutrality vanished, to be 
replaced with a hot, sustaining anger still 
evident in those who witnessed the events. One 
of the merely curious who was hosed and arrested 
returned the next day to Join the protest 
commented ruefully, "I was a political virgfl~ 
but I was raped on the steps of City Hall." 
Two hundred had taken part in the initial march; on the 
following day more than four thousand picketed the hearings. 
Not only does such action by the authorities "identify• 
people with the movement, their consequent violent behavior 
often forces people to identify themselves with the movement 
through either or both of the other forms of identification 
i.e., they have shared an experience, properties if you 
like, and they can unite in that which they both dislike or 
hate. Franklyn Haiman recognized the potential of these 
forms of "body rhetoric" in 1968, when he said 
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An important by-product of these activities is 
that they not only convey a message to outsiders 
but play an important role in reinforcing the 
convictions and developing the solidarity of 
those who are already members of the persuading 
group. Singing together, marching together, 
sitting-in together, being cattle-prodded or 
water-hosed together are much more potent ways 
of becoming involved in an_issue than listening 
to'one's leader make speeches from a public 
platform. 114 
While such activities may make the person identify more 
rapidly with the movement and its goals than "traditional 
rhetorical means," once this sort of identification has 
occurred, then the individual will be more receptive to 
such appeals. Additionally, the very sight of such behavior 
or the communication of such actions to the population not 
initially involved may create perceptions of discrepancies 
between the values expressed and accepted within society 
(value expectations) and the capacity for realizing those 
values. The expectation of "peaceful assembly" may be 
denied by the exercised capacity of the authorities. Such 
sources of strain, or relative deprivations in terms of welfare 
and power values, may then ~ake the individual and others 
like him -- potential acceptors of the movement's ideology or 
of another movement. 
The Integrative Function of Rhetoric 
In the early parts of this chapter we stated that a 
movement's development required the interaction of each of 
the characteristics examined. The importance of such interac-
tions is made more clear when we return to the discussion of 
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of sociology by Parsons in which action involved the 
attachment of meaning to behavior. Action could be character-
ized by positive action, by passive acceptance or deliberate 
inaction. But in each instance, meaning is attached to behavior 
which removes it from the realm of motion. Once meaning. 
is attached, behavior becomes purposive and, as such, 
produces consequences for others. 115 But it is in fact 
the anticipation of these consequences, although perhaps 
not quite the same ones anticipated, that gave purpose --
or meaning -- to initial acto 
In each characterist.ic examined (whether it be the 
source of strain, leadership, organization or whatever) an 
act relating to one had consequences for the others. As 
it became clear in the discussion, the particular source of 
strain which developed influenced the ideology, the likely 
sources of membership, the form of the movement's organi-
zation and the means of social control. Similarly, the 
forms of social control employed to curtail the movement 
often precipitated new forms of strain, having additional 
impact upon membership, leadership, and types of organization 
most beneficial for a specific movement. Without developing 
a mathematically progressive formulation of the specific 
number of combinations of interactions, suffice it to say 
that the essence of any movement is a product of the 
interactions among these elements. 
Such interactions do not just "occur" out of the blue, 
however, but they exist only as they are perceived to exist, 
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as they are given meaning. And, it is through symbols 
and their conscious use, i.e., rhetoric, that such 
interactions occur and are given meaning. Sources of 
strain are "meaningful" only so long as they are perceived 
to have consequences -- however far reaching -- for 
individuals; and collectives develop only so long as 
sources of strain have consequences for groups of individuals 
symbolically united. Thus, " •.• human beings interpret 
or 'define' each other's actions instead of merely reacting 
to each other's actions. Their 'response' is not made 
directly to the actions of one another but instead is 
based on the meaning which they attach to such actions. 
Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, 
by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one 
another's actions." 116 
Social movements are not "caused," rather they are 
"created" by the interactions of men with other men and 
their institutions. And, they are created through the 
capacity of rhetoric, of symbols, to attribute meaning to 
such interactions. Conscious movements must, in the words 
of Herbert Blumer, 
. depend on effective agitation, the skillful 
fomentation and the exploitation of restlessness 
and discontent, an effective procedure for the 
recruitment of members and followers, the forma-
tion of a well-knit and powerful organization 
[a remark which we would modify in light of 
Gerlach and Hines' research] , the development 
and maintenance of enthusiasm, conviction, and 
morale, the intelligent translation of ideology 
into homely and gripping form,,the development 
of skillful strate1~ and tactics, and finally, leadership ...• 1 
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And it is only through rhetoric as we have conceptualized 
it that such constructions may occur. 
Both the antagonist and the protagonist must rely upon 
rhetoric to attack and to champion the existing structure 
of social relationships. In the process they will often. 
appealto the same values using the same linguistic construc-
tions. Just as the movement will justify its existence in 
terms of humanitarian ideals, so too will the established 
order. But symbolic interpretations will differ drastically 
reflecting the different worlds of symbolic interactions 
from which they emerge. "'Justice' for Senator Eastland 
means the continued exploitation of, his sharecropping black 
people; 'peace' for Mayor Daley means crushing the skulls 
of demonstrators; 'prosperity' for the trade union member-
ship men as exclusion of blacks. .; and the United States• 
notion of 'self-determination' implies counterrevolutionary 
. 11118 repression. o •• 
Just as it is symbolic interpretation which originally 
united the various groups into a social system, so too is 
it symbolic interpretation which promotes the cleavage between 
them and the unity of adversaries for the conduct of conflict. 
Summary 
In this chapter we have examined the general approaches 
of sociology toward social change, considering briefly theories 
of class, status, functional-stratification and mass theory. 
The social characteristics of movements -- source of strain, 
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ideology, membership, leadership, organization, and social 
control -- were examined largely through the use of sociolo-
gical concepts. In each of these areas; the importance of 
the specific characteristic to the general progress of 
the movement and the vital role of rhetoric was examined .. 
Throughout, the necessity for viewing each element not as 
an independent determinant of a movement's progress was 
stressed; rather, each is important only in so far as it 
interacts with the others in order to promote an inter-
pretation, an understanding, of the movement as a whole. 
Finally, the integrative nature of rhetoric was briefly 
examined to demonstrate that movements are the creation of 
actors within a social system influencing each other, and 
themselves, by symbols. 
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Chapter V 
RHETORIC AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL-PSYCHOANALYTIC 
ASPECTS OF MOVEMENTS 
In the eighth century AD Alcuin enjoined his 
readers, "Nor should we listen to those who say, 
'The voice of the people is the voice of God', 
for the turbulence of the mob is always close to 
insanity. 11 1 
Introduction 
Social movements have been examined from the sociologi-
cal perspective in the preceeding chapter; but we must avoid 
the reductionist tendency to accept sociological explanations 
as explaining all of the important aspects of social move-
ments and their resulting rhetoric. Any movement involves a 
membership, and if we are to explain why particular 
uses of symbolic construction were successful or not or what 
their implications are over the long run, we must consider 
the masses to which they were directed and the individuals 
who created them. To do so requires that we consider 
psychological and psychoanalytic constructs; for, as an 
emminent sociologist, Neil Smelser, has written, "any account 
of the recruitment into, the internal composition of, and 
the quality of participation in a collective episode must 
rest on a consideration of the psychological dynamics of the 
individual person. 112 Smelser extends his analysis: 
[collective behavior] has a psychological dimension, 
since the deepest and most powerful human emotions 
idealistic fervor, love, and violent rage, for 
example -- are bared in episodes of col_lective 
behavior, and since persons differ psychologically 
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in their ~ropensity to become involved in such 
episodes. 
We may, therefore, gain some insights into the use of 
rhetoric and its impact upon potential membership, and 
enemies, through an analysis of psychological characteristics. 
Additionally, through an analysis of the rhetoric, we may be 
able to gain some insights into the "speakers" and recipients 
of the messages since "genuine speech is the expression of 
a genuine personality. 114 If, as Kenneth Burke maintains, 
man's motives "are merely shorthand descriptions of situations", 
we would expect that language -- or, in a broader sense, 
symbolic behavior both describes those situations 
(and motives) and at the same time proves a source of 
motivation.5 And further: 
If we say that we perform an act under the moti-
vation of duty, for instance, we generally use 
the term to indicate a complex stimulus-situation 
wherein certain stimuli calling for one kind of 
response are linked with certain stimuli calling 
for another kind of response. We act out of duty 
as against love when we finally respond in the 
way which gives us less immediate satisfaction 
(we do not throw up our Job and elope) though 
promising more of the eventual satisfactions that 
may come of retaining thi goodwill of irate parent 
or censorious neighbors. 
Thus, motives are symbolized in man's discourse and are 
stimulated or created by it as well. It is through such 
rhetorical analysis that we may inquire into the birth and 
existence of social movements. 
_ ln t~is chapt~~ we shall not attempt to provide a 
complete explanation of either psychological theory or 
the controversies surrounding different approaches or of 
disputes about the values and difficulties resulting.from , 
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different approaches to psychoanalysis. Such a treatise 
would be beyond both the limitations of this study and the 
competency of this writer. We shall, however, present 
rudimentary and generalized interpretations of some attempts 
to explain these areas and will attempt to demonstrate 
their relevance to the rhetorical critic of social movements. 
The "Traditional" View of Movements 
The modern study of collective behavior, and from it 
the study of social movements, began with Gabriel Tarde and 
Gustave Le Ban's examinations of "the crowd." Le Bon tended 
to indiscriminately lump mobs and parliamentary bodies into 
the same cauldron and concluded that a man "descends several 
rungs in the ladder of civilization" when he became a member 
of such a collective. 7 His approach, while valuable for 
discrediting democratic enemies (and perhaps finding renewed 
acceptance among students of Congress) nevertheless does not 
help to explain such actions. Le Bon found the crowd swayed 
by "rumours, hatreds, fears and superstitions." "Not 
surprisingly," writes Paul Wilkinson, "such a view leads 
him to conclude that crowds and mass movements are basically 
a diabolic influence. If unleashed they risk wrecking the 
civilization created by a small elite. They act. 'like 
microbes which hasten the dissolution of enfeebled bodies. 
The moment a civilization begins to decay it is always the 
masses that bring about its downfall. 1118 
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Such conceptions of the meffibership of movements are 
not limited to nineteenth century Europeans. Eric Hoffer 
( 
notices that "when the frustrated congregate in a mass 
movement, the air is heavy-laden with suspicion. There is 
prying and spying, tense watching and a tense awareness of 
being watched. The surprising thing is that this patholo-
gical mistrust within the ranks leads not to dissension but 
to strict conformity. 119 Several factors seem to have attributed 
to this tendency. Most men of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries tended to view social order as the natural state 
of society. Such conceptualizations were consistent with 
doctrines as diverse as Social Darwinism and with more 
elaborate models positing an "equilibrium" among social 
groupings. Psychologists also contributed to the difficulties 
since most who investigated social movements labeled partici-
pants as "abnorrrLal" or as "deviant. 11 Much work was performed 
by intellectuals of all disciplines following the collapse 
of the Third Reich so as to explain how such a phenomenon 
could have occurred -- and hopefully how such a repetition 
could be prevented. The horrors of National Socialism were 
projected, intentionally or not, onto the genre of social 
movements as a whole. 
Modern research reveals that social movements are "not 
irrational, and involvement in them is, on the whole, a 
conscious act on the part of the participants." While 
defending movements, Bush and Denisoff still seem to 
maintain the irrational image of crowd behavior -- "Crowd 
behavior is, as its analysts point out, basically irrational 
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and spontaneous. 1110 This seems somehow, like a modern 
version of the War between the Roses. Anthony Oberschall 
advances a more 11 enlightened" view: 
The destructive and violent behavior of the 
rioters was confined to specific kinds of 
behaviors and situations within the riot 
situation. Eyewitnesses reported that rioters 
and looters in cars were observing traffic laws 
in the riot area -- stopping for red lights, 
stopping for pedestrians at crosswalks -- even 
when carrying away stolen goods. Firemen were 
obstructed in putting out fires set to business 
establishments, yet one incident is reported 
where people beseeched firemen to save a house 
that had caught fire when embers skipped to it 
froro a torched coro~ercial building, and during 
which firemen were not hindered in any way from 
carrying out their Job. These and similar 
incidents testify to the ability of rict 
participants to choose appropriate means for 
their ends. '!'hough riot behavior cannot be 
called "rational" in the everyday coroJPon meaning 
of that term, it does contain normative and 
rational elements and is far more situatjonally 
determined that t.he. popular view would have it. 11 
Oberschall makes an 1rr,portant distinction which perhaps 
should receive further elaboration: that is, while such 
action may not be "rati.onal 11 in terms of criteria defined 
by rules of logic aPd of optimal societal apFroval, such 
behavior ie often "reasonable" and is "reasoned" to the 
exte:nt that participants perceive- that -they are acting in their 
best interests and have "thought through" their actions. 
It is in aP effort. to better understand how men "think through 11 
theiz: actions that we shall now turn to an examination of 
psychological conceptualizations and how these apply to our 
study of social movements. 
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Psychology, Individuals, and Social Movements 
Psychological explanations of human action tend to be 
predicated upon two fundamental assumptions. The first of 
these was expressed by Kenneth Gergen: "Several hundred 
years before Christ, both Epicurus and Aristippus (a 
pupil of Socrates) developed a theory of human motivation 
that has continued to provide a challenge even to the 
present day. Boldly stated, the core assumption of the 
theory is that man is motivated by a single principle: 
to achieve pleasure and to avoid pain. 1112 Whether described 
as hedonism, behaviorism, drive-reduction, or a learned 
basis of social motivation, the movement toward satisfaction 
and from dissatisfaction seems to underly most theories of 
psychic functioning. 
Following closely behind, perhaps as a means of 
providing this satisfaction, is the claim that man seeks 
prediction, or understanding. George Kelly claims that 
anticipation "is both the push and pull" of psychological 
systems. 13 
There seems to be adequate evidence for such assumptions. 
Man does avoid those items or events which he knows to be 
painful JUSt as he seeks out those experiences which provide 
him with satisfaction. It must be kept in mind that one 
man's (or woman's) pleasure is another's pain -- which 
partially explains happy masochists and sadists. Man must 
also seek to order his world, to understand qua understanding, 
for he has progressed beyond where his mere animal instincts 
would lead him. By understanding, by anticipating consequences 
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of events and acts, man is better able to structure his 
world and so to promote his satisfaction. 
Several approaches have been advanced by psychologists 
explaining how man does structure his world -- at least 
psychologically. Perhaps the most widespread of these is. 
that of attitudes and attitude systems. While much discussion 
has occurred over the properties of an attitude, most 
definitions seem reasonably consistent with that presented 
by Daniel Katz: 
Attitude is the predisposition of the individual 
to evaluate some symbol or object or aspect of 
his world in a favorable or unfavorable manner. 
Opinion is the verbal expression of an attitude, 
but attitudes can also be expressed in nonverbal 
behavior. Attitudes include both the affective, 
or feeling core of liking or disliking, and the 
cognitive, or belief, elements which describe the 
obJect of the attitude, its characteristics, and 
its relation to other obJects.14 
Such attitudes do not, however, exist as independent 
entities floating around man's psychic space. They are 
incorporated into systems, usually thought to be in 
groupings of similar and dissimilar attitudes. 
Even those psychologists who do not use the term 
attitude end up with systems very similar to what we have 
discussed. Milton Rokeach, for example, creates belief 
and disbelief systems: 
The belief system is conceived to represent all 
the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, 
conscious and unconscious, that a person at a 
given time accepts as true of the world he lives 
in. The disbelief system is composed of a series 
of subsystems rather than rerely a single one, and 
contains all the disbeliefs, sets, expectancies, 
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conscious and unconscious, that, to one degree or 
another, a person at a given time rejects as 
false. Thus, our conception of the disbelief 
system is that it is far more than the mere 
opposite of the belief system. 15 
Rokeach does not distinguish between cognitive and affective 
components, 'maintaining instead that it makes little 
difference whether one thinks, believes, or feels something 
the end result is the same. Thus, for him, each cognition 
has affective loadings and each emotion has cognitive rela-
tions as well. 
In somewhat the same vein, George Kelly has proposed 
a "psychology of personal constructs." A "construct" is an 
abstract relationship which encompasses both similarity and 
contrast and is used to provide a "structure, within the 
framework of which the substance takes shape or assumes 
meaning" -- i.e., an interpretation is placed upon some 
phenomencn in terms of its similarities or contrast with 
other phenomena which have been interpreted previously. 16 
Thus, constructs may exist such as "good -- bad", "warm --
cold" and so on. Like attitudes and Rokeach's concept of 
beliefs, Kelly's constructs do not exist independently but 
are systematized. Kelly writes that "a person's construction 
system is composed of complementary superordinate and 
subordinate relationships. The subordinate systems are 
determined by the superordinate systems into whose jurisdiction 
they are placed. The superordinate systems, in turn, are 
free to invoke new arrangements among the systems which are 
subordinate to them. 1117 Unlike Rokeach's belief system, 
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constructs are in effect mirror-images -- that is, each 
construct has the positive and negative interpretation 
included. 
One final construction of cognitive and affective 
elements is that provided by Fritz Heider in his influential 
The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Heider posits 
two types of relations among individuals, obJects, and so 
on. There is the "sentiment relation" ( "This refers to 
a person's evaluation of something •••• ") and the "unit 
relation" ("Persons and objects are the units that first 
come to mind; the parts of such units are perceived as 
belonging together in a specially close way.") •18 Sentiment 
and unit relations are not independent but rather the one 
influences the other; they are, in Hieder's words, "mutually 
interdependent." The importance of examining briefly each 
of these approaches is that they ultimately come very close 
to positing the same thing. Heider's unit relation is 
certainly close to Katz' concept of a belief and the sentiment 
relation similar to the affective element. When we consider 
their mutual interdependence, it does not seem unreasonable 
to call the entire unit-sentiment relation an attitude. 
Kelly's constructs may also be subsumed under the heading of 
attitude for to the extent that some interpretation is 
attached to some phenomenon, a perceived relation must also 
exist, thus the cognitive element. And, if an interpretation 
is made of it, this also includes the affective component. 
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We shall, then, discuss man's psychological construc-
tion and interpretation of his world -- both physical and 
psychic in terms of his attitudes; attitudes which are 
related to one another in a hierarchically arranged system, 
which Katz defines as a "value system." We will adopt 
Rokeach's notion of regions of belief -- central, intermediate, 
and peripheral -- which shall become regions of attitude. 
For the sake of this discussion, we shall equate values 
with those attitudes which are "superordinate" and are 
near to the central regions. 19 
One more assumption is made about attitudes which is 
vital for our discussion of their importance for social 
movements and the resulting rhetoric. That is the concept 
of balance -- "by a balanced state is meant a situation in 
which the relations among the entities fit together harmon-
iously; there is no stress towards change. A basic assump-
tion is that sentiment rleations and unit relations tend 
toward a balanced state. if a balanced state does not 
exist, then forces toward this state will arise. 1120 Such a 
concept, which has been developed under such differing 
names as congruity, strain toward symmetry, cognitive 
dissonance and others, will be interpreted to mean for 
this study a very broad area of "cognitive consistency. 1121 
Thus, man will, except for occasional desire for novelty 
and paradox, seek and attempt to maintain consistent relations 
among his attitudes. This should not be interpreted to 
limit the attitudes which man holds to those which are only 
consistent with one another, for the development of a 
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system, and of subordinate attitudes under a broader 
attitude or value, means that there may be inconsistent 
attitudes which do not provoke a tension for balance. 
What is important is that such attitudes not be brought 
into a direct relationship: "The beliefs a person has 
acquired are safe as long as they are not put to the test. 
A person can live with inconsistencies as long as these 
do not confront each other, and he can operate on the 
basis of invalid assumptions if these are not directly 
matched against experience. 1122 
In case anyone may have forgotten, we are concerned 
with the help that psychological constructs can provide in 
our study of social movements. And, James Geschwender 
states unequivocably the benefit that theories of attitude 
change have for understanding movements: 
All of the patterns of temporal change which 
produce revolutionary activities may be explained 
with dissonance theory [we would prefer the use of 
"consistency theory"]. Changes in objective 
conditions produce a state of mind in which indivi-
duals believe that they are unjustly deprived of 
a better way of life. First, they develop the 
image of a state of affairs which is possible of 
attainment. Second, they develop the belief that 
they are entitled to that state of affairs. 
Third, they know that they are not enjoying that 
state of affairs. The simulataneous possession of 
these three cognitions produces a state of dissonance. 
Dissonance is not comfortable and it produces 
pressures toward dissonance reduction. One means 
of reducing this dissonance is to alter the environ-
ment so as to produce the desired state of affairs. 
Therefore, dissonance-reducing activities often 
take the form of social protest or revolutionary 
behavior. 23 
While we would not agree with Geschwender that "all" of the 
changes producing protest activity can be explained by 
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consistency theory, we would certainly agree that it proves 
a beneficial tool in understanding why protest may occur. 
In each of the examples provided in the previous chapter on 
the creation of relative deprivation, some inconsistency 
between attitudes was apparent. One limitation which Denton 
Morrison applies to deprivation, which he defines as a 
"special type of cognitive dissonance," is that the "intensity 
of dissonance will be a function of the rate at which the 
perception of blockage probability for a legitimate 
expectation increases. 1124 It is the possibility of creating 
such perceptions of legitimate expectation and of authorita-
tive blockage that rhetoric provides for the movement. Thus, 
appeals to universally accepted values coupled with rhetorical 
explanations of how such values are being distorted or prevented 
from being fulfilled all create the potential for social 
movement. Thus, when we examine movements from the social 
perspective of relative deprivation, we may better understand 
the existence of such deprivation by understanding the 
attitudes of those individuals comprising the group experien-
cing deprivation. 
Theories of cognitive consistency are often relied upon 
to explain attitude change; and to the extent that a rhetorician 
can bring inconsistent attitudes into relation, or can create 
attitudes which are then inconsistent with pre-existing 
attitudes, inconsistency will create tensions which should 
be reduced. In analyzing the nature and effects of agitative 
rhetoric, Mary McEdwards provides this example: 
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Forced by such rhetoric ["Hey, hey, L.B.J.! How 
many kids did you kill today?"] to a sharp personal 
awareness of the situation, Americans rush to the 
defense of the President's policy. In doing so, 
they need specific knowledge of conditions in 
Vi·et Nam and must learn something about the 
United States' foreign policy. It is this process 
of evaluation, of development of proof for a 
judgment or an opinion that is the valuable 
and necessary result of agitative rhetoric. 25 
If, in developing the proof needed to support his beliefs 
or attitudes, the individual finds evidence to create 
inconsistency among his existing beliefs a pressure will 
arise to resolve it. This does not mean that he will 
resolve it in the direction of the appeal, for much will 
depend upon which attitude is more crucial to his world-view 
and self-concept; but the likelihood of gaining acceptance 
is created. Once a doubt is planted, additional information 
which may have been ignored or distorted into supporting 
the prior attitude -- may now be perceived as supporting 
the "doubt" and thus potentially increasing the possibility 
of attitude change. 26 
Attitudes are heavily shaped by the groups with which 
individuals identify; 27 and we would expect individuals 
sharing certain social characteristics to have shared 
attitudes, in a very general manner. People will still 
react to a given event in an individual manner, but certain 
similarities are likely to exist across the specific responses. 
Once an initial commitment is made toward some group or 
movement -- based initially on individual responses, the 
member begins to identify with the group and it exerts a 
greater influence upon his psychological structure. Hans 
Toch provides the example of the Montgomery bus boycott 
- 192 -
which began largely with individual discomfort at physical 
inconvenience and embarrassment from having to sit at the 
back of buses and give up seats to whites. 28 Remembering 
the tendency of normative movements to escalate to value-
oriented movements when not resolved, the failure of the· 
City Council to respond to specific grievances forced the 
blacks of Montgomery to either acquiesce or to continue. 
By this time, however, the blacks had invested time and 
personal effort and the protest had grown beyond the initial 
issue. Lewis Coser describes the nature of commitment: 
The member who for the sake of the group relinquishes 
some of his immediate personal interests feels 
that he has invested in it; he has projected upon 
it part or all of his personality. Through 
introjection of the group's purpose and power and 
through proJection of his own self into the group, 
the group has become but an extension of his own 
personality. Under these conditions, threats to 
the group touch the very core of his personality. 29 
Thus, once the member has identified with the group and 
has projected his interests as being the same as the group's, 
the attitudes which were once peripheral have now become 
either intermediate or core. They now define the member's 
self-concept and he will be more reluctant to change them. 
This not only is true of protestors but of those who 
identify with the agents of social control. Thus once the 
protest and acts of social control are perceived as being 
attacks upon the self, upon values, and not upon specific 
roles or norms, the possibility for easy resolution seems 
to disappear. 
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The more extreme the individual attitudes, the less 
likely he is to perceive any similarities between himself 
and others. Anthony Oberschall writes: 
• the further away on the ideological left-
right spectrum, the less likely it is that he can 
discriminate between various shades of difference 
in that range. For an extreme right-winger, 
anybody left of center, whether he be a liberal, 
socialist, communist, Maoist, Trotskyite, is 
lumped together under one broad cateogry of 
"communist" or "revolutionary," whereas a left-
winger will tend to see conservatives, Birchites, 
Goldwaterites, neo-Nazis, racist groups, and so on 
as "Fascists" pure and simple. Thus, a mental 
image of the opposition as far more homogeneous, 
united, and able to act in concert is created. 
Evidence of disunity, factionalism, rivalries, and 
the absence of an overarching organization and 
leadership is conveniently omitted. A similar 
principle also holds for the perception of 
social, as well as ideological, differences. 30 
Thus, once the opponents in a struggle are perceived as 
sharing common values and as being united, organized and 
prepared for action, the more extreme attitudes and acts of 
the group with which the individual identifies become 
justified. Consistency theory is valuable in creating 
initial attitude change, but once an individual has 
identified with a particular position or group, it is 
increasingly difficult to alter his perceptions. 
The creation of inconsistency does not necessarily 
explain the formation of movements, however. One can still 
feel uncomfortable and not know the specific reason why. A 
partial answer, however, may be found in discussions among 
psychologists about man's need to understand -- to attribute 
causes. While those schooled in rigorous scientific method 
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would probably disagree with our conception of cause, 
arguing a real distinction between "causes 11 and "reasons, 1131 
we will use the term as providing an explanation for certain 
actions and the consequences of those actions. 
There is a tendency to personify the causes of acts,. 
especially sinpe each act must have an agent. Albert Hastorf 
and others write the following: 
We perceive them [people] as causal agents. They 
are potential causes of their behavior. They may 
intend to do certain things, such as attempting to 
cause certain effects; and because we see them as 
one source of their actions, we consider them capable 
of varying their behavior to achieve their intended 
effects .•.• Our perception of others' inten-
tionality leads us next to organize the behavior of 
other people into intent-act-effect segments which 
form perceptual units. We infer the intentions of 
others. 32 
Tied to perception of agents being responsible for their 
actions is the relative importance of negative informational 
and behavioral traits. If, for example, "an individual believes 
that most people are sincere, he is likely to be relatively 
unimpressed with the information that person Xis sincere • 
. . • credit for it attaches to social pressure to the 
simple fact of being human rather than to person X. 
Insincerety, however, is another matter. By standing in 
\ 
contrast to the norm, the insincere individual invites 
attributions of responsibility for this trait. These 
attributions in turn are likely to increase the importance 
and centrality of the trait in evaluations of him qua 
individual. 1133 
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The importance of attributing responsibility, or 
causal influence, to individuals and the relative importance 
attached to negative information become valuable in under-
standing the creation of social movements. We have already 
discussed that the "political system is the agent most likely 
to be held responsible in the modern and modernizing nation" 
and it thus becomes a causal agent for the actions and 
policies within a given nation. 34 When an individual 
perceives some expectation as being "Just" and also perceives 
some blockage of that expectation, he increasingly attributes 
responsibility to the political system. If we relate this 
attribution with the importance of negative behavior, as this 
blockage of "legitimate" expectations will be perceived, it 
becomes increasingly likely that individuals and groups of 
individuals sharing similar perceptions will tend to see the 
political system in increasingly negative terms. These 
negative images will become the central traits or character-
istics of the-governmental agencies. Once such perceptions 
occur, the legitimacy of governmental authority declines and 
protest action becomes easier to commence -- inconsistency 
between the desire to protest and the traditional acceptance 
of institutional authority is thus reduced. 
Such attribuions are not limited to those challenging 
legitimate power, however. For if attributions are made to 
individuals as causal agents, and if negative behavior is 
given more importance, these elements function to organize 
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perceptions by agents of social control. Those who comply 
with illegitimate authority will also be perceived as being 
responsible for their actions. It is through such perceptions 
that authority identifies anyone involved with protest with 
the elements who have organized the activity. It is thruugh 
such perceptions that innocent bystanders and those partially 
sympathetic to a movement are given broken heads, hosings 
and jail sentences just as those who are more committed. 
As has been previously discussed, such actions often lead 
"bystanders" to identify with the dissident elements of 
society and thereby increase the potential force of the 
mvoement. 35 Such perceptions will be the result of rhetoric 
be it verbal or "body rhetoric." 
Implicit within this preceeding discussion is the notion 
of "implicit personality theories." Assuming that agents 
are responsible for their actions, and assuming further that 
certain actions occur with come frequency, "we are prone to 
perceive the other as having an enduring personality 
characteristic. 1136 As Hastorf and others have written: 
••• the idea that the perceiver has an implicit 
theory of personality is useful in explaining 
regularities in person perception. Because they 
have theories, people, can make inferences about 
others from limited information. The regularities 
in the inferences made by various perceivers about 
a given individual [or group of individuals, or 
institution.] suggest that members of a given 
culture share an implicit theory of personality. 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that 
individuals have stable implicit personality 
theories of their own •••• 
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Such implicit theories of personality appear 
to have the functional value of organizing the 
stimulus complex and of allowing the prediction of 
regularities in the behav1ors of others. Since 
the patterns of inferences of individuals and 
groups of individuals can be described by a dimen-
sional structure, the theories may consist of a 
series of dimensions which channel information and 
help form the linkages between stimulus traits 
and traits the perceiver infers.37 
Such groupings are quite similar to what Heider calls 
"dispositional properties:" 11 ••• those properties that 
'dispose' objects and events to manifest themselves in 
certain ways under certain conditions. Dispositional 
properties are the invariances that make possible a more or 
less stable, predictable, and controllable world. They 
refer to the relatively unchanging structures and processes 
that characterize or underlie phenomena. 1138 
If we assume that such personaltiy traits, as we infer, 
dominate a given individual or such characteristics as 
dominate an institution or grouping, are reflections of core 
attitudes, we both perceive that they are more durable and, 
hence, less susceptible to change and at the same time more 
likely to be in conflict with our own values -- given that 
we perceive differences between us. We tend, therefore, to 
associate such personality characteristics or traits, as we 
infer them to exist, with the value system of the ~ndividual 
or grouping. And, as we have repeatedly maintained, "disagree-
ment at the level of values will have more widespread effects 
than disagreement at a more specific level, in the sense that 
the persons in conflict will see a wider range of their 
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behaviors as being in conflict with the behaviors of the 
other person. 1139 
The importance of implicit theory of personality for 
the rhetoric of social movements arises in that perceptions 
will influence the form and content of the rhetoric as 
created and will also influence its interpretation by 
those to whom it is addressed: 
11 
••• each word and message has a cluster of 
images, some applicable to the society, some 
applicable to the individual, and some applicable 
to both." The relationship between cognitive 
"realitiesn and communication is a reciprocal 
one, i.e,, the quality, intensity, shape, and 
force of images comprising an individual's symbolic 
reality will influence the character of his commu-
nication, and in a similar fashion a person's 
symbolic reality is to some extent shaped and 4 colored by the communicative messages he receives. O 
The importance of perceptions is that they influence 
how we act toward those to whom we make attributions --
acts encompassing physical responses and those we have 
subsumed under rhetoric, those which are symbolic. In 
many instances it is impossible to make a clear distinction, 
nor is it even necessary that we do so. But underlying our 
acts is another assumption; an assumption receiving expression 
by Kenneth Gergen: 
.•. there is a strong tendency on the part of 
individuals to respond in kind to the behavior they 
receive. If rewards or satisfactions are received 
from another, there is a tendency to provide 
rewards in return; if dissatisfactio~1is received, the response is to punish the other. 
Attacks upon an enemy by identifying him as an "oppressor" 
and as having "dangerous intentions" may actually cause him 
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to perceive the attacker as challenging his values and 
position in society, forcing him to respond as predicted. 
Such labels may well provoke a self-fulfilling prophecy. 42 
A failure to understand such concepts may provoke the 
situation described by Park G. Burgess: 
As Norman Cousins observes, "When Negroes act 
like Ku Klux Klanners, they must be treated like 
Ku Klux Klanners." [from "Black Racism, 11 
Saturday Review, September 27, 1964, p. 34] Racism 
and power become the idiom of the battle on both 
sides. Whatever the vocabulary of the culture 
may be, it is likely to be pregnant with the 
undertones and overtones of power, of force, of 
violence. And the intended target will be clear 
enough and often Justifiable. As this response to 
the crisis intensifies, the full effect will be 
for the culture to consider Black Power advocacy 
in all its forms as violent, reprehensible, and 
un-Arnerican, and for Negroes to consider responses 
to it as but further evidence of t2J racist attitudes 
and rhetoric of the civic culture. 
In the development of social movements it must be the 
dissenting elements of society who say "No" to the established 
institutions, even though such a No may have been precipi-
tated by institutional action. Once the No has occurred 
and the challenge has been made, the future development of 
the movement depends upon the response by the agents of social 
control. If the dictates of the concept of behavior exchange 
are observed, escalation is likely which may produce a deep 
division within society which can only be resolved by suppression 
either by the agents of control or by the movement when 
it assumes power. On the other hand, implementation of 
policies which deal with the grievances of the people or a 
return to acknowledgement of legitimacy by protesting 
individuals and groups should have the tendency to de-escalate 
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the conflict from one of values to less threatening 
areas. 
In this section, we have attempted to consider 
briefly certain aspects of psychological thought and to 
inquire into its value in exploring social movements. 
We do not claim to have presented a complete investiga-
tion of psychological theory; nor do we claim to resolve 
arguments surrounding various approaches to attitude 
change, whether cognitive consistency or attribution theory 
most helpfully explains man's behavior, or even whether 
there is a correspondence between attitudes and behavior. 44 
Our own opinion is implicit in the discussion presented; 
but the real value of psychological theory for the critic 
is that such constructs as we have examined can prove 
helpful in better understanding the rhetoric of social 
movements. 
Psychoanalysis, Individuals and Social Movements 
The applicability of psychoanalytic techniques to 
social movements may appear somewhat suspect from first 
impressions. It is, after all, concerned with individuals 
and what holds true for one does not necessarily hold 
true for society. With this we must, of course, agree; 
but that in no way denies the value of psychoanalytic theory 
in understanding why individuals may Join movements, or 
perhaps more importantly -- why those movements heavily 
influenced by individuals -- Weber's charismatic leaders, 
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for instance -- assume the dimensions they acquire. Few 
would deny the potential for fruitfully inquiring into 
the personalities of individuals via psychoanalytic theory. 
It is our contention that psychoanalytic theory then becomes 
valuable for understanding social movements "because men .are 
the actors in the drama of politics, [and] their personalities 
are important contributors to the character of their 
political participation. 1145 We may conclude, as does E. 
Victor Wolfenstein, that "for political men private motives 
are displaced on public objects and rationalized in terms 
of the public interest. 1146 
While some apparently accept the potential value of 
at least partially explaining, or understanding, movements 
in terms of such constructs, there remains an implicit 
assumption that not all elements of a movement can be so 
examined. Gary Bush and Serge Denisoff, for instance, 
write that: 
The social psychologist, it appears, is 
primarily concerned with the psychological 
characteristics of members and their collec-
tive impact rather than with the organizational 
structure of the movement, its ideology, or 
the structural problems generating revolutionary 
activity. This emphasis on the individual may 
be attributed, in large measure, to the influence 
of Sigmund Freud on American social psychology. 
His influence is reflected in the literature on 
social movements in terms of three basic themes: 
(1) the frustration of individual drives by social 
restraints, (2) collective behavio~7 and (3) the neurotic or psychotic personality. 
Such objections, however, appear to be resolved by some of 
the recent practitioners of psychoanalytic theory and its 
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application to sociology and history. As we shall discover, 
the development of ideology and its appeal to the individual 
as well as the organization of a movement may often be 
heavily influenced by psychological factors. Just as the 
use of metaphor and reliance upon sociological principles. 
could not adequately explain all aspects of social movements, 
neither can we expect psychological or psychoanalytic tech-
niques to provide all the answers. We must rely upon an 
interaction of them all. 
Any discussion of psychoanalysis must begin with Sigmund 
Freud, for it is he more than any other single individual who 
has influenced development of the discipline. Freud's 
theories have not gone unchallenged and they have certainly 
been modified in light of more recent developments and 
refined thought. But it is Freud who still permeates the 
literature of psychoanalysis. 
Freud posits three maJor portions of the mind: the 
first is the id, which he describes as containing "every-
thing that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is 
laid down in the constitution above all ..• the 
instincts 11 ; the ego which is that portion 11 under the influence 
of the real external world around us"; and the superego 
which is a special agency "in which •.. parental influence 
is prolonged. 11 During the course of the individual's 
development, the superego "receives contributions from later 
successors and substitutes of his parents, such as teachers 
and models in public life of admired social ideals. 1148 The super-
ego is often referred to as the "conscience. 11 
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Each of these has certain functions within the develop-
ment and action of the individual. Freud assumes that 
there are two basic instincts within the id, "Eros and the 
destructive instinct. The aim of the first of these 
... is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve 
them thus -- in short, to bind together; the aim of the 
second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so to 
destroy things. 1149 The ego has the task of self-preservation: . 
As regards external events, it performs that task 
by becoming aware of stimuli, by storing up 
experiences about them (in the memory), by 
avoiding excessivly strong stimuli (through 
flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli 
(through adaptation) and finally by learning to 
bring about expedient changes in the external 
world to its own advantage (through activity). As 
regards internal events, in relation to the id, 
it performs that task by gaining control over 
the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether 
they are to be allowed satisfaction, by post-
poning that satisfaction to times and circum-
stances favourable in the external world or by 
suppressing their excitations entirely.so 
Even so, however, the instincts will still tend to cause 
difficulties and place the ego in a continually balancing 
position. 51 
Erik Erikson has analyzed three crises of identity 
during the development of the child, an analysis which 
derives from Freud's states of growth: "The first crisis 
is the one of early infancy. How this crisis is met decides 
whether a man's innermost mood will be determined more by 
basic trust or by basic mistrust. 1152 This first crisis depends 
upon its resolution largely upon the successful ministrations 
of the mother. Her concerns for the child must be consistent 
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and predicated upon a certain mutuality which produces 
certainty and prediction to the "original cosmos of urgent 
and bewildering body feelings" of the baby. Thus, the more 
gratifying his mother's treatments, the more trustful the 
adult will be. 53 
The second crisis, which equates to Freud's anal 
phase, develops the infantile "sources of what later becomes 
a human being's will, in its variations of willpower and 
wilfulness." The child is expected to develop certain 
controls over his excretory functions, and to the extent 
he is successful he will develop a sense of autonomy. If, 
on the other hand, he fails the child will develop a sense 
of guilt or shame. 54 
The third crisis, "that of initiative versus guilt, is 
part of what Freud cescribed as the central complex of 
the family, namely, the Oedipus complex. It involves a 
lasting conscious association of sensual freedom with the 
body of the mother and the administrations received from 
her hand; a lasting association of cruel prohibition with 
the interference of the dangerous father; and the consequences 
of these associations for love and hate in reality and in 
phantasy. 1155 It is this latter crisis, which must be resolved 
during the phallic stage, that becomes the overarching concern 
of the adult. "Society," write Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. 
Platt, "in these terms has evolved on the basis of repression, 
renunciation, and sublimation, as a defense against the fulfill-
ment of the wish; society is based on the existence of the 
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common impulse, which must be controlled if man is to achieve 
k . d f t bl . . " 56 any in o s a e organization. 
The question of how applicable such speculations are to 
the study of social movements is certainly open to question. 
Bush and Denisoff maintain that for an analysis of class-. 
based movements, such theories are of little use. They 
are led "to concur with [Leonard] Reissman that: 'The 
studies [on class and child-rearing practices] do not provide 
firm enough findings to point the way. It still seems 
plausible to assume that different class environments 
create important differences for the socialization of the 
child, even though none of the studies fully substantiated 
that assumption. 11157 This area will be examined generally 
in just a bit. However, the importance of child-rearing 
practices, along with other events in his life, may prove 
especially beneficial in examining movements heavily 
influenced by individual leaders. In a most interesting 
work, E. Victor Wolfenstein has examined the lives of 
Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi and the movements which each 
influenced. Relying largely upon biographies, personal 
statements and examinations of the movements, Wolfenstein 
has found strong relationships between the child's resolution 
of Erikson's crises and future behavior of the adult, behavior 
which manifested itself in political action and heavily 
influenced the movement. Lenin, for exarople, emerged from 
his first crisis largely mistrustful of those surrounding 
him -- a characteristic which produced a secretive revolutionary 
- 206 -
organization. On the other hand, Trotsky emerged trustful, 
and never worried about organization or about being captured 
by Tsarist police.58 Other writers, notably Erik Erikson, 
have also discovered similar relationships. 59 
While Freud placed heavy emphasis upon the role of the 
id in the development and future action of the child, he 
also recognized the role of external forces. In Civilization 
and Its Discontents, initially published in 1930, Freud 
painted a rather gloomy picture: 
The existence of ••. inclination to aggression 
[emanating from the id], which we detect in our-
selves and Justly assume to be present in others, 
is the factor which disturbs our relations with 
our neighbour and which forces civilization into 
such a high expenditure (of energy}o In conse-
quence of this primary mutual hostility of human 
beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened 
with disintegration. The interest of work in 
common would not hold it together; instinctual 
passions are stronger than reasonable interests.60 
However, something occurs which makes man's aggression 
less harmful: 
His aggressiveness is introJected, internalized; 
it is, in point of fact, sent back to where it 
came from -- that is, it is directed towards his 
own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of 
the ego, which sets itself over against the rest 
of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the 
form of "conscience", is ready to put into action 
against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that 
the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, 
extraneous individuals. The tension between the 
harsh super-ego and the ego that is subJect to it, 
is called by us the sense of guilt; it expresses 
itself as a need for punishment. Civilization, 
therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's 
dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and 
disarming it and by setting up an agency within 
him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered 
city. 61 
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Writing some ten years later, the importance of external 
forces becomes even more pronounced: 
The details of the relation between the ego and 
the super-ego become completely intelligible 
when they are traced back to the child's attitude 
to its parents. This parental influence of course 
includes in its operation not only the personalities. 
of the actual parents but also the family, racial 
and national traditions handed on through them, as 
well as the demands of the immediate social milieu 
which they represent.6 2 
The importance of these rather long passages is that they 
illustrate Freud's recognition of the importance of social 
factors in developing the personality of the adolescent and 
the adult. It is not the id which necessarily exerts the 
greater influence, but the social interactions which impinge 
upon the individual's experiential field. The relationship 
between Freud's conceptualization and that of Mead as presented 
earlier becomes remarkably clear. Most of Mead's ideas 
were developed prior to 1900 and were initially published 
in 1930, while Freud's work was published from approximately 
1895 through the next half century. It seems likely that 
these two men developed independently, yet produced similar 
conceptualizations -- a most remarkable occurrence. 
An interesting modification of Freud's original 
position is made by Talcott Parsons who argues that "categories 
of instinctual and learned components cut across the id, the 
ego, and the superego. 1163 If we assume this to be true, a 
more complex relationship develops where the symbolic 
,environment becomes even more pervasive. We are not able 
at this time to pursue this particular discussion, but the 
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only way we can understand the functioning and influence 
of the id is through its symbolic expression. It was this 
that Freud presumed occurred in dreams, when the id wrestled 
with the ego -- the result being dream distortion. 
We may, and will, admit that there are idiosyncratic 
aspects of personality whether one labels them as the id 
or the "I" -- in fact, it 1.s this individuation which makes 
man both so difficult and fascinating to study. But 
there are additionally shared aspects of personality; and 
nthe symbolic codes on which the sharing is based have a 
controlling influence over the individual's experience, 
within a believable latitude, similar erotic and aggressive 
feelings or inhibitions, or how similar frustrations, 
fears, and anxieties can arise in a group of people faced 
with the same social conditions. 1164 Even if the child-
rearing practices do differ among classes, the shared 
symbolic world will be similar for ~ach and will exercise 
its influence, perhaps even upon the unconscious. 
Lest one think that we have forgotten about relation 
of psychoanalysis and social movements, we may turn toward 
a brief example of how such factors coalesce to present a 
fertile breeding ground for movement. Jerome Bruner writes 
that "it is not simply society that patterns itself on the 
idealizing myths, but unconsciously it is the individual 
man as well who is able to structure his internal clamor 
of identities in terms of prevailing myth. Life then 
produces myth and finally imitates it." 65 It is this which 
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may account for Freud's Oedipus complex. A more specific 
example, however, can be found in National Socialism. 
Fichte proclaimed in his addresses to the German Nation 
in 1807 the notion of a "superior German 'Kultur.'" 
Hegel "praised the power of the state and the virtues of 
war;" and von Treitschke and Nietzsche "stressed the 
principle of survival of the fittest." Wagner portrayed a 
Weltenschauung of unconscious racial forces and anti-Semitism 
in his operas and political writingso And Arthur de Gobineau 
and Houston Chamberlain wrote of theories of racial superiority. 
Hitler synthesized these and promulgated "images which 
gathered their force from ideas and themes ["an exaggerated 
romanticism, a science of racism, a vague economic socialism, 
and the alleged supernatural and unconscious forces of 
Volk activity"] already implanted in German tradition. 1166 
In Bruner's terms, the myth was being lived. However much 
we might like to think of ourselves as rational men, or 
at least as reasonable, and however inhibited we are by 
ethical considerations, we must recognize that the unconscious 
-- whether strictly instinctual or modified by a symbolic 
environment -- remains a powerful force in man's life. 67 
Given the complex interrelationships between the 
instinctual elements of man, his id, and the forces 
external to him, we may expect that some degree of psychic 
disorganization may occur from either of these two directions. 
In either case, they must threaten some element of his 
identity, his self-concept, if he is to respond to a move-
ment. Instinct conflict between the eros and destructive 
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portions may become intense and, in Freudian terms, over-
come the fragile balance maintained by the ego. At the 
same time, however, efforts by the ego may not be strong 
enough to integrate cognitive functions with changing 
external conditions. Thus, when cognitive relations have. 
been created regarding certain elements of the perceived 
reality and another part of "reality" fails to operate 
in accordance with these expectations, it may be difficult 
to operate effectively. When those elements of the super-
ego are neither applicable to this particular situation 
nor capable of maintaining their influence (if, for 
instance, some major component of the superego which has 
provided guidance in the past fails to act in conjunction 
with expectations) the difficulty of maintaining the previous 
perceptions and actions may become extremely difficult. 
A feeling of isolation, of detachment, of alienation, may 
result. This is quite similar to Erikson's concept of 
identity crisis: 
. it occurs in that period of life cycle when 
each youth forges for himself some central perspec-
tife and direction, some working unity, out of 
the effective remnants of his childhood and the 
hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must 
detect some meaningful resemblance between what 
he has come to see in himself and what his 
sharpened awareness tells him others judge and 
expect him to be.68 
The resolution of this identity crisis, carried over for the 
most part from experiences encountered during the three 
phases described earlier, will have a profound influence upon 
future development of the adult life. 
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Eric Hoffer seems to believe that involvement in a social 
movement requires a denial of self-identity: 
To ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must cease 
to be George, Hans, Ivan or Tadao -- a human 
atom with an existence bounded by birth and death. 
The most drastic way to achieve this end is by 
the complete assimilation of the individual into 
a collective body. When asked, who he is, his 
automatic response is that he is a German, a 
Russian, a Japanese, a Christian .... He has 
no purpose, worth and destiny apart from his 
collective body; and as long as that body lives 
he cannot really die. 69 
The thrust of Hoffer's statement is that the individual 
gives up his self-identity; but, in fact, he is really 
searching for it. And he may often find it in a movement. 
If we remember that the two basic instincts are those of 
eros and of destruction, and remember further that each of 
these are present during the Oedipal stage in that there 
is an identification with the father while at the same 
time a hatred of him, and the erotic attachment toward the 
mother -- we may find the resolution of this ambivalence in 
attachment to a social movement. 
By identifying with the movement, ambivalence is split 
apart and dealt with separately. The love relationship 
is applied to the group and its members; while the hatred is 
applied to those who are not members, especially to the 
authority who has created the difficulties and who stands as 
the personification of Oedipal father. Within any movement 
exists an ideology -- and it performs valuable functions for 
the movement's membership and leadership. Such ideologies 
may "gratify unconscious wishes, and it is usually possible 
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to identify a variety of drive contents in theme But this 
is an acceptable position only insofar as ego and reality 
functions are included and any implied notion of 'endogenous 
potentiality 1 is not limited to drive expression; and only 
insofar as we understand that such unconscious wishes •• ·• 
are structured to some degree from the beginning by words, 
behaviors, feelings, and ideas sanctioned by the moral 
order in which they appear. 1170 The god and devil terms of 
the ideology become the superego, the source of Justifi-
cation for the individual, and the hated authority figure. 
Thus, the ambivalence growing out of the identity crisis 
is resolved. However, since the ideology must account for 
all relationships, it must be totalist. Thus, "because-this 
system of rationalization is so intimately tied to the 
individual's view of himself, it must be clung to unalterably. 
The root characteristics of the ideology serve as the conscious 
Justificatory formula for the individual, the token of his 
management of intense and disruptive feelings. 071 
Not only does the ideology provide a new self-identity 
in many cases, but often such new identities are strengthened 
through rhetorical means, as explained by Richard Gregg: 
A [n] ... aspect of the ego-function of rheto~ic 
has to do with constituting self-hood through 
expression; that is, with establishing, defining, 
and affirming one's self-hood as one engages in a 
rhetorical act. The idea here refers to self-
persuasion in a peculiar way, for what is at stake 
is not the nature of the rhetorical claims or the 
sense and probity of appeals and arguments for 
their own sakes, but just the fact that the rhetoric 
must be verbalized in order for one's self-hood to 
be realized. Rhetoric, in this sense, takes on 
the aspects of both act and appeal, the two occurring 
simultaneously.72 
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In addition to Richard Gregg's discussion of the verbal 
aspects of rhetoric, Murray Edelman posits virtually the 
same thing about "body rhetoric:" 
Riot support or participation is •.. both a 
mode of self-expression and a source of self-
definition, particularly for the young. To 
participate in a riot is dramatically to make the 
point, both to oneself and to others, that 
one no longer accepts the subordinate role and 
status defined for blacks by the pr71ailing 
belief in a symbiotic social order. 
Thus, whether it is the black verbally establishing his 
identity by claims of the beauty ?f blackness or demonstrating 
his denial of acquiescence to the white power structure by 
hurling a stone, the result is the same: he is attempting 
to establish his identity through rhetorical means. At the 
same time, he is identifying in terms of whom he is against, 
with whom he is sharing common experiences or "properties"; 
and is being identified with part of a larger activity. We 
can see, then, the close similarities between Burke's notion 
of identification and that provided by Freudian, or psycho-
analytic, analysis. 
Within this, too, is the redemptive identification which 
occurs through the process of shared guilt. In Burkeian 
terms, those who utter the Negative, the "No", to the established 
order, are burdened by guilt at having broken the covenant 
which infused the hierarchy. They have denied the bonds of 
love and are then chastised by the superego, the conscience. 
It is then by means of a new identification, one which splits 
the ambivalent feelings regarding the authority figure, that 
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these men create a new order -- a new order based upon new 
covenants and justified by placing their collective guilt 
upon the eternal scapegoat: "The persecutors attribute to 
a sacrificial victim all the sins which plague them internally 
and then are purged of sin by the actual or symbolic destruc-
tion of the victim. 1174 It is in these ways that psychoanalytic 
theory helps provide a means of gaining greater understanding 
for the critic of movement rhetoric. 
The Integrative Function of Rhetoric 
The assumption underlying this entire analysis is quite 
simply that man can only understand through symbolic forms, 
and that all his psychic space which functions in providing . 
order for his environment and his functioning within it 
depend upon symbolic transformation. We have argued that 
because of this process, motive becomes expressed as situation, 
which then becomes expressed as symbol. The symbol does 
not necessarily "represent" the thing so much as it represents 
a way of acting toward it. The act may be explicit, as in 
language or physical expression, or it may be incipient, 
as Burke describes an attitude. In either instance, the 
external manifestation of man's inner being is there for 
examination. By examining these acts the critic is gaining 
insight into the inner workings of the human mind and can 
better understand why particular symbols are used by indivi-
duals and why they affect others as they do. 
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Attitudes are symbolic and they are often the result of 
interactions between the one and the many surrounding him. 
But they are the result of those interactions only to the 
extent that meaning is attached to them; and meaning, or 
understanding, can only exist symbolically. Those symbols 
then are both products of and shapers of the way in which 
we perceive the world. If language, or other nonverbal 
forms of rhetoric, are actually expressive of a way of acting, 
then Murray Edelman's analysis of political metaphor becomes 
increasingly important: 
Metaphor •.• defines the patterns of perception 
to which people respond. To speak of deterrence 
and strike capacity is to perceive war as a game; 
to speak of legalized murder is to perceive war 
as a slaughter of human beings; to speak of a 
struggle for democracy is to perceive war as a 
vaguely defined instrument for achieving an 
intensely sought obJective. Each metaphor 
intensifies selected perceptions and ignores 
others, thereby helping one to concentrate upon 
desired consequences of favored public policies 
and helping one to ignore their unwanted, unthink-
able, or irrelevant premises and aftermaths. 75 
In somewhat more explosive language, Peter L. Berger writes 
that linguistic usage is highly important: "Anyone who 
remembers the Nazi usage of SauJuden should stop to reflect 
about the human implication of the current usage of the 
term 'pigs.' But even those with shorter memories should be 
aware of the fact that, by definition, pigs are designated 
for slaughter."76 The implication of each of these is that 
such linguistic expression portrays an attitude, a predis-
position to act, or a motive which produces action within a 
situation. Through the rhetorical analysis of movement 
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symbol we can gain insights into attitudes, clusters of 
perceived personality traits and make inferences about the 
reasons for past or existing behavior and guesses about the 
potential consequences of such symbolic groupings. One 
need only remember the warning in Kenneth Burke's "Rhetoric 
of Hitler's Battle" -- a warning that went largely unheeded. 
If the rhetorical critic can provide anything, better 
illumination of acts may provide other men information by 
which they may make more reasoned 'choices. 
The relationship between symbols and psychoanalytic 
approaches is even more clear. It is, in fact, largely 
through a form of "rhetorical analysis" that the psychoanalyst 
functions. In Wolfenstein's study of The Revolutionary 
Personality, it is largley through a combination of bio-
graphical information and a symbolic analysis of writings, 
speeches and symbolic actions that relationships between 
the crises of childhood and of identity and the manifestations 
of the resolution of such crises in the adult attachment to and 
influence on a given movement are explored. Once such relation-
ships may be discerned, a better understanding of the function 
of rhetoric in movements may he gained. 
John Rathbun indicates that we can only understand, 
for example, the rhetoric of Martin Luther King by examining 
the identity which he assumed, the public role of prophet: 
. this role of Dr. King was consciously held. 
At one time he said that in his quest for social 
Justice he left his home to aid the down-trodden 
"just as the eighth-century prophets left their 
little villages and carried their 'thus saith 
the Lord' far beyond the boundaries of their 
home towns." •.. without some understanding of 
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the prophetic role played by Dr. King, such 
problems as his sense of the continuity of univer-
sal history as opposed to secular history, the 
case for social justice through the exercise of 
love, the collective guilt of institutional forms, 
and the divine JUdgment on public policies and 
actions seem to lack significant relation. But 
when we establish the prophetic point of view and 
acknowledge that it is something more than mere 
11 image-making 11 , these fall into place.7 7 
The importance of Rathbun's statement seems clear; but we 
would disagree that mere"conscious" expression of a metaphor 
indicates a "conscious" awareness of the identity crisis' 
resolution. Such m~y profitably be explained through 
psychoanalytic theory, which gives an additional and valuable 
perspective by which our analysis of movement rheotric can 
become much deeper and richer. It must also be stated that 
the relationship between psychology and psychoanalysis is 
relatively close -- perhaps to the chagrin of both. But 
the resolution of the childhood crises is reflected in the 
individual's attitudes- and perceptions of his world. The 
social psychological explanation of personal and social 
development constructed by Mead and the psychoanalytic 
explanation advanced by Freud bear more than a passing 
resemblance. But in either case, it is only through symbols 
that such psychic phenomena can be manifested and explored, 
and through an understanding of psychological and psycho-
analytic explanations of symbol formation. In either case, 
it is only through symbols that such psychological and 
psychoanalytic development occurs. And it is these symbolic 
constructs which then strike to psychic structures of other 
men and make social movements living entities. 
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Summary 
This chapter attempts to examine the contribution of 
psychological and psychoanalytic theory to the rhetorical 
criticism of social movements. While recognizing that these 
constructs are ultimately of symbolic origin, they nevertheless 
provide insight into the creation, use and consequences of 
later symbolic forms. It is for these reasons that a study of 
such approaches may be beneficial to the rhetorical critic. 
Traditional views of social movements were examined, and 
were largely predicated upon assumptions that such behavior was 
"pathological" and violated the sensible, acceptable norms or 
values of civilized society. A more modern view maintains that 
such actions are often assumed to be "rational" or are at least 
reasoned. Such acts are encompassed by rhetoric, and may be 
partially understood through psychological constructs. 
The role of attitudes, balance (or cognitive consistency), 
commitment, attribution of cause to personal agents and implicit 
personality theories were briefly examined and illustrations 
were given to indicate their potential usefulness to the critic. 
Additionally, Freudian theories and more recent modifications 
of them were presented. The relationship between rhetoric and 
the development of personality was explored and the identifi-
cation features of modern protest rhetoric were related to 
specific ego-functions. 
Finally, the integrative notion of rhetoric was again 
explored and the implications of rhetorical analysis as an 
indicator of attitudes and potential acts. 
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Chapter VI 
II •• AND SO SHALL IT BE IN THE END" 
In the beginning was the word. But, just following 
the word, there is the critic who observes, 
analyzes, describes, and evaluates. 1 
Introduction 
Throughout these many pages we have attempted to inquire 
into the specific relationships between rhetoric and the 
social and psychological-psychanalytic aspects of social 
movements. We must agree with those who claim that a 
movement can be studied from the perspective of either of 
these approaches; but at the same time, to do so would 
appear to deprive the movement of much of its uniqueness, 
of its dynamism and of the completeness which makes it so 
manifestly a human product. In this concluding chapter, 
we shall briefly explore the rationale by which we believe 
social movements should receive study. It is wise, however, 
for us to reiterate our caveat from the beginning of this 
effort that neutrality cannot be attained and that what 
follows must be recognized solely for what it is, a personal 
statement of position. 
An Interpenetration of "Forms" 
Ernst Cassirer writes in An Essay~ Man that: 
The philosophy of symbolic forms starts from the 
presupposition that, if there is any definition 
of the nature of "essence" of man, this definition 
can only be understood as a functional one, not a 
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substantial one. We cannot define man by any 
inherent principle which constitutes his meta-
physical essence -- nor can we define him by any 
inborn faculty or instinct that may be ascertained 
by empirical observation. Man's outstanding 
characteristic, his distinguishing ma2k, is not his metaphysical nature but his work. 
The only way we can understand man is by examining the func-
tion in which his creative capacities operate. It is this 
function rather than substance, which makes man unique. 
We may borrow the notion of function rather than sub-
stance in our examination of social movements. If we strive 
for a unified synthesis of a given movement rather than a 
particularization of it, we must consider the functions of 
these various approaches, or perspectives, to the whole of 
the created work. Just as Cassirer uses the concept of 
cultural forms -- language, art, myth, science, and history 
to better understand man, so too may we employ Burke's notion 
of circumference and draw an analogy to the "forms" of 
social movements -- social aspects, psychological-psychoanalytic 
aspects, and rhetoric. This is not to claim that such is an 
exhaustive listing of the "forms" of a movement, but it does 
seem to encompass most of the writings about them. We might 
want to consider history and political science as additional 
areas of study, but it appears that they may be incorporated 
into the broad rubrics that we have considered. 
We must also admit, as students of rhetoric, that our 
main focus is upon the use of rhetoric within the confines 
of the movement. We are seeking to discover, or to better 
understand, how rhetoric is shaped by social and mental factors 
while at the same time shaping them. We are, then, examining 
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social movements from a given perspective which will concen-
trate our efforts upon that particular aspect or "form." 
But we find that rhetorical criticism, for that is what we 
do as we provide illumination to our fellow man about rhetoric 
and the movements which use it, encompasses many of man's. 
creative perspectives. Robert L. Scott has maintained: 
... the human territory in which we are 
interested is one in which many humans are at 
work from many points of view. These points of 
view go by various names, among them, political 
science, sociology, psychology, philosophy, 
linguistics, anthropology and history. If we 
want to know the territory we refer to as 
"rhetorical," we must ... repudiate "once and 
for all" the notion of a takeover and embrace 
rather the notion of a pluralistic set of arts, 
learning from all relevant disciplines and indeed 
willing to be absorbed by other disciplines at 
appropriate moments.3 
Rhetoric, as we have defined it, is a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation. As such, it may imply that cooperation 
is the ultimate goal -- but it is a goal that can never 
be attained. Kenneth Burke posits that language (and we 
would expand his notion to include all purposive symbolic 
behavior) is the means by which man overcomes his inherent 
biological division. If we adhere to the principle of 
entelechy we might expect that the perfection of such 
inducements to cooperation would be "pure persuasion." 
Pure persuasion would be free of strife by definition, for 
man would have been induced to a state which can only be 
conceived of as the absence of division, or conflict. But 
the ideal can never be reached. Therefore, man must remain 
within the realm of "inducing" cooperation, within the realm 
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of overcoming division which can never be completed. Man 
must always be moving "towards the better life." 
There is, within language, "a dialectical dimension 
in that it contains in itself the property of transcension, 
the capacity to separate and unite, name and divide. 114 If 
we refer to the concept of identification, it was often 
sought in order to more effectively and efficiently promote 
division, a segregation by congregation. It is language which 
permits the growth of the self, the incorporation of the 
individual into the group (his unification) but it is the 
use of symbols and the consequences of such use that makes 
man conscious of his separateness from other men. 
Symbol, we would submit, is the centripedal force of 
human existence. It provides the creation of psychological 
structure and expression; and it permits man's interaction 
with other men -- which is the creation of the social world. 
But it is the interpenetration of these "forms" which in turn 
create new symbols and new uses of them. Man seeks under-
standing based largely upon an anticipation of the consequences 
of actions by other men. It is through symbols that such 
actions are created and it is through symbols that they are 
understood. 
But crucially, rhetoric is not all -- it is not, as 
Art Smith claims, the "essence" of the social movement: 
For if rhetoric gives rise to the various other 
dimensions of a movement, if it functions to coor-
dinate, sustain, and produce the thrust of a move-
ment, it is essential to a movement. Rhetoric 
becomes a productive structuring art. Furthermore, 
if rhetoric constitutes, as it does, the essence 
of a movement it is meaningful as an understanding 
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of human behavior to identify, analyze and study 
movements by their rhetorical indicators. Move-
ments differ not merely in the origin of their 
grievances or the composition of their votarists 
but principally in their rhetorical manifestations. 5 
Smith concludes that it is only "after a researcher has 
isolated the principal and minor metaphors can he begin 
to make sense out of the historical and sociological aspects 
of a movement." He can then "refer to the social and 
historical contexts for clarification of the symbol's 
purposes and values, historically and contemporarily. 116 
To take such an approach is to employ a reductionist outlook. 
The symbol is not merely a "product" of the social and 
historical context, but rather is a shaper of that context 
as well. It is only through the interrelations of such 
contexts and the symbol, or metaphor, that any meaning is 
ascribed to the symbol. "Since ••• the meaning of language 
derives salience from social context," writes George Knox, 
"all symbolic charge must depend upon extraliterary situations. 117 
Just as we must argue against approaches that attempt to 
reduce social movements to social factors and to psychological-
psychoanalytic, so too must we object to those who would 
reduce movement to metaphor. 
Throughout, we have stressed the importance of rhetoric --
which we have defined as the symbolic inducement of cooperation 
to both the social and psychological-psychoanalytic aspects 
of social movements. It is only through symbolic means that 
these factors develop; but at the same time they exert 
influence upon the use of symbols which in turn create 
another, different "reality." Additionally, the interpenetration 
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of the social and mental aspects of movement should also 
have become clear. The social system is conceived of as 
the interactions of actors toward whom each is cathectic. 
On the other hand, the psychological aspects of movement 
are shaped by these interactions. Thus, it is only through 
the interpenetration, or interrelatedness, of these three 
aspects that we can ad~quately attempt to understand social 
movements. 
Talcott Parsons describes the potential source of 
movement through means of this interrelationship: 
Any situation where an established institutional 
order has to a considerable extent become disor-
ganized, where established routines, expectations 
and symbols are broken up or are under attack is a 
favourable situation for such a movement. This 
creates widespread psychological insecurity which 
in turn is susceptible of reintegration in terms 
of attachment to a charismatic movement. 8 
Thus, it is symbols under attack, institutions becoming 
disorganized (which can only be understood through symbols; 
or, for that matter, only attacked symbolically which may 
include physical means) producing psychological disorganization. 
But at the same time, it is rhetoric in the form of the 
movement's ideology which provides the unification. 
According to Clifford Geertz: 
.... it is ... the attempt of ideologies to 
render otherwise incomprehensible social situations 
meaningful, to so construe them as to make it 
possible to act purposefully within them, that accounts 
both for the ideolgies' highly figurative nature 
and for the intensity with which, once accepted, 
they are held. As metaphor extends language by 
broadening its semantic range, enabling it to 
express meanings it cannot or at least cannot yet 
express literally, so the head-on clash of literal 
meanings in ideology -- the irony, the hyperbole, 
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the overdrawn antithesis -- provides novel symbolic 
frames against which to match the myriad "unfamiliar 
somethings" that ... are produced by a transforma-
tion in political life. Whatever else ideologies 
may be -- projections of unacknowledged fears, 
disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions 
of group solidarity -- they are, most distinctively, 
maps of problematic social reality and matrices 
for the creation of collective conscience.9 
As such, ideology reflects the interpenetration of these 
"forms" of social movement. Ideology is a "symbolic frame" 
which provides a "map of social reality" and a series of 
structures by which a "collective conscience" {a superego) 
can be created. 
The implication of such an analysis can best be stated 
by Gary Bush and Serge Denisoff. Bush and Denisoff argue 
that movements of neither the Right nor the Left have been 
viable when the other was ascendant. The reason for such 
occurrences is that "the solutions they offered for social 
problems were not historically significant. Quite simply, 
social significance is bestowed on those ideologies {and 
the groups espousing them) which provide a viable solution 
to the problems about which publics are concerned. 1110 
Admittedly, all this can ultimately be reduced to symbols, 
or metaphor, but to do so distorts the nature of the inter-
action to such an extent that we are no longer examining the 
same phenomenon t~at we initially considered. Just as 
Cassirer posited that it was only through an understanding 
of each of the functional forms of culture that man could be 
understood, it is only through an understanding of the 
"forms" of social movements that we can understand their 
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emergence, their success or failure, and their 
consequences. 
The Moral Responsibility of Criticism 
If man can only be described by his work,by his creation, 
then he is ultimately creating his own essence. Abraham 
Kaplan writes: 
First, man is; and what he is is settled in the 
course of his existence and is not predetermined, 
not an antecedent condition of his existence. 
A man's existence is not exhausted by his exhibi-
ting a particular essence, by his being just a 
man of whatever kind he is. He is more than Just 
a type, a character defined by some role or other. 
The human being, in his every action,_ def 1.nes his 
own essence •... 
Now to conceive of man as the existent which deter-
mines its own essence is to recognize that the most 
fundamental attribute of the human being is his 
capacity for -Choice .•.• What makes us fully 
and distinctively human is not choosing between 
willing good on the one hand and willing evil on 
the other, but consists rather JUSt in choosing 
to will. It consists in1 the bare fact that we genuinely make a choice. 
Man does have choice; and no matter how constrained his 
freedom of selection among alternative becomes, he has the 
ultimate choice of "No." In examining the Sartrian notion of 
freedom, William Barrett writes that "where all the avenues 
of action are blocked for a man, this freedom may seem a tiny 
and unimportant thing; but it is in fact total and absolute, 
and Sartre is right to insist upon it as such, for it affords 
man his final dignity, that of being man. 1112 
The element of choice for man also becomes apparent in 
the joining or not joining of the social movement, and the 
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similarities of Sartre and Kenneth Burke, including those 
who borrow from him, are readily apparent: "Movements 
begin when some pivotal individual or group -- suffering 
attitudes of alienation in a given social system, and drawn 
(consciously or unconsciously) by the impious dream of a mythic 
Order -- enacts, gives voice to, a No. 1113 But the creation 
of the No, which at the same time is a Yes to an alternative 
again demonstrating the inherent dialectical nature of 
language, is in fact a choice of man; and so, too, is his 
choice of the reality which he creates symbolically. If 
man is influenced by the symbolic world which surrounds him, 
he still retains the capacity for rejecting it. And if he 
does, he is choosing an alternative reality -- it becomes 
a symbolic creation of man's own artifact. 
The mere "choosing," however, is not he all; for in 
the choosing there must exist a moral responsibility. Again, 
Kaplan: 
But man's freedom is also inseparably linked with 
responsibility. The significance of a choice is 
not exhausted by the act of choosing, but extends 
also to what is chosen: It lies, that is, in the 
consequences of the act and not just in the act 
itself. Responsibility is only the measure of 
the farthest reaches of freedom. In the existen-
tialist account, each man is plainly responsible, 
to start with, for his own individuality. What 
we are, each of us, is determined by one thing 
and by one thing only -- ourselves. The limitless 
freedom of choice in which man's existence consists 
is thus at the same time a boundless responsibility 
for what he makes of himself . 
. . . we are responsible for more than what becomes 
of us; we are also responsible for what becomes of 
others. When we make a choice we are choosing, 
not merely for ourselves, but for all men .... 
It is my choice that makes me human, and thereby 
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it makes something of humanity. My individuality 
is constituted by my choice and does not stand 
antecedent to it. In the choice itself I am 
acting as a representative of mankind ... [We 
must, then, adopt] ... the Kantian categorical 
imperative: You must never will what you cannot 
consistently wi114should be willed by all other rational beings. 
If we perceive of every act, regardless of how apparently 
insignificant, as having,consequences which affect others, 
then each act becomes fused with moral choice. Even though 
we have equated value-oriented movements with what are 
usually considered moral issues in this study, to some 
degree the moral element is present in all choices. 
Just as the principle of the hierarchy is present in all 
elements of it even though it receives its ultimate and 
clearest expression at the pinnacle, so too with morality 
of choice. To commit the ultimate moral act and deprive one 
of his freedom or life is without question fused with the 
issue; but, to a lesser degree, so is the act of saying no 
to some social order or even of maintaining an attitude, an 
incipient act, about such an order. At every turn the 
moral concern is pervasively present. To argue further, as 
we have done, however, that the symbolic forms which we use to 
create our reality and that of our "listeners" is to assume 
a moral obligation. For as Richard Vatz has maintained, 
"To view rhetoric as a creation of reality or salience 
rather than a reflector of reality increases the rhetor's 
moral responsibility. We do not just have the academic 
exercise of determining whether the rhetor understood the 
'situation' correctly. 11 15 But we must recognize the potential 
consequences of his act and Judge it accordingly. 
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Arthur Kruger has written that "Argumentum ad baculum, 
or the appeal to force or threats, is often available and 
quite persuasive." But because of his philosophic prefer-
ence for a rhetoric composed of "good reasons" Kruger finds 
no justification for the study of such methods: 
.•• even if we grant that closely reasoned argu-
ments are ineffective, is it educationally defen-
sible to teach the doctrine that in influencing 
others, "valid arguments," per se, are not enough? 
If we look closely at these so-called "extra-
logical" appeals, we find that none of them can 
be justified from the standpoint £t either respon-
sible teaching, logic, or ethics. 
Kruger may represent his ethical position very well, but it 
appears to leave modern man in a lurch. There is much talk 
about "relevance" -- about the value of criticism to the 
"real"world in which man functions. The common complaint 
is that rhetorical criticism does not help the man who must 
make choices in the social or political arena to make "more 
reasoned" choices. But Kruger will not help him. If, as we 
have claimed, the goal of criticism is to help man under-
stand himself, then we must examine all his creations, for 
it is by these creations that we have defined man. This 
means that we cannot pick and choose among those which we 
find personally pleasing; but rather that we must explain 
man in all his facets -- even those which we find deplorable. 
For it is only by understanding such creations that we can 
either avoid them or develop the means to change them. It is 
this function that the rhetorical critic can perform. 
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We, as critics, are then forced to concern ourselves 
with moral issues. We must interact with the creative 
episode we study in order to examine its consequences. 
While we must recognize the limitations of our studies 
in that, after all, we are not being "objective" and repo:i::ting 
just "fact" we may nevertheless take heart from our 
position so long as we remember our fundamental principle: 
that in choosing we are a representative of mankind, and 
make our choices and statements accordingly. If, in order 
to help man better understand himself, the critic is forced 
to make moral Judgments, he must at the same time recognize 
that his statement of criticism is itself a creative act, 
a symbolic construction of reality. The benefit of moralistic 
criticism is expressed by Parke G. Burgess: 
. critical assessment of symbolic action from 
an amoral view of generic categories alone runs the 
grave risk of missing the significance of the 
action. The risk of critical myopia would be 
greatest ... when moral motives are most vitally 
involved, generating exactly the kind of strategic 
distinctions to which an amoral critic is blind. 
No wonder his perspective produces critical 
commentary often superficial and bland next to 
moralistic outbursts, and no wonder that most 
concerned observers of moral conflict would 
prefer the latter. However subjective it may 
be, moralistic commentary at least confronts 
motives and discriminations vital and signifi-
cant in moralistic rhetorical elements.17 
Just as we emphasized the importance of the voluntary 
nature of movement membership, in that each member made a 
choice and hence shared responsibility for the actions of 
the movement, so too must the critic confront the moral 
choices made by the rhetoric of social movement as well as 
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the choice, and moral implications, of his symbolic construc-
tion of that movement through his criticism. 
The value of such criticism is apparent in Kenneth; 
Burke's "Rhetoric of 'Hitler's Battle.'" The potential 
warning, the threat of the exorcism of Hitler's Jewish 
"devil" arrived in the criticism of Mein Kampf before the 
Final Solution was expressed or implemented in Germany. 
The warning was there, and the refusal or failure of the 
non-Germanic nations to respond to the plight of the Jews is 
a moral blight that must be confronted eternally. It is the 
responsibility of the critic to discern such principles; 
and it can be done by the rhetorical critic. He must 
recognize that, in the America of the Seventies, '"crowd 
control' may mean splitting open the heads of bystanders; 
a 'looter' may in fact be an ordinary ghetto resident ••• 
trying to get off the street. By invoking the concept of 
'looter,' however, public officials can conJure the picture 
of heinous crime, can sidestep the normal penalty structure 
of the criminal law, call for the use of deadly force, and 
be applauded for a firm stand on 'law and order. 11118 It is 
the responsibility of the critic to study, to explain this 
to himself and to his fellow man. At the same time, he must 
study the implications of 11 pig, 11 "establishment," and "up 
against the wall." 
Social movements are vital to modern societies, 
particularly to those societies which are relatively open 
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open for the expression of dissent. Such movements must 
be studied, not only because they help man better understand 
qua understanding, but also for the more pragmatic reasons 
that the consequences of movements and responses to them 
have vital ramifications to the type and functions of 
institutions in society, and in man's relation to them. 
William Barrett concludes his chapter in Irrational 
Man on Sartre: 
It may be that, as the modern world moves on, 
the Sartrian kind of freedom will be more and 
more the only kind man can experience. As 
society becomes more totalitarian, the islands 
of freedom get smaller and more cut off from the 
mainland and from each other -- which is to say 
from any spontaneous interchange with nature or 
the community of other human beings. Sartre's 
Orestes says to his celestial oppressor, "I am a 
man, Jupiter." One imagines the last Resistant 
of the last Resistance saying No in a prison cell 
in the Lubianka; saying No without any motive of 
self-advantage and without any hope that future 
humans will take up his cause, but saying No 
nonetheless simply because he is a man and his 
liberty cannot be taken from him. This last 
man would exist in a night darker than that into 
which the great Descartes cast himself, in that 
historic inn in Holland, when he paused to 
think and said No to the demon.19 
So long as man says No, the potential for social movements 
exists; and as a creation of man, they must be studied. 
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